[PDF] Liquidity Creation And Financial Fragility eBook

Author : Douglas Warren Diamond
Publisher :
Page : 51 pages
File Size : 48,81 MB
Release : 1999
Category : Bank liquidity
ISBN :

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Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to attract or retain funding. Because borrowers typically cannot repay investors on demand, investors will require a premium or significant control rights when they lend to borrowers directly, as compensation for the illiquidity investors will be subject to. We argue that banks can resolve these liquidity problems that arise in direct lending. Banks enable depositors to withdraw at low cost, as well as buffer firms from the liquidity needs of their investors. We show the bank has to have a fragile capital structure, subject to bank runs, in order to perform these functions. Far from being an aberration to be regulated away, the funding of illiquid loans by a bank with volatile demand deposits is rationalized in the context of the functions it performs. This model can be used to investigate important issues such as narrow banking and bank capital requirements

Author : Christian Weistroffer
Publisher : Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH
Page : 124 pages
File Size : 23,42 MB
Release : 2010
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3832526978

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Open-end real estate funds (OEREFs) are the predominant vehicle in Germany for channeling private capital flows into commercial real estate markets. They transform longer-term investment projects into daily redeemable claims. To the extent that OEREFs stand ready to both issue new shares and redeem outstanding ones on a daily basis they provide valuable liquidity transformation. At the same time, they become susceptible to run phenomena. This dissertation analyzes the inherent fragility of open-end real estate funds in light of the German open-end fund crisis of 2005/06. The dissertation comprises three papers. The first paper explores how fund performance and other factors influenced capital flows into OEREFs before, during and after the German open-end fund crisis of 2005/06. The second paper looks at the valuation practice of OEREFs and assesses whether funds have suffered from a valuation problem. It finds evidence in support of the view that systematic deviations of appraised values from prices achieved in the market were at the heart of the 2005/06 German open-end fund crisis. The third paper relates findings from banking theory to OEREFs. It explores under which conditions the open-end fund contract resembles a demand deposit contract that is prone not only to panics but also to fundamental runs. The dissertation concludes by discussing policy options to mitigate the run problem.

Author : Allen N. Berger
Publisher : Academic Press
Page : 296 pages
File Size : 37,64 MB
Release : 2015-11-24
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0128005319

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Bank Liquidity Creation and Financial Crises delivers a consistent, logical presentation of bank liquidity creation and addresses questions of research and policy interest that can be easily understood by readers with no advanced or specialized industry knowledge. Authors Allen Berger and Christa Bouwman examine ways to measure bank liquidity creation, how much liquidity banks create in different countries, the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, the effects of bailouts, and much more. They also analyze bank liquidity creation in the US over the past three decades during both normal times and financial crises. Narrowing the gap between the "academic world" (focused on theories) and the "practitioner world" (dedicated to solving real-world problems), this book is a helpful new tool for evaluating a bank’s performance over time and comparing it to its peer group. Explains that bank liquidity creation is a more comprehensive measure of a bank’s output than traditional measures and can also be used to measure bank liquidity Describes how high levels of bank liquidity creation may cause or predict future financial crises Addresses questions of research and policy interest related to bank liquidity creation around the world and provides links to websites with data and other materials to address these questions Includes such hot-button topics as the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, and the effects of bailouts

Author : Zuzana Fungacova
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 33 pages
File Size : 36,88 MB
Release : 2015-05-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1475581807

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We formulate the “High Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (HLCH) that a proliferation in the core activity of bank liquidity creation increases failure probability. We test the HLCH in the context of Russian banking, which provides a natural field experiment due to numerous failures experienced over the past decade. Using Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measures as a comprehensive proxy for overall bank output, we find that high liquidity creation significantly increases the probability of bank failure; this finding survives multiple robustness checks. Our results suggest that regulatory authorities can mitigate systemic distress and reduce the costs of bank failures to society through early identification of high liquidity creators and enhanced monitoring of their funding and investment activities.

Author : Charles M. Kahn
Publisher :
Page : 36 pages
File Size : 12,26 MB
Release : 2010
Category :
ISBN :

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We study the fragility of the banking system in relation to its role in liquidity creation. In our framework, fragility stems from the interconnections banks establish to protect themselves from liquidity shocks. In the absence of contractual constraints, banks choose the optimal degree of mutual insurance, because market participants correctly take into account the economic effects of their own interdependence. When banks are in the business of providing liquidity, some contractual flexibility is missing. In this case, we show that banks have an incentive to become too risky in aggregate, since some of the beneficiaries of the liquidity provision are unable to compensate the banks for remaining solvent. We examine possible regulatory remedies for this problem.

Author : Zuzana Fungacova
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 33 pages
File Size : 44,64 MB
Release : 2015-05-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1484371100

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We formulate the “High Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (HLCH) that a proliferation in the core activity of bank liquidity creation increases failure probability. We test the HLCH in the context of Russian banking, which provides a natural field experiment due to numerous failures experienced over the past decade. Using Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measures as a comprehensive proxy for overall bank output, we find that high liquidity creation significantly increases the probability of bank failure; this finding survives multiple robustness checks. Our results suggest that regulatory authorities can mitigate systemic distress and reduce the costs of bank failures to society through early identification of high liquidity creators and enhanced monitoring of their funding and investment activities.

Author : Mr.Francisco F. Vazquez
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 33 pages
File Size : 26,18 MB
Release : 2012-01-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1463933142

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This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.

Author : Zuzana Fungáčová
Publisher :
Page : 35 pages
File Size : 26,99 MB
Release : 2017
Category :
ISBN :

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This paper examines how the introduction of deposit insurance influences the relationship between bank cap-ital and liquidity creation. As discussed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), there are two competing hypothes-es on this relationship which can be influenced by the presence of deposit insurance. The introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in an emerging market, Russia, provides a natural experiment to investigate this issue. We study three alternative measures of bank liquidity creation and perform estimations on a large set of Russian banks. Our findings suggest that the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme exerts a limited impact on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation and does not change the negative sign of the relationship. The implication is that better capitalized banks tend to create less liquidity, which sup-ports the "financial fragility/crowding-out" hypothesis. This conclusion has important policy implications for emerging countries as it suggests that bank capital requirements implemented to support financial stability may harm liquidity creation. JEL classification: G21; G28; G38; P30; P50 Keywords: Bank capital, liquidity creation, deposit insurance, Russia.