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Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition's task more difficult?
Research brief summarizes an analysis of information derived from interviews with former senior Iraqi officials to determine factors contributing to the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance to the Coalition invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003.
Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration's conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers -- criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups -- were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons, including the danger that the imperatives of "force protection" may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.
A new account of modern Iraqi politics that overturns the conventional wisdom about its sectarian divisions How did Iraq become one of the most repressive dictatorships of the late twentieth century? The conventional wisdom about Iraq's modern political history is that the country was doomed by its diverse social fabric. But in State of Repression, Lisa Blaydes challenges this belief by showing that the country's breakdown was far from inevitable. At the same time, she offers a new way of understanding the behavior of other authoritarian regimes and their populations. Drawing on archival material captured from the headquarters of Saddam Hussein's ruling Ba'th Party in the wake of the 2003 US invasion, Blaydes illuminates the complexities of political life in Iraq, including why certain Iraqis chose to collaborate with the regime while others worked to undermine it. She demonstrates that, despite the Ba'thist regime's pretensions to political hegemony, its frequent reliance on collective punishment of various groups reinforced and cemented identity divisions. At the same time, a series of costly external shocks to the economy—resulting from fluctuations in oil prices and Iraq's war with Iran—weakened the capacity of the regime to monitor, co-opt, coerce, and control factions of Iraqi society. In addition to calling into question the common story of modern Iraqi politics, State of Repression offers a new explanation of why and how dictators repress their people in ways that can inadvertently strengthen regime opponents.
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 85/100, University of Malta, course: International Relations, language: English, abstract: The purpose of this research is to analyze and assess the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency that followed. The latter was a direct result of the Coalition’s inability to come to terms with the various complexities of the country. This paper will look into the Iraq war’s transformation from a conventional invasion, into an anti-occupation insurgency, as well as the Coalition’s progress with dealing with the insurgency from its outbreak in 2003 to the most recent developments in early 2008. I had chosen this particular topic because being a Maltese-American, anything that either country does in its foreign policy is of direct interest to me – not only as a student of International Relations, but also as a citizen. The issue of Iraq has long been on the front pages of newspapers, and the top stories on the news on television. No matter what medium of the media you access, news about the situation Iraq is everywhere. I do not believe that one should simply sit back and watch the issues unfold with just as a means to pass the time, or worse, criticize without an ample knowledge of the facts. Rather, we should analyze and interpret the events that have occurred in Iraq and try to remedy the situation by evaluating every possible option to achieve stability in the country. The term ‘fighting the flea’ derives from a book written by Robert Taber, an investigative journalist, after witnessing first-hand Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries wage a successful insurgency against the Batista government in the mid-1950’s and effectively take over the country.
Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.
The Gulf War of 1991 heralded a new type of warfare that was characterised by astonishing speed and high technology with remarkably low numbers of casualties amongst the coalition forces. Just under a million coalition personnel were deployed to the Gulf region to face a variety of threats from extreme temperatures to weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and suspected nuclear) and a formidable Iraqi occupation force. This book assesses the defensive Operation Desert Shield (the build up of coalition forces) and the offensive Operation Desert Storm (the liberation of Kuwait) as well as the key personalities on both sides.
Personal account by the U.S. Air Force general who planned and executed 1991 Persian Gulf War with emphasis on use of technology and new strategies as they apply to modern warfare.