[PDF] Rules Discretion And Central Bank Independence eBook

Author : Jan Kleineman
Publisher : BRILL
Page : 238 pages
File Size : 12,15 MB
Release : 2021-10-18
Category : Law
ISBN : 9004481303

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In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.

Author : Paul Tucker
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 662 pages
File Size : 21,91 MB
Release : 2019-09-10
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0691196303

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Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.

Author : Christopher Adolph
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 389 pages
File Size : 39,33 MB
Release : 2013-04-15
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1139620533

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Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Author : Francesco Lippi
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
Page : 180 pages
File Size : 46,66 MB
Release : 1999-01-27
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9781782542971

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This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.

Author : Eric Schaling
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
Page : 288 pages
File Size : 43,65 MB
Release : 1995
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :

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Central bank independence is a key issue for political and monetary authorities in many countries. In this text, the author looks at the impact of different central banks on price stability and macroeconomic performance, and their optimal degree of legislative independence.

Author : Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 27 pages
File Size : 46,96 MB
Release : 2012-04-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1475502915

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We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.