[PDF] Two Essays On Spatial Competition eBook

Author : Robert D. Dietz
Publisher :
Page : pages
File Size : 26,75 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Intergovernmental fiscal relations
ISBN :

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Abstract: This dissertation contributes to the study of the economics of strategic interactions through the examination of four distinct but thematically related investigations of spatial competition, conflict and cooperation. A spatial accounting, whether conceptualized as local interactions, neighborhood effects, externalities, or other locally defined phenomena, increases the detail used to examine the decisions of economic agents. The first essay examines the theoretical conditions in which spheres of influence form in games of spatial conflict. The term sphere of influence is defined for nation-state competition. Spheres of influence form in non-cooperative games of strategic complements if the contact between the rivals is repeated in both spatial and temporal contexts. The constraints on global cooperation are eased by the ability to form spheres, which allow the nation-states to avoid exhaustive conflict within individual spatial competitions. Employing this sphere of influence model, the second essay develops a theory of cooperative tax strategies to reexamine the problem of local tax competition. Cooperative tax polices assume the form of either uniform or differentiated taxation on local capital. Contrary to previous findings, differentiated taxation of capital may generate higher community welfare, as well as increased resistance to defection from cooperative policy regimes. A spatial econometric examination of state-level local taxation is consistent with these theoretical propositions. The third essay examines another form of spatial competition: defense spending by nation-states. Two theoretical models are developed in this paper: a two-period dyadic rivalry model and an alliance and hegemonic defense provision model. Spatial econometric testing of the model indicates evidence for U.S. hegemonic behavior, but an underlying rivalry in defense expenditure and armed forces for all other nation-states. The final essay also employs the sphere of influence model to study the lack of competitive elections for the U.S. Congress. So-called sweetheart gerrymandering is demonstrated to be the result of bipartisan efforts to allocate voters by political preferences in order to reduce electoral competition within congressional districts. The adoption of these strategies increases the number of party loyalists, reduces bipartisan legislative coalitions, increases the risk associated with the legislative process, but does not change the expected legislative output of Congress.

Author : Vera Magin
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 156 pages
File Size : 10,94 MB
Release : 2007-12-27
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3835092774

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In her first essay Vera Magin uses primary experimental data to explore the effects of information on marketing decisions, performance, and competition. In the second essay she discusses several approaches to measure product differentiation in spatial contexts.

Author : Bertrand Ottino-Loffler
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 21,20 MB
Release : 2017
Category :
ISBN :

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We generalize Hotelling's model of spatial competition with more than two firms in a two-dimensional space. Firms choose both price and location to maximize profits. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold in general. Local duopolies emerge from the interaction between firms. Firms do not spread uniformly across the two-dimensional space, nor do they all charge the same price. Firms in more competitive locations charge lower prices. More product attributes produce more price competition.

Author : Sang-Yeob Lee
Publisher :
Page : 117 pages
File Size : 45,32 MB
Release : 2008
Category : Econometrics
ISBN :

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Abstract: The first essay explores the consequences of misspecified spatial interdependence structure in SAR models with a row-normalized weight matrix. I provide the analytical formulae for the asymptotic biases of the OLS estimator when a spatial weight matrix is over-specified, under-specified, or omitted in a simple linear regression model. I then design Monte Carlo experiments to study how a misspecified spatial weight matrix in the SAR model might impact the finite sample properties of the 2SLSE and MLE. The major finding is that an "over-specification" of the weight matrix causes less bias in 2SLSE and MLE as well as lower RMSE than an "under-specification." The results also strongly suggest that goodness of fit measures such as adjusted R-square and log-likelihood can serve as selection criteria for the choice of a spatial weight matrix. In the second essay, I consider the effectiveness of Wald, distance difference, minimum Chi-square, and gradient tests within GMM framework in selecting different specifications of spatial weights in SAR models. The two major results I obtain are (1) that for each of the five tests, GMM framework significantly improves the empirical power of the tests over 2SLS framework, and (2) that when performed in GMM framework, all five tests have suitable empirical size and power with similar performance outcomes. Finally, the third essay investigates the nature of competition in the retail gasoline market using a two year panel data of weekly prices for gas stations in San Diego County. I use IV methods to estimate several spatial autoregressive (SAR) models of stations' price reaction functions after specifying spatial weights based on distance between stations. By using the SAR model, I am able to identify that the brand of competing stations and their relative geographic proximity to the original station are important factors in explaining price variation across gasoline stations, as opposed to just the number of competing stations.

Author : James M. Enelow
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 266 pages
File Size : 12,57 MB
Release : 1990-06-29
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780521352840

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This volume brings together eight original essays designed to provide an overview of developments in spatial voting theory in the past ten years. The topics covered are: spatial competition with possible entry by new candidates; the "heresthetical" manipulation of vote outcomes; candidates with policy preferences; experimental testing of spatial models; probabilistic voting; voting on alternatives with predictive power; elections with more than two candidates under different election systems; and agenda-setting behavior in voting. Leading scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and other's work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.

Author : Harborne W. Stuart
Publisher :
Page : 20 pages
File Size : 26,74 MB
Release : 1997
Category :
ISBN :

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Two-stage, non-cooperative models of spatial competition usually assume that firms have price-setting power in the second stage of the game. This paper relaxes the price-setting assumption and replaces it with unrestricted bargaining. With unrestricted bargaining, a firm cannot capture more than its location-based, cost advantage. Further, there always exists an equilibrium in which firms choose socially efficient locations. These results do not depend on either the number of firms, the locations of the buyers, or the shape of the transportation-cost function.