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The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies

Author : Robert P. Gilles
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 264 pages
File Size : 40,21 MB
Release : 2010-04-02
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 3642052827

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The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.

Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory

Author : Marco Slikker
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 310 pages
File Size : 44,79 MB
Release : 2001-03-31
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0792372263

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Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation.

Cooperative Game Theory and Applications

Author : Imma Curiel
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 198 pages
File Size : 20,16 MB
Release : 2013-03-14
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 147574871X

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In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

Author : Bezalel Peleg
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 336 pages
File Size : 47,13 MB
Release : 2007-08-15
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3540729453

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This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

Author : Georgios Chalkiadakis
Publisher : Morgan & Claypool Publishers
Page : 171 pages
File Size : 43,15 MB
Release : 2012
Category : Computers
ISBN : 1608456528

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Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.

Cooperative Game Theory Tools in Coalitional Control Networks

Author : Francisco Javier Muros
Publisher : Springer
Page : 233 pages
File Size : 30,33 MB
Release : 2019-04-24
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 3030104893

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This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.

Value Solutions In Cooperative Games

Author : Roger A Mccain
Publisher : World Scientific
Page : 236 pages
File Size : 11,97 MB
Release : 2013-03-07
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9814417416

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This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

Game Theory in Communication Networks

Author : Josephina Antoniou
Publisher : CRC Press
Page : 150 pages
File Size : 37,50 MB
Release : 2012-08-06
Category : Computers
ISBN : 1439848106

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Focusing on heterogeneous networks, this book addresses important resource management and security issues found in networks and uses theoretical tools to model them. Although it explores network design and management from the perspective of game theory and graph theory, the text also provides practical solutions for each mechanism that needs improvement with a step-by-step approach. It also includes simulation code, so readers can use some or all of the proposed models for better network planning.

Models in Cooperative Game Theory

Author : Rodica Branzei
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 203 pages
File Size : 31,78 MB
Release : 2008-03-08
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 354077954X

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Cooperative game theory is a booming research area with many new developments in the last few years. So, our main purpose when prep- ing the second edition was to incorporate as much of these new dev- opments as possible without changing the structure of the book. First, this o?ered us the opportunity to enhance and expand the treatment of traditional cooperative games, called here crisp games, and, especially, that of multi-choice games, in the idea to make the three parts of the monograph more balanced. Second, we have used the opportunity of a secondeditiontoupdateandenlargethelistofreferencesregardingthe threemodels of cooperative games. Finally, we have bene?ted fromthis opportunity by removing typos and a few less important results from the ?rst edition of the book, and by slightly polishing the English style and the punctuation, for the sake of consistency along the monograph. The main changes are: (1) Chapter 3 contains an additional section, Section 3. 3, on the - erage lexicographic value, which is a recent one-point solution concept de?ned on the class of balanced crisp games. (2) Chapter 4 is new. It o?ers a brief overview on solution c- cepts for crisp games from the point of view of egalitarian criteria, and presents in Section 4. 2 a recent set-valued solution concept based on egalitarian considerations, namely the equal split-o? set. (3)Chapter5isbasicallyanenlargedversionofChapter4ofthe?rst edition because Section 5. 4 dealing with the relation between convex games and clan games with crisp coalitions is new.

From Hierarchies to Levels

Author : Mikel Alvarez-Mozos
Publisher :
Page : 49 pages
File Size : 44,46 MB
Release : 2015
Category :
ISBN :

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Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players' possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we propose three new solutions for games with hierarchical structure and characterize them by properties that relate a player's payoff to the payoffs of other players located in specific positions in the structure relative to that player. To define each of these solutions, we consider a certain mapping that transforms any hierarchical structure into a levels structure, and then we apply the standard generalization of the Shapley Value to the class of games with levels structure. The transformations that map the set of hierarchical structures to the set of levels structures are also studied from an axiomatic viewpoint by means of properties that relate a player's position in both types of structure.