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This paper examines the interest spending and taxation channels through which EMU could affect the public finances. It provides a framework for examining different views on a further narrowing of interest rate differentials. A model of Blanchard and Fischer is amended to analyze the two channels, and empirical evidence on the tax harmonization process is presented. The paper argues that “high-debt” and “high-tax” countries pursuing prudent fiscal policies could benefit the most from EMU: if monetary and widespread fiscal discipline are jointly established, interest rates could decline rapidly, while tax harmonization is likely to be gradual.
Europe is on the road to monetary union (EMU) even if there may be delays and diversions on the way. The focal point of EMU will be its single currency, valid throughout all participating countries, and replacing the national currencies. There will be considerable transitional pain and stress, most of all for member states with very high public debts. For the rest, the road ahead will not be smooth, but should be assisted by easier monetary policy in Germany since 1993. For some countries at least, the pain will be aggravated unnecessarily by design defects in the transitional rules for entry - which there is still time to remedy. The author - no admirer of a federal Europe - describes how EMU could actually work better in a confederal Europe with no federal chief executive and with a relatively weak Parliament. The independent Eurofed would be responsible for managing economic policy on an EC-wide basis, while national governments could use fiscal policies to mitigate local deviations. Weak regions and poor peripheral countries would require more flexible assistance from EC resources, however.
Recoge: 1. Introduction - 2. The fiscal dominance case for the SGP - 3. What do national governments do with their fiscal policies? - 4. Mutual insurance via transfers - 5. Institutional requirements for a transer system - 6. Conclusions reform - 9. Conclusions.
The launch of the euro reinforces the foundations for unprecedented economic integration encompassing 11 countries, 16 per cent of world GDP and 290 million people. For the first time, the OECD has studied the euro-area as a fully-fledged economic ...
This paper examines the interest spending and taxation channels through which EMU could affect the public finances. It provides a framework for examining different views on a further narrowing of interest rate differentials. A model of Blanchard and Fischer is amended to analyze the two channels, and empirical evidence on the tax harmonization process is presented. The paper argues that quot;high-debtquot; and quot;high-taxquot; countries pursuing prudent fiscal policies could benefit the most from EMU: if monetary and widespread fiscal discipline are jointly established, interest rates could decline rapidly, while tax harmonization is likely to be gradual.
Pursuit of price stability may, but need not, exacerbate output fluctuations. This paper discusses the monetary strategy of the European Central Bank, the intermediate targets that this should entail, and implications for accountability, transparency, and reputation. Country-specific shocks will remain but output correlation may not reflect the old pattern of core and peripheral countries. The Stability Pact will force some countries to switch off their automatic stabilizers; others, with fewer fiscal problems, can retain them. Output correlations in EMU may reflect a fiscal core and fiscal periphery. Additional labor market flexibility remains the best solution.
European Economic and Monetary Union does not envisage creating a central fiscal authority. Monetary and exchange rate policies will be centralized, but fiscal policy will remain a national responsibility, in line with the subsidiarity principle. This paper argues that monetary union will generate pressures for closer economic integration than currently envisaged. Although not a necessity, a more active central role could then be justified on the grounds of allocative efficiency, redistribution, and stabilization. While in the short term enhanced policy coordination may address those pressures satisfactorily, as economic integration proceeds, the case for a central fiscal authority may become stronger.