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This book explores how the law of treaty withdrawal operates. Many commentators have observed a wider sense of crisis in international law as governments of different ideological stripes withdraw or threaten to withdraw from international organisations and treaties. There are different political forces behind all of these cases, but they all use the same basic device in international law a treaty withdrawal clause. This book focuses on withdrawal clauses within multilateral treaties, providing a detailed overview of their operation, drawing on a range of case studies including Brexit, nuclear weapons treaties and investment arbitration agreements. The obligations a withdrawal clause places on a withdrawing state help regulate the withdrawal process, providing a notional form of stability. Using insights from international relations theory and legal theory, this book unpacks how and why the law of withdrawal operates and what its limitations are.
This book explores how the law of treaty withdrawal operates. Many commentators have observed a wider sense of crisis in international law as governments of different ideological stripes withdraw or threaten to withdraw from international organisations and treaties. There are different political forces behind all of these cases, but they all use the same basic device in international law a treaty withdrawal clause. This book focuses on withdrawal clauses within multilateral treaties, providing a detailed overview of their operation, drawing on a range of case studies including Brexit, nuclear weapons treaties and investment arbitration agreements. The obligations a withdrawal clause places on a withdrawing state help regulate the withdrawal process, providing a notional form of stability. Using insights from international relations theory and legal theory, this book unpacks how and why the law of withdrawal operates and what its limitations are.
Withdrawal from Multilateral Treaties is the first comprehensive and systematic legal analysis of withdrawal. It examines the political and legal framework around treaty making to explain how withdrawal evolved over time and suggests ways to improve conditions for orderly withdrawal.
What leads states to exit from treaties? Is treaty exit simply a reversal of the conditions that lead states to commit to a treaty? What factors increase the likelihood a state will withdraw from a treaty and what treaties are they most likely to leave? In this dissertation, I identify broad patterns in state withdrawal from international agreements and theorize that there are two distinct patterns of exit, pragmatic and principled. State proclivity to engage in either pattern of exit is influenced by the interaction of state specific factors, such as diffuse political trust, and treaty legalization. I test this theory through case studies, elite interviews, analysis of speeches and press statements, supervised machine learning with treaty text as data, survival models, and regressions. I begin in Chapter 2 by defining treaty exit and the conditions under which is it allowed. I briefly discuss two legal controversies, whether there is an inherent right to withdraw from a treaty regardless if it is explicit in treaty exit, and which actors within the state have the authority to initiate withdrawal. I then share data on patterns of treaty exit I compiled from the UN Treaty Archive, which contains all publicly registered treaties between 1919-2019. I identify over 4,800 treaty withdrawals, and find that treaty exit peaks during times of global transition, such as decolonization and the end of the Cold War. States withdraw from economic, labor, and environmental treaties more frequently than they exit security agreements and agreements which govern physical integrity rights. Somewhat counter intuitively, I discover that the states most prone to exiting treaties, even as a fraction of total treaty participation, are often the states most invested in global cooperation, such as Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan.Even controlling for total treaty participation and thus the opportunity to exit, European states (and former British settler colonies) leave treaties at higher rates than countries in other regions. In Chapter 3, I examine how our understanding of treaty commitment, compliance, and backlash may inform our perceptions of exit. I theorize that treaty exit is the product of three things: a change related to the treaty, as highlighted by the quote above, the degree to which the treaty is legalized, and state leader beliefs about the source of the legitimacy of international law, which stem from state political trust. I identify two primary distinct patterns of exit, principled and pragmatic. In principled exits, states withdraw from treaties to contest the norms enshrined in the treaty and are not influenced by the likelihood of enforcement under the treaty. In pragmatic exits, the state leaves because they would face a consequence under the treaty for current or future violation. I then hypothesize about how the interaction between political trust and treaty design may lead to patterns of principled or pragmatic exit. I begin the examination of the role of treaty-level factors, specifically legalization, in Chapter 4. I identify hallmarks of precision, delegation, obligation and flexibility in international treaties. I then use supervised machine learning to label a large corpus of treaties based on the presence of each element of legalization. I find that delegation and precision significantly increase the likelihood of treaty exit, while obligation, especially the presence of dispute