[PDF] Withdrawal From Multilateral Treaties eBook

Author : Antonio Morelli
Publisher : BRILL
Page : 291 pages
File Size : 40,19 MB
Release : 2021-10-05
Category : Law
ISBN : 9004467645

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Withdrawal from Multilateral Treaties is the first comprehensive and systematic legal analysis of withdrawal. It examines the political and legal framework around treaty making to explain how withdrawal evolved over time and suggests ways to improve conditions for orderly withdrawal.

Author : Frederick Cowell
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing
Page : 325 pages
File Size : 22,78 MB
Release : 2023-11-16
Category : Law
ISBN : 1509938575

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This book explores how the law of treaty withdrawal operates. Many commentators have observed a wider sense of crisis in international law as governments of different ideological stripes withdraw or threaten to withdraw from international organisations and treaties. There are different political forces behind all of these cases, but they all use the same basic device in international law – a treaty withdrawal clause. This book focuses on withdrawal clauses within multilateral treaties, providing a detailed overview of their operation, drawing on a range of case studies including Brexit, nuclear weapons treaties and investment arbitration agreements. The obligations a withdrawal clause places on a withdrawing state help regulate the withdrawal process, providing a notional form of stability. Using insights from international relations theory and legal theory, this book unpacks how and why the law of withdrawal operates and what its limitations are.

Author : Antonio Morelli
Publisher :
Page : 351 pages
File Size : 17,83 MB
Release : 2019
Category : International cooperation
ISBN : 9781085586306

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The dissertation explores the current phenomenon of high profile withdrawal from multilateral agreements, understanding and enhancing commitment to multilateralism under the lens of international law and global governance.Withdrawals from multilateral treaties have unleashed a new period of upheaval in the world order. We are living in a time where counties are making high-profile withdrawals from multilateral agreements. Brexit, the Paris Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and many others suggest a trend of countries disengaging from international cooperation as domestic conditions change. In the age of withdrawal, is there still any room for international law to regulate the rules of the game or will ex post facto decisions overturn the current architecture of a multilateral global order? The author aims to create a map for the phenomenon of withdrawal, in order to understand the reasons and the consequences of this emerging trend in foreign policy. Pictured in its socio-political milieu, withdrawal represents a way to reestablish the status quo in the world order, as it was ex ante globalization. The dissertation looks at the factors that give rise to long-term commitments and techniques to manage the risk of withdrawal. Based on quantitative and qualitative studies, it shed lights on the reasons that lead countries to exit, and identifies the conditions necessary to maintain commitment. Grounded on the principle pacta sunt servanda, the analysis demonstrates how States' commitment vis-a-vis ex post facto decisions can make international law still matter.

Author : Mark Eugen Villiger
Publisher : BRILL
Page : 1093 pages
File Size : 15,7 MB
Release : 2009
Category : Law
ISBN : 9004168044

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The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, regulating treaties between States, lies at the heart of international law. This commentary interprets the Conventiona (TM)s 85 articles clearly and precisely. It covers such major topics as reservations to treaties, their interpretation and the grounds for terminating a treaty, for instance breach. Emphasis is placed on the practice of States and tribunals and on academic writings. It contains further sections on customary international law and the Conventiona (TM)s history while providing up-to-date information on ratifications and reservations. This commentary is a must for practitioners and academics wishing to establish the meaning and scope of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Author : Congressional Service
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 34 pages
File Size : 35,60 MB
Release : 2018-06-02
Category :
ISBN : 9781720604129

