[PDF] Sealed Bid Auctions With Ambiguity eBook

Author : Yan Chen
Publisher :
Page : 44 pages
File Size : 38,85 MB
Release : 2012
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This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown. In our experimental setting, in the first price auction, bids are lower in the presence of ambiguity. This result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes. We also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price auction with and without ambiguity.

Author : Martin G. Kocher
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 38,30 MB
Release : 2012
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We study experimentally the selection into first-price sealed-bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect. Transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller. Evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders. A control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes.

Author : Kin Chung Lo
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Page : 0 pages
File Size : 45,65 MB
Release : 1998
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Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141-153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model, it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.

Author : Serafin Grundl
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 25,32 MB
Release : 2013
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This paper studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design.

Author : Stefan Tobias Trautmann
Publisher : Rozenberg Publishers
Page : 199 pages
File Size : 15,60 MB
Release : 2008
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ISBN : 9036100917

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In most decisions we have to choose between options that involve some uncertainty about their outcomes and their effect on our well-being. Casual observation and carefully controlled studies suggest that, in making these decisions, we often deviate from the benchmark of expected income maximization. This should not come as a surprise. Our well-being is affected by many factors, and the outside observer does not know the importance of various dimensions of the outcome to the decision maker. Even if goals are well defined, it is far from obvious that we succeed in choosing what is best for us. The psychological literature has shown deviations from optimal behavior in simple decision tasks, and we may expect similar deviations to occur in more complex real life problems. In real life situations, however, experience and market interaction will help to restrain suboptimal behavior. This thesis examines deviations from expected income maximization in situations involving uncertainty. We focus on deviations generated by social factors.

Author : Timothy Mathews
Publisher :
Page : 22 pages
File Size : 19,3 MB
Release : 2009
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A single item is sold to two bidders by way of a sealed bid second price auction in which bids are restricted to a set of discrete values. Restricting attention to symmetric pure strategy behavior on the part of bidders, a unique equilibrium exists. When following these equilibrium strategies bidders may bid strictly above or below their valuation, implying that the item may be awarded to a bidder other than the high valuation bidder. In an auction with two acceptable bids, the expected revenue of the seller may be maximized by a high bid level not equal to the highest possible bidder valuation and may exceed the expected revenue from an analogous second price auction with continuous bidding (and no reserve price). With three acceptable bids, a revenue maximizing seller may choose unevenly spaced bids. With an arbitrary number of evenly spaced bids, as the number of acceptable bids is increased, the expected revenue of the seller and the probability of ex post inefficiency both may either increase or decrease.

Author : Mark Isaac
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 25,90 MB
Release : 2012
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This article uses laboratory data from a series of first-price (FP) and second-price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substantial amount of coincidence with theory. We observe systematic deviations from risk neutral bidding in FP auctions and show theoretically that these deviations are consistent with risk averse preferences. We find essentially no heterogeneity in bidding in SP auctions where risk preferences and the number of bidders do not affect the optimal bid, while in the FP auctions heterogeneity in bidding persists with experience. We find that heterogeneity in bidding in FP auctions is consistent with heterogeneity in risk preferences, the attempt to count the number of bidders in the auction, and bidder specific noise.

Author : Paulo Fagandini
Publisher :
Page : 21 pages
File Size : 33,4 MB
Release : 2019
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Computational methods are used to analyze bidding in first price sealed bid auctions for abroad range of realistic scenarios. Bidders valuations may have both common value and firm-specific components, and the accuracy of their estimates of the common value component may differ. In addition, we allow for a subset of “naive” bidders, defined as bidders who do not account for the Winners' Curse. Following Rothkopf (1969, 1980), Wilson (1984), and Compte and Postlewaite (2012), we obtain a constant Shading Factor that maximizes ex-ante expected profits. Our computations show that profit-maximizing shading is greatly impacted by asymmetries in the bidding population and, in particular, by the presence of naive bidders. Failing to account for the presence of naive bidders results in underbidding only in one case, when facing a single rival who is naive, and in overbidding in all other cases. Overbidding is particularly severe when the population of naive competitors is large.