resolution mechanisms, may lower it. I briefly examine how legalization may influence exit risk in more detail through examining withdrawal from treaties governing the death penalty, and the denunciation of ILO conventions related to child labor. After this exploration of the role of treaty-level factors in exit, I examine state-level factors, specifically domestic political trust, in Chapter 5. I theorize that states with high levels of domestic trust are more likely to engage in principled exit but are less likely to engage in pragmatic exit. On the other hand, states with low trust are less likely to engage in principled exit and more likely to carry out pragmatic exit. I test this theory aided by Euro-barometer data from 1999-2019, given that Euro-barometer questions on trust during this period are more widely asked and more consistent than trust data collected from other regions. I find support for the hypothesis that domestic political trust is associated with treaty exit. High political trust decreases the likelihood of pragmatic exit while increasing principled exit. I then turn from my discussion of treaty and state level factors to an examination of the patterns of principled and pragmatic exit, which integrates these factors. In Chapter 6, I explore principled exit through the case of state withdrawal from early 20th century ILO conventions which sought to restrict women's equal opportunity at work under the guise of special protection. Using survival models, I find that states with strong women's and workers rights are more likely to exit these agreements than their counterparts with weaker rights, suggesting that these denunciations are driven by state conflict with the normative content of these agreements. I then use 42 semi-structured interviews with ILO staff and delegates to better understand the logic behind the denunciation of these agreements. Finally, in Chapter 7, I study patterns of pragmatic exit by contrasting Burundi's exit from the Rome Statute with South Africa's threatened withdrawal with the help of interviews, press releases, general assembly speeches, and statements made at the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC.I find that in both cases, a precipitating event occurred that increased conflict between the state and the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, for Burundi, the precision of the Rome Statute, as well as the delegated authority to the UNSC, created irreconcilable tension that led to exit. In contrast, after deciding to remain in the treaty, South Africa plans to use the dispute resolution provision within the treaty to ask the ICJ to clarify the conflict between obligations under the Rome Statute and customary international law.
This Oxford Handbook ambitiously seeks to lay the groundwork for the relatively new field of comparative foreign relations law. Comparative foreign relations law compares and contrasts how nations, and also supranational entities (for example, the European Union), structure their decisions about matters such as entering into and exiting from international agreements, engaging with international institutions, and using military force, as well as how they incorporate treaties and customary international law into their domestic legal systems. The legal materials that make up a nation's foreign relations law can include constitutional law, statutory law, administrative law, and judicial precedent, among other areas. This book consists of 46 chapters, written by leading authors from around the world. Some of the chapters are empirically focused, others are theoretical, and still others contain in-depth case studies. In addition to being an invaluable resource for scholars working in this area, the book should be of interest to a wide range of lawyers, judges, and law students. Foreign relations law issues are addressed regularly by lawyers working in foreign ministries, and globalization has meant that domestic judges, too, are increasingly confronted by them. In addition, private lawyers who work on matters that extend beyond their home countries often are required to navigate issues of foreign relations law. An increasing number of law school courses in comparative foreign relations law are also now being developed, making this volume an important resource for students as well. Comparative foreign relations law is a newly emerging field of study and teaching, and this volume is likely to become a key reference work as the field continues to develop.
The paradigm of state consent in the law of treaties is increasingly under attack. Which narratives on the treaty concept legitimize or delegitimize the challenges to the consensualist paradigm? Which areas of the law of treaties are more concerned by these attacks? What are the ensuing risks? From consent to be bound to treaty succession, and from treaty denunciation to reservations, this book offers a tour de force on the paradigm of state consent, its challenges, and their politics.
The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties are essential components of the international legal order. This is the first Commentary on their provisions, containing thorough and well-structured analyses of each of their Articles. It draws on preparatory works and practice and is written by a large collection of experts from the field
Giving an overview of the current state of the law and practice in relation to treaties, this edited work is an essential reference for practitioners and legal advisers involved in treaty negotiations or the interpretation of treaties. It also reflects on the current areas of disagreement or ambiguity.
Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.