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The legal procedure through which the United States withdraws from treaties and other international agreements has been the subject of long-standing debate between the legislative and executive branches. Recently, questions concerning the role of Congress in the withdrawal process have arisen in response to President Donald J. Trump's actions related to certain high-profile international commitments. This report outlines the legal framework for withdrawal from international agreements under domestic and international law, and it applies that framework to two pacts that may be of significance to the 115th Congress: the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iran's nuclear program. Although the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the Executive has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated. Moreover, not all agreements between the United States and foreign nations take the form of Senate-approved, ratified treaties. The President also enters into executive agreements, which do not receive the Senate's advice and consent, and "political commitments" that are not binding under domestic or international law. The legal procedure for withdrawal often depends on the type of agreement at issue, and the process may be further complicated when Congress has enacted legislation to give the international agreement domestic legal effect. On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement-a multilateral, international agreement intended to reduce the effects of climate change. Historical practice suggests that, because the Obama Administration considered the Paris Agreement to be an executive agreement that did not require the Senate's advice and consent, the President potentially may claim authority to withdraw without seeking approval from the legislative branch. By its terms, however, the Paris Agreement does not allow parties to complete the withdrawal process until November 2020, and Trump Administration officials have stated that the Administration intends to follow the multiyear withdrawal procedure. Consequently, absent additional action by the Trump Administration, the United States will remain a party to the Paris Agreement until November 2020, albeit one that has announced its intent to withdraw once it is eligible to do so. The Trump Administration has not withdrawn the United States from the JCPOA, but the President has stated he intends do so unless the plan of action is renegotiated. When the Obama Administration concluded the JCPOA, it treated the plan of action as a non-binding political commitment. To the extent this understanding is correct, President Trump's ability to withdraw from the JCPOA would not be restricted by international or domestic law. However, some observers have suggested that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 subsequently converted at least some provisions in the JCPOA into obligations that are binding under international law. As a result, withdrawal from the JCPOA could implicate a complex debate over the plan of action's status in international law. As a matter of domestic law, the President and Congress have authority to reassert sanctions lifted pursuant to U.S. pledges made in the JCPOA if they deem the reinstitution of such sanctions to be appropriate, even if such action resulted in a violation of international law. Several possible domestic legal avenues exist to re-impose sanctions, some of which would involve joint action by the President and the legislative branch, and others that would involve decisions made by the President alone.

Author : Paul A. Eden
Publisher :
Page : 31 pages
File Size : 26,71 MB
Release : 2018
Category :
ISBN :

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This paper considers whether the United Kingdom's notification under Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017 can be unilaterally revoked. The article also considers the right of states to revoke of unilateral notifications of withdrawal from multilateral treaties more generally due to the fact that the United Kingdom's right to withdraw its Article 50 TEU notification is (at least in part) dependent on an applicable right of withdrawal in customary international law.The paper addresses the applicability of Article 68 the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to the Article 50 TEU unilateral revocation debate paying particular attention to the drafting history of the article as well as the arguments for and against the customary status of any right of unilateral revocation of instruments of withdrawal from multilateral treaties. The article also examines whether Article 50 TEU, by express words or necessary implication, excludes the operation of any alleged customary right to unilaterally revoke an instrument of withdrawal before it takes effect.

Author : Jill Barrett
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 533 pages
File Size : 12,26 MB
Release : 2020-03-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1107111900

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Aims to provide a useful analytical tool and practical guidance on good treaty practice. It will be of interest to those working with treaties and treaty procedures in governments, international organisations, and legal practice, as well as legal academics and students wishing to gain insight into the realities of treaty practice.

Author : Olivier Corten
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
Page : 2171 pages
File Size : 48,11 MB
Release : 2011
Category : Law
ISBN : 0199546649

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The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties are essential components of the international legal order. This is the first Commentary on their provisions, containing thorough and well-structured analyses of each of their Articles. It draws on preparatory works and practice and is written by a large collection of experts from the field

Author : Bree Laura Bang-Jensen
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 38,5 MB
Release : 2022
Category :
ISBN :

