[PDF] Knives Of The United States Military In Vietnam eBook

Author : Michael W. Silvey
Publisher : Schiffer Military History
Page : 128 pages
File Size : 49,46 MB
Release : 2016-11-28
Category : History
ISBN : 9780764351983

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This guide showcases knives used by America's clandestine military in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. It provides the collector and others interested in the period a way of identifying honest SOG (Studies and Observations Group) specimens and separating them from counterfeits. With beautiful color photographs that show a high level of detail, the book identifies all known SOG specimens (over 165 knives) and includes rare personalized knives and custom combat knives made in the United States. Sections of the book focus on Randalls, Eks, Gerbers, and the knives made by tribal artisans in Southeast Asia. This is the eighth in Mike Silvey's series on military knives.

Author : Robert Eugene Hunt
Publisher : Turner Publishing Company
Page : 216 pages
File Size : 45,21 MB
Release : 2002
Category : Knives
ISBN : 1563117797

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This first-ever publication offers the reader a colorful and interesting guide to Randall knives spanning WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, which involved American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. Randall Fighting Knives in Wartime contains many never-before-published full color photos of rare Randall-made knives. Pictured alongside the knives is a range of distinctive militaria, separating this book from other publications. A descriptive narrative and specific technical data"" accompanies each photo, linking the Randall knives throughout each war in the book. A Collector's Value Guide rounds out this book, giving the reader an at-a-glance comparison of the value of each knife.""

Author : John A. Nagl
Publisher : Penguin
Page : 260 pages
File Size : 30,43 MB
Release : 2014-10-16
Category : Biography & Autobiography
ISBN : 0698176359

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From one of the most important army officers of his generation, a memoir of the revolution in warfare he helped lead, in combat and in Washington When John Nagl was an army tank commander in the first Gulf War of 1991, fresh out of West Point and Oxford, he could already see that America’s military superiority meant that the age of conventional combat was nearing an end. Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. But that made him an outsider within the army; and as if to double down on his dissidence, he scorned the conventional path to a general’s stars and got the military to send him back to Oxford to study the history of counterinsurgency in earnest, searching for guideposts for America. The result would become the bible of the counterinsurgency movement, a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. But it would take the events of 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give counterinsurgency urgent contemporary relevance. John Nagl’s ideas finally met their war. But even as his book began ricocheting around the Pentagon, Nagl, now operations officer of a tank battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed to a particularly unsettled quadrant of Iraq. Here theory met practice, violently. No one knew how messy even the most successful counterinsurgency campaign is better than Nagl, and his experience in Anbar Province cemented his view. After a year’s hard fighting, Nagl was sent to the Pentagon to work for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, where he was tapped by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new army and marine counterinsurgency field manual, rewriting core army doctrine in the middle of two bloody land wars and helping the new ideas win acceptance in one of the planet’s most conservative bureaucracies. That doctrine changed the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Nagl is not blind to the costs or consequences of counterinsurgency, a policy he compared to “eating soup with a knife.” The men who died under his command in Iraq will haunt him to his grave. When it comes to war, there are only bad choices; the question is only which ones are better and which worse. Nagl’s memoir is a profound education in modern war—in theory, in practice, and in the often tortured relationship between the two. It is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.

Author : Knife World Publications Staff
Publisher :
Page : 255 pages
File Size : 13,97 MB
Release : 2001-01-01
Category : Knives
ISBN : 9780940362185

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"From the pages of Knife world magazine"--T.p.

Author : Joe Klein
Publisher : Simon and Schuster
Page : 416 pages
File Size : 23,9 MB
Release : 2015-10-27
Category : Biography & Autobiography
ISBN : 1451683626

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"In 1981, while the country was celebrating the end of the Iran hostage crisis, an unemployed Vietnam veteran named Gary Cooper went berserk with a gun, angry over the jubilant welcome the hostages received in contrast to his own homecoming from Vietnam. He was killed in a fight with police. Joe Klein ... tells Cooper's story, as well as the stories of four of the other vets in Cooper's platoon. These stories all begin with an ambush and a grisly battle in the Que Son Valley in 1967, but Payback is less about remembering the war and more about examining its long-term effects on the grunts who fought it. Klein focuses on filling in the next fifteen years of these men's lives after they return home, and his account ... captures the struggles of a whole generation of Vietnam veterans and their families."--Back cover.

Author : John Nagl
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing USA
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 35,54 MB
Release : 2002-10-30
Category : History
ISBN : 0313077037

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Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.