[PDF] Record Of Decision And General Conformity Determination For Realignment Of E 2 Squadrons From Marine Corps Air Station Mcas Miramar California eBook
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The Department of the Navy, after carefully weighing the operational, environmental, and cost implications of relocating E-2 aircraft from MCAS Miramar to other Naval installations, announces its decision to realign four E-2 squadrons to Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) Point Mugu, California.
United States. Navy Department. Office of the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Environment)
Author : United States. Navy Department. Office of the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Environment) Publisher : Page : 11 pages File Size : 36,9 MB Release : 1998 Category : Air ISBN :
Author : United States. Marine Corps Publisher : Page : 154 pages File Size : 34,77 MB Release : 1992 Category : Courts-martial and courts of inquiry ISBN :
United States. Commission on Training Camp Activities
Author : United States. Commission on Training Camp Activities Publisher : Page : 40 pages File Size : 17,7 MB Release : 1917 Category : Military training camps ISBN :
During the more than three decades that have elapsed since the war in Vietnam ended, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have progressively developed a remarkable degree of harmony in the integrated conduct of aerial strike operations. That close harmony stands in sharp contrast to the situation that prevailed throughout most of the Cold War, when the two services lived and operated in wholly separate physical and conceptual worlds, had distinct and unique operating mindsets and cultures, and could claim no significant interoperability features to speak of. Once the unexpected demands of fighting a joint littoral war against Iraq in 1991 underscored the costs of that absence of interoperability, however, both the Air Force and the Navy quickly came to recognize and embrace the need to change their operating practices to accommodate the demise of the Soviet threat that had largely determined their previous approaches to warfare and to develop new ways of working with each other in the conduct of joint air operations to meet a new array of post-Cold War challenges around the world. This monograph describes the evolution of Air Force and Navy integration in aerial strike warfare from the time of the Vietnam War, when any such integration was virtually nonexistent, to the contemporary era when Air Force and Navy air combat operations have moved ever closer to a point where they can be said to provide both a mature capability for near-seamless joint-force employment and a role model for other possible types of closer Air Force and Navy force integration in areas where the air and maritime operating domains intersect.
U.S. Marines In Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971-1973Charles D Melson; Curtis G Arnold;United States. Marine Corps. History and Museums Division."This is the eighth volume of a projected nine-volume history of Marine Corps operations in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories. This volume details the activities of Marine Corps units after the departure from Vietnam in 1971 of III Marine Amphibious Force, through to the 1973 ceasefire, and includes the return of Marine prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Written from diverse views and sources, the common thread in this narrative is the continued resistance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, in particular the Vietnamese Marine Corps, to Communist aggression. This book is written from the perspective of the American Marines who assisted them in their efforts. Someday the former South Vietnamese Marines will be able to tell their own story."
This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. From the Preface - From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis' force seized what became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined as the "three-block war." Following TF-58's deployment during the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.-led coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat. From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine Corps' commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus' "surge strategy" in Iraq. By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone to later publish the story "How We Lost the War We Won." In recognition of the shifting tides in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. . . .
This book shows how disinformation spread by partisan organizations and media platforms undermines institutional legitimacy on which authoritative information depends.