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What leads states to exit from treaties? Is treaty exit simply a reversal of the conditions that lead states to commit to a treaty? What factors increase the likelihood a state will withdraw from a treaty and what treaties are they most likely to leave? In this dissertation, I identify broad patterns in state withdrawal from international agreements and theorize that there are two distinct patterns of exit, pragmatic and principled. State proclivity to engage in either pattern of exit is influenced by the interaction of state specific factors, such as diffuse political trust, and treaty legalization. I test this theory through case studies, elite interviews, analysis of speeches and press statements, supervised machine learning with treaty text as data, survival models, and regressions. I begin in Chapter 2 by defining treaty exit and the conditions under which is it allowed. I briefly discuss two legal controversies, whether there is an inherent right to withdraw from a treaty regardless if it is explicit in treaty exit, and which actors within the state have the authority to initiate withdrawal. I then share data on patterns of treaty exit I compiled from the UN Treaty Archive, which contains all publicly registered treaties between 1919-2019. I identify over 4,800 treaty withdrawals, and find that treaty exit peaks during times of global transition, such as decolonization and the end of the Cold War. States withdraw from economic, labor, and environmental treaties more frequently than they exit security agreements and agreements which govern physical integrity rights. Somewhat counter intuitively, I discover that the states most prone to exiting treaties, even as a fraction of total treaty participation, are often the states most invested in global cooperation, such as Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan.Even controlling for total treaty participation and thus the opportunity to exit, European states (and former British settler colonies) leave treaties at higher rates than countries in other regions. In Chapter 3, I examine how our understanding of treaty commitment, compliance, and backlash may inform our perceptions of exit. I theorize that treaty exit is the product of three things: a change related to the treaty, as highlighted by the quote above, the degree to which the treaty is legalized, and state leader beliefs about the source of the legitimacy of international law, which stem from state political trust. I identify two primary distinct patterns of exit, principled and pragmatic. In principled exits, states withdraw from treaties to contest the norms enshrined in the treaty and are not influenced by the likelihood of enforcement under the treaty. In pragmatic exits, the state leaves because they would face a consequence under the treaty for current or future violation. I then hypothesize about how the interaction between political trust and treaty design may lead to patterns of principled or pragmatic exit. I begin the examination of the role of treaty-level factors, specifically legalization, in Chapter 4. I identify hallmarks of precision, delegation, obligation and flexibility in international treaties. I then use supervised machine learning to label a large corpus of treaties based on the presence of each element of legalization. I find that delegation and precision significantly increase the likelihood of treaty exit, while obligation, especially the presence of dispute resolution mechanisms, may lower it. I briefly examine how legalization may influence exit risk in more detail through examining withdrawal from treaties governing the death penalty, and the denunciation of ILO conventions related to child labor. After this exploration of the role of treaty-level factors in exit, I examine state-level factors, specifically domestic political trust, in Chapter 5. I theorize that states with high levels of domestic trust are more likely to engage in principled exit but are less likely to engage in pragmatic exit. On the other hand, states with low trust are less likely to engage in principled exit and more likely to carry out pragmatic exit. I test this theory aided by Euro-barometer data from 1999-2019, given that Euro-barometer questions on trust during this period are more widely asked and more consistent than trust data collected from other regions. I find support for the hypothesis that domestic political trust is associated with treaty exit. High political trust decreases the likelihood of pragmatic exit while increasing principled exit. I then turn from my discussion of treaty and state level factors to an examination of the patterns of principled and pragmatic exit, which integrates these factors. In Chapter 6, I explore principled exit through the case of state withdrawal from early 20th century ILO conventions which sought to restrict women's equal opportunity at work under the guise of special protection. Using survival models, I find that states with strong women's and workers rights are more likely to exit these agreements than their counterparts with weaker rights, suggesting that these denunciations are driven by state conflict with the normative content of these agreements. I then use 42 semi-structured interviews with ILO staff and delegates to better understand the logic behind the denunciation of these agreements. Finally, in Chapter 7, I study patterns of pragmatic exit by contrasting Burundi's exit from the Rome Statute with South Africa's threatened withdrawal with the help of interviews, press releases, general assembly speeches, and statements made at the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC.I find that in both cases, a precipitating event occurred that increased conflict between the state and the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, for Burundi, the precision of the Rome Statute, as well as the delegated authority to the UNSC, created irreconcilable tension that led to exit. In contrast, after deciding to remain in the treaty, South Africa plans to use the dispute resolution provision within the treaty to ask the ICJ to clarify the conflict between obligations under the Rome Statute and customary international law.