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For this study, a group of Russian authors were commissioned to describe and assess the arms trade policies and practices of Russia under new domestic and international conditions. The contributors, drawn from the government, industry, and academic communities, offer a wide range of reports on the political, military, economic, and industrial implications of Russian arms transfers, as well as specific case studies of key bilateral arms transfer relationships.
Author : U. S. Military Publisher : Independently Published Page : 174 pages File Size : 10,26 MB Release : 2018-09-16 Category : History ISBN : 9781723745126
International arms sales are a useful tool in executing a country's economic and foreign policy strategy. As such, investigating the drivers behind these exports discloses a state's priorities. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russian arms sales have steadily increased in several geographic areas while Russo-American relations have gradually deteriorated. Therefore, as Putin seeks to foster global multi-polarity in order to challenge the American-dominated geopolitical world order, how is Russia conducting international arms sales and for what reasons? This thesis investigates Russian arms sales to China, India, and the Middle East in order to determine Putin's motives behind his export agenda. It focuses on analyzing the potential relationships of two main hypotheses: domestic economic factors and international political factors. This thesis argues that while Russian arms sales generated many domestic economic benefits, especially in the early years of Putin's presidency, international political factors provided the greater impetus behind Russia's export of military hardware. Specifically, Putin used arms sales to secure both influence and leverage with selected partners with the intent of developing a polycentric world, balancing the United States, and improving Russia's reputation as a great power. In conclusion, although Putin has achieved some gains from using arms exports as a foreign policy tool, the long-term benefits of his overall strategy are minimal. This thesis uses comparative case studies of three geopolitical regions as its backbone. East Asia, due to its geopolitical significance to the Russian Federation, is the initial region this study analyzes with China serving as the first case study. Russia shares a sizeable border with China, specifically the second longest border between Russia and any other country and the sixth longest border between any two countries in the world. Besides the tumultuous period during the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s, Russia and China have been strategic allies since the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Nationalist Party in 1949, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. China's rise as a regional power directly supports Putin's desire for polycentrism, otherwise understood as his belief in the "decline of the West and the rise of the rest." Given the recent economic sanctions and political hostilities between Russia and the West, China also serves as a natural geopolitical ally and economic outlet for Russian political and monetary capital. South Asia is also an important area in which to test hypotheses behind Russian foreign military sales. In this region, India is Russia's leading partner. Similar to China, India has been a long-time ally of both the Soviet Union and Russian Federation and is a part of the BRICS penta-state association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). More important to the context of this thesis, India has been the biggest importer of Russian arms since the fall of the USSR. India is also involved in a continual dispute with its neighbor Pakistan over the Kashmir and Jammu region. Such turmoil ensures that India will desire to maintain a capable and technologically advanced military. India's need to balance the growing Chinese influence in the region also requires the deterrence factor of a robust and advanced military. Therefore, it serves as another market open to Russian military sales. The Middle East provides the third and final case study of this thesis.
Russia has recently sold or transferred many military weapons or technologies to China. Russian state policy has also officially joined with China in a relationship described as a strategic cooperative partnership. Some Russian diplomats also say that there is virtually complete identity with China on all issues of Asian and global security. Dr. Stephen Blank examines this relationship carefully for what it reveals about both states' international security policies.
Eight prominent Russian experts contribute to this unique Russian-American analysis of the state of Russia's arms industry and national export controls, as well as the strategic implications of Russian arms sales to China and clients in the Middle East. Since the early 1990s, Russia's once colossal defense-industrial complex has been in upheaval. Parts of the arms industry have collapsed, and hopes for conversion from military to civilian production have proven largely illusory. An aggressive arms-sales policy--seen as a panacea--has also met with mixed results. At the same time, turmoil in domestic politics and in the reform process has limited and slowed much-needed changes in the industry's organization, operations, decisionmaking, and controls over the export of arms and sensitive technologies. The authors examine these and other issues posed by Russia's participation in the world arms trade, weigh the chances of Russian-American discord over arms exports to rogue states as well as the possibilities for arms cooperation; discuss the prospects for Russia's expanded participation in multilateral arms restraint and international norm-setting, and offer policy proposals. The book evolved from discussions of the Russian-American working group on conventional arms proliferation convened by the co-editors at the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center.
During the late 1980's the Soviet Union embarked on a major revision of its arms export policy. Grant aid recipients gradually disappeared from delivery ledgers while Moscow pursued inroads into high profit, traditionally Western-dominated markets. The newly founded Russian Federation completed this reorientation, and announced in January 1992 that future contracts would be paid in hard currency. It was expected that sales revenues would be sufficient to both finance the conversion of Russia's immense arms industry to commercial production, and help alleviate the domestic hardships caused by President Yeltsin's sweeping economic reforms. These plans were frustrated by early failures in Yeltsin's conversion programs, the poor performance of Russian arms when competing with Western technology, and the unexpectedly severe domestic impact of reform. In a succession of policy changes Moscow has attempted to revitalize its arms trade. Barter has returned as an acceptable medium of payment, and Russia has acquiesced to the building of major arms plants abroad. More crucial to U.S. interests, export controls have been loosened considerably. Today Russian-produced weapons are sold by factory and design bureau representatives, various government agencies, the military and even international marketers. Profit has supplanted politics as the primary sales determinant, opening the door to outcast regimes in Iran and China. Moreover, export restrictions on many weapons types have been abandoned; high tech, offensively capable arms now dominate Russian sales. Unchecked, this escalating trend promises to surpass the proliferation seen during the high water mark of Soviet internationalism.
The transfer of arms and military technology is one of the main instruments of Russia's security strategy in East Asia. This research report documents Russia's arms exports to these countries and examines the motivations behind its policies and decisions.
In August 2006, the U.S. Government imposed sanctions on Russian arms sellers and producers, Rosoboroneksport, Russia's main arms-selling agency, and Sukhoi, which manufactures aircraft, because of their arms sales to Iran. Although Russian observers believe that Washington did so because of these firms arms sales to Venezuela, these sales to such dangerous states oblige us to analyze the Russian defense export program and the structure of its defense industry. Until now, that industry would have collapsed without arms sales. Arms sales thus have become the main source of its revenue until the present and will play a key role in Russia's ongoing attempt to regenerate its armed forces while winning friends and influence abroad. Unfortunately, Russia appears to be aiming to win friends and influence strictly among anti-American states and cement an alliance or coalition among them. Moreover, Russi' s program of weapons exports reveals the inner workings of its defense industry and the relationship between state and society that is a fundamental driver of its foreign and defense policies. Since 1991, when the Russian Federation came into being, there have been few, if any, attempts to look at this sector of the economy and its relationship to the state, but the patterns revealed here are of the utmost importance for anyone wishing to come to terms with current Russian foreign and defense policies. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to present this monograph on a salient issue in international security.