[PDF] Optimal Monetary And Fiscal Policy In A Liquidity Trap eBook

Author : Gauti B. Eggertsson
Publisher :
Page : 61 pages
File Size : 23,45 MB
Release : 2004
Category : Liquidity (Economics)
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In previous work (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003), we characterized the optimal conduct of monetary policy when a real disturbance causes the natural rate of interest to be temporarily negative, so that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, and showed that commitment to a history-dependent policy rule can greatly increase welfare relative to the outcome under a purely forward-looking inflation target. Here we consider in addition optimal tax policy in response to such a disturbance, to determine the extent to which fiscal policy can help to mitigate the distortions resulting from the zero bound, and to consider whether a history-dependent monetary policy commitment continues to be important when fiscal policy is appropriately adjusted. We find that even in a model where complete tax smoothing would be optimal as long as the zero bound never binds, it is optimal to temporarily adjust tax rates in response to a binding zero bound; but when taxes have only a supply-side effect, the optimal policy requires that the tax rate be raised during the "trap", while committing to lower tax rates below their long-run level later. An optimal policy commitment is still history-dependent, in general, but the gains from departing from a strict inflation target are modest in the case that fiscal policy responds to the real disturbance in an appropriate way.

Author : Stefano Maria Corbellini
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 23,91 MB
Release : 2022
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Optimal monetary and fiscal policy are jointly analyzed in a heterogeneous two-agents New Keynesian environment, where fiscal policy is modeled in the form of lump-sum transfers set by the government. The main result is that transfer policy does not serve as a substitute for forward guidance - as it entails consumption dispersion costs - and does not affect its optimal duration. Transfers indeed influence the length of stay at the zero lower bound through two offsetting channels: a shortening channel works through an initial increase in transfers that mitigates the recession (reducing the need for forward guidance), and a lengthening channel works through a later transfer cut that curbs the undesired expansion (making forward guidance desirable for a longer horizon). Imposing a homogeneous transfer policy across agents does not change the stabilization outcome or the effect on the duration of forward guidance, nor does so allowing for cyclical income differences.

Author : Gauti B. Eggertsson
Publisher :
Page : 77 pages
File Size : 16,48 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Liquidity (Economics)
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We consider the consequences for monetary policy of the zero floor for nominal interest rates. The zero bound can be a significant constraint on the ability of a central bank to combat deflation. We show, in the context of an intertemporal equilibrium model, that open-market operations, even of unconventional' types, are ineffective if they do not change expectations about the future conduct of policy; in this sense, a liquidity trap' is possible. Nonetheless, a credible commitment to the right sort of history-dependent policy can largely mitigate the distortions created by the zero bound. In our model, optimal policy involves a commitment to adjust interest rates so as to achieve a time-varying price-level target, when this is consistent with the zero bound. We also discuss ways in which other central-bank actions, while irrelevant apart from their effects on expectations, may help to make credible a central bank's commitment to its target, and consider implications for the policy options currently available for overcoming deflation in Japan

Author : Iván Werning
Publisher :
Page : 48 pages
File Size : 48,71 MB
Release : 2011
Category : Economics
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I study monetary and fiscal policy in liquidity trap scenarios, where the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding. I work with a continuous-time version of the standard New Keynesian model. Without commitment, the economy suffers from deflation and depressed output. I show that, surprisingly, both are exacerbated with greater price flexibility. I examine monetary and fiscal policies that maximize utility for the agent in the model and refer to these as optimal throughout the paper. I find that the optimal interest rate is set to zero past the liquidity trap and jump discretely up upon exit. Inflation may be positive throughout, so the absence of deflation is not evidence against a liquidity trap. Output, on the other hand, always starts below its efficient level and rises above it. I then study fiscal policy and show that, regardless of parameters that govern the value of "fiscal multipliers" during normal or liquidity trap times, at the start of a liquidity trap optimal spending is above its natural level. However, it declines over time and goes below its natural level. I propose a decomposition of spending according to "opportunistic" and "stimulus" motives. The former is defined as the level of government purchases that is optimal from a static, cost-benefit standpoint, taking into account that, due to slack resources, shadow costs may be lower during a slump; the latter measures deviations from the former. I show that stimulus spending may be zero throughout, or switch signs, depending on parameters. Finally, I consider the hybrid where monetary policy is discretionary, but fiscal policy has commitment. In this case, stimulus spending is typically positive and increasing throughout the trap.

Author : George W. Evans
Publisher :
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 16,4 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Fiscal policy
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This paper reports on the findings of Evans, Guse and Honkapohja (2007) concerning the global economic dynamics under learning in a New Keynesian model in which the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. Under normal monetary and fiscal policy the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Large pessimistic shocks to expectations can lead to deflationary spirals with falling prices and falling output. To avoid this outcome we recommend augmenting normal policies with inflation threshold policies: if under normal policies inflation would fall below a suitably chosen threshold, these policies should be replaced by aggressive monetary and fiscal policies that guarantee this lower bound on inflation.--Author's description.

Author : Mitsuru Iwamura
Publisher :
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 45,69 MB
Release : 2005
Category : Fiscal policy
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We characterize monetary and fiscal policy rules to implement optimal responses to a substantial decline in the natural rate of interest, and compare them with policy decisions made by the Japanese central bank and government in 1999-2004. First, we find that the Bank of Japan's policy commitment to continuing monetary easing until some prespecified conditions are satisfied lacks history dependence, a key feature of the optimal monetary policy rule. Second, the term structure of the interest rate gap (the spread between the actual real interest rate and its natural rate counterpart) was not downward sloping, indicating that the Bank of Japan's commitment failed to have su.cient influence on the market's expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Third, we find that the primary surplus in 1999-2004 was higher than predicted by the historical regularity, implying that the Japanese government deviated from the Ricardian rule toward fiscal tightening. These findings suggest that inappropriate conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during this period delayed the timing to escape from the liquidity trap.

Author : Taisuke Nakata
Publisher :
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 47,54 MB
Release : 2020
Category : Fiscal policy
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We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely-studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.

Author : Boris Chafwehé
Publisher :
Page : 57 pages
File Size : 21,3 MB
Release : 2021
Category : Debts, Public
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'We propose a framework of optimal monetary policy where debt sustainability may, or may not, be a relevant constraint for the central bank. We show analytically that in each environment the optimal interest rate path consists of a Taylor rule augmented with forward guidance terms. These terms arise either i) from 'twisting interest rates' when the central bank ensures debt sustainability, or ii) under no debt concerns, from committing to keep interest rates low at the exit of the liquidity trap. The optimal policy is isomorphic to Leeper's (1991) 'passive monetary/active fiscal policy' regime in the first instance, or 'active monetary/passive fiscal policy' regime in the second. We insert our framework into a standard medium scale DSGE model calibrated to the US. Optimal passive monetary policy with debt concerns is ineffective in stabilizing inflation, whereas under no debt concerns, monetary policy is very effective in stabilizing the macroeconomy'--Abstract, page ii.