[PDF] What Determines Institutional Arrangements For Macroprudential Policy eBook

What Determines Institutional Arrangements For Macroprudential Policy Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of What Determines Institutional Arrangements For Macroprudential Policy book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.

Macroprudential Policy - An Organizing Framework - Background Paper

Author : International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 33 pages
File Size : 33,55 MB
Release : 2011-03-14
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1498339174

GET BOOK

MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.

Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks

Author : Erlend Nier
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 53 pages
File Size : 43,15 MB
Release : 2011-11-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1463923325

GET BOOK

A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.

Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy

Author : International Monetary Fund
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 45 pages
File Size : 19,90 MB
Release : 2014-06-11
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1498342620

GET BOOK

This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries

Institutional Arrangements for Macroprudential Policy in Asia

Author : Cheng Hoon Lim
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 22 pages
File Size : 46,33 MB
Release : 2013-07-17
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1484338367

GET BOOK

This paper surveys institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy in Asia. Central banks in Asia typically have a financial stability mandate, and play a key role in the macroprudential framework. Smaller and more open economies with prudential regulation inside the central bank tend to have institutional arrangements that give the central bank a leading role. In larger and more complex economies where prudential regulation is outside the central bank, the financial stability mandate is usually shared with other agencies and the government tends to play a leading role. Domestic policy coordination is typically performed by a financial stability committee/other coordination body while cross-border cooperation is largely governed by Memoranda of Understanding.

Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy - Background Paper

Author : International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 64 pages
File Size : 18,90 MB
Release : 2013-10-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1498341713

GET BOOK

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

Institutional Models for Macroprudential Policy

Author : Erlend Nier
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 26 pages
File Size : 47,27 MB
Release : 2011-11-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1463926537

GET BOOK

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

The Macroprudential Framework

Author : Cheng Hoon Lim
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 40 pages
File Size : 47,1 MB
Release : 2013-07-17
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1484377818

GET BOOK

This paper gauges if, and how, institutional arrangements are correlated with the use of macroprudential policy instruments. Using data from 39 countries, the paper evaluates policy response time in various types of institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy and finds that the macroprudential framework that gives the central bank an important role is associated with more timely use of macroprudential policy instruments. Policymakers may also tend to use macroprudential instruments more quickly if the ability to conduct monetary policy is somehow constrained. This finding points to the importance of coordination between macroprudential and monetary policy.

Central Bank Policy

Author : Perry Warjiyo
Publisher : Emerald Group Publishing
Page : 592 pages
File Size : 39,90 MB
Release : 2019-07-25
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1789737516

GET BOOK

Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice analyses various policies, theories and practices adopted by central banks, as well as the institutional arrangements underlying the principles of good governance in policy-making. It is the first book to comprehensively discuss the latest theories and practices of central bank policy.

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation

Author : Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 27 pages
File Size : 31,67 MB
Release : 2012-04-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1475502915

GET BOOK

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.