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This paper uses a newly constructed revenue dataset of 35 resource-rich countries for the period 1992-2009 to analyze the impact of expanding resource revenues on different types of domestic (non resource) tax revenues. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between resource revenues and total domestic (non resource) revenues, including for the major tax components. For each additional percentage point of GDP in resource revenues, there is a reduction in domestic (non resource) revenues of about 0.3 percentage points of GDP. We find this primarily occurs through reduced effort on taxes on goods and services—in particular, the VAT— followed by a smaller negative impact on corporate income and trade taxes.
Conventional wisdom has it that natural resource dependence is associated with increased vulnerability to external shocks emanating from sudden supply and demand changes in the global economy. This paper explores to what extent government revenue in low- and middle-income countries is affected by different kinds of shocks and whether these effects are different for resource-rich as compared to non-resource-rich countries. Based on data from 176 countries between 1980-2010, we measure the elasticity of tax revenue in resource-rich countries with respect to two kinds of shocks: exchange rate pressure and terms of trade shocks. We find that government revenue in resource-rich countries is more volatile, but not necessarily more vulnerable, in particular with regard to terms of trade shocks. Poorer resource-rich countries are more vulnerable than their higher-income counterparts. Vulnerability in resource-rich countries has significantly decreased in the 2000s as compared to previous decades. Introducing institutional variables such as political regime type or bureaucratic quality we find that the general institutional characteristics of a country may not always reflect the quality of its management of natural resources. Still, results provide some support to those arguments that stress the relevance of good governance in the context of the so-called “resource curse”
Public policies in taxation and revenue management are key to ensuring natural resource wealth results in economic development. Tax policy and systems should ensure that whenever natural resources are extracted, the host state receives a fair share of revenue. Revenue management policies are required to ensure that government revenues from natural resources are wisely used to finance sustainable economic development. This Economic Paper analyses key issues in natural resource taxation and revenue management and recommends policies that can improve countries’ economic performance. The discussion draws on economic theory, empirical evidence and the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
The recent development literature stresses that countries that receive large revenues from natural resource endowments typically raise less revenue from domestic taxation, and that this creates governance problems because the lower domestic tax effort reduces the incentive for the public scrutiny of government. Our results from a panel of 30 hydrocarbon producing countries indicate that the offset between hydrocarbon revenues and revenues from other domestic sources is about 20 percent but that it is invariant to governance indicators.
Some scholars have argued that direct distribution of natural resource revenues to the population would help resource-rich countries escape the “resource curse.” This discussion note analyzes whether this proposal is a viable policy alternative for resource-rich countries. The first priority for policymakers is to establish fiscal policy objectives to support macroeconomic stability and development objectives. In this regard, the establishment of an adequate fiscal framework that informs decisions on how much to save and invest, or how to smooth out revenue volatility, and deal with exhaustibility issues should precede any discussion of direct distribution of resource wealth to the population.
Public policies in taxation and revenue management are key to ensuring natural resource wealth results in economic development. Tax policy and systems should ensure that whenever natural resources are extracted, the host state receives a fair share of revenue. Revenue management policies are required to ensure that government revenues from natural resources are wiselyused to finance sustainable economic development.This Economic Paper analyses key issues in natural resource taxation and revenue management and recommends policies that can improve countries' economic performance. The discussion draws on economic theory, empirical evidence and the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Sovereign Wealth Funds have become increasingly powerful and influential investors. Their increasing role, and unusual character as both political and market actors, raise a number of issues with regard to finance, politics, regulation, and international business. This handbook draws together the growing but fragmented research on SWFs.
While natural resource revenues ought to enable development, past experiences with the "Paradox of Plenty" have shown that mineral and oil wealth often represents a curse rather than a blessing, inducing slower growth and higher levels of poverty. Many resource rich countries have high poverty rates and are among recipients of international aid. This paper looks at how lessons from successful resource rich countries can provide lessons for resource management. It also considers how international donors can act to facilitate such processes. Norway and Chile are small open economies with high concentration in petroleum and copper, respectively. Yet the interaction between good institutions and fiscal policy, facilitated by the use of resource funds, has allowed both countries to largely escape the resource curse. Both countries have prioritised institutional development before engaging in heavy resource extraction. Maintaining a broad tax base, developing linkages to the rest of the economy, investing in human capital, and engaging in political consensus-building have helped retain incentives that limit rent-seeking. Many countries facing high inflows of natural resource rents also have weak institutions. For these countries, strengthening institutions through developing the skill and efficiency of civil servants and committing to transparency and accountability can help change the pay-offs from engaging in corrupt practices or rent-seeking. Yet in many cases, large-scale institution building might be beyond these countries' immediate capacity, leaving an important opportunity for international donors. Aid, in the traditional sense, is not the solution to the resource curse. Once the natural resource revenues have started flowing, resource rich countries are not primarily in need of further financial inflows. Fostering long-term development here is rather a question of technical support and capacity building, support for international anti-corruption mechanisms and imposing transparency and legal requirements on national companies operating in these countries.
Oil to Cash explores one option to help countries with new oil revenue avoid the so-called resource curse: just give the money directly to citizens. A universal, transparent, and regular cash transfer would not only provide a concrete benefit to regular people, but would also create powerful incentives for citizens to hold their government accountable. Oil to Cash details how and where this idea could work and how policymakers can learn from the experiences with cash transfers in places like Mexico, Mongolia, and Alaska.
The recent development literature stresses that countries that receive large revenues from natural resource endowments typically raise less revenue from domestic taxation, and that this creates governance problems because the lower domestic tax effort reduces the incentive for the public scrutiny of government. Our results from a panel of 30 hydrocarbon producing countries indicate that the offset between hydrocarbon revenues and revenues from other domestic sources is about 20 percent but that it is invariant to governance indicators.