[PDF] Is Knowledge Market Power On The Relationship Between Data Protection Data Power And Competition Law eBook
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Everyone is talking about the relationship between data protection, “data power” and competition law. The increasing importance of data and the presumed concentration of data in the hands of certain companies have stoked fears, leading to calls for political regulation and increased antitrust oversight. The merger of Facebook and WhatsApp, the ongoing EU proceedings against Google, and the investigations of Facebook by the German FCO (Bundeskartellamt) have cast a spotlight on the role of competition law. The following contribution explores the significance of data and data protection in competition law. Section I examines the role of data in the Internet economy. Section II follows with an analysis of the competitive relevance of data to establish “data power” or market power. Building on this, Section III examines potentially abusive practices of “data rich” companies. Finally - particularly with a view to the current antitrust proceeding against Facebook - Section IV evaluates the relationship between data protection and competition law.The German version of this article was previously published in NZKart 2016, 303 et seq. and 348 et seq. The English Version updates and expands the original presentation.
All are agreed that the digital economy contributes to a dynamic evolution of markets and competition. Nonetheless, concerns are increasingly raised about the market dominance of a few key players. Because these companies hold the power to drive rivals out of business, regulators have begun to seek scope for competition enforcement in cases where companies claim that withholding data is needed to satisfy customers and cut costs. This book is the first focus on how competition law enforcement tools can be applied to refusals of dominant firms to give access data on online platforms such as search engines, social networks, and e-commerce platforms – commonly referred to as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Internet. The question arises whether the denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors access to its data could constitute a ‘refusal to deal’ and lead to competition law liability under the so-called ‘essential facilities doctrine', according to which firms need access to shared knowledge in order to be able to compete. A possible duty to share data with rivals also brings to the forefront the interaction of competition law with data protection legislation considering that the required information may include personal data of individuals. Building on the refusal to deal concept, and using a multidisciplinary approach, the analysis covers such issues and topics as the following: – data portability; – interoperability; – data as a competitive advantage or entry barrier in digital markets; – market definition and dominance with respect to data; – disruptive versus sustaining innovation; – role of intellectual property regimes; – economic trade-off in essential facilities cases; – relationship of competition enforcement with data protection law and – data-related competition concerns in merger cases. The author draws on a wealth of relevant material, including EU and US decision-making practice, case law, and policy documents, as well as economic and empirical literature on the link between competition and innovation. The book concludes with a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to potential forms of abuse of dominance relating to data. In addition, it makes suggestions as to how data protection interests can be integrated into competition policy. An invaluable contribution to ongoing academic and policy discussions about how data-related competition concerns should be addressed under competition law, the analysis clearly demonstrates how existing competition tools for market definition and assessment of dominance can be applied to online platforms. It will be of immeasurable value to the many jurists, business persons, and academics concerned with this very timely subject.
In this timely book, Beata Mäihäniemi analyses and evaluates how the characteristics of information as a good, as well as the characteristics of digital platforms, affect the application of competition law in both theory and practice.
"Recent studies on competition law and digital markets reveal that accumulating personal information through data collection and acquisition methods benefits consumers considerably. Free of charge, fast and personalised services and products are offered to consumers online. Collected data is now an indispensable part of online businesses to the point that a new economy, a data-driven sector, has emerged. Many markets such as the social network, search engine, online advertising and e-commerce are regarded as data-driven markets where the utilisation of Big Data is a requisite for the success of operations. However, the accumulation and use of data brings competition law concerns as they contribute to market power in the online world resulting in a few technology giants have gaining unprecedented market power due to the Big Data accumulation, indirect network effects and the creation of online ecosystems. As technology giants have billions of consumers worldwide, data-driven markets are truly global. In these data-driven markets, technology giants abuse their dominant positions, but existing competition law tools seem ineffective in addressing market power and assessing abusive behaviour related to Big Data. This book argues that a novel approach to the data-driven sector must be developed through the application of competition law rules to address this. It argues that current and potential conflicts can be mitigated by extending the competition law assessment beyond the current competition law tools to offer a modernised and unified approach to the Big Data related competition issues. Promoting new legal tests for addressing the market power of technology giants and assessing abusive behaviour in data-driven markets, this book advocates for cooperation between competition and data protection authorities. It will be of interest to students, academics, and practitioners with an interest in competition law and data protection"--
In digital markets, data protection and competition law affect each other in diverse and intricate ways. Their entanglement has triggered a global debate on how these two areas of law should interact to effectively address new harms and ensure that the digital economy flourishes. Coherence between Data Protection and Competition Law in Digital Markets offers a blueprint for bridging the disconnect between data protection and competition law and ensuring a coherent approach towards their enforcement in digital markets. Specifically, this book focuses on the evolution of data protection and competition law, their underlying rationale, their key features and common objectives, and provides a series of examples to demonstrate how the same empirical phenomena in digital markets pose a common challenge to protecting personal data and promoting market competitiveness. A panoply of theoretical and empirical commonalities between these two fields of law, as this volume shows, are barely mirrored in the legal, enforcement, policy, and institutional approaches in the EU and beyond, where the silo approach continues to prevail. The ideas that Majcher puts forward for a more synergetic integration of data protection and competition law are anchored in the concept of 'sectional coherence'. This new coherence-centred paradigm reimagines the interpretation and enforcement of data protection and competition law as mutually cognizant and reciprocal, allowing readers to explore, in an innovative way, the interface between these legal fields and identify positive interactions, instead of merely addressing inconsistencies and tensions. This book reflects on the conceptual, practical, institutional, and constitutional implications of the transition towards coherence and the relevance of its findings for other jurisdictions.
This incisive book provides a much-needed examination of the legal issues arising from the data economy, particularly in the light of the expanding role of algorithms and artificial intelligence in business and industry. In doing so, it discusses the pressing question of how to strike a balance in the law between the interests of a variety of stakeholders, such as AI industry, businesses and consumers.
The monetization of personal data has become an increasingly common business practice, igniting global debate on the interface between data privacy law and competition law. Data Privacy and Competition Law in the Age of Big Data provides a comprehensive, novel, and interdisciplinary analysis of this nexus. Drawing insights from emergent properties and complexity science, the book exposes the commonalities and conflicts between how data privacy law and competition law address challenges resulting from the commercialization of personal data. Samson Y. Esayas begins by identifying key shifts in big data: the growing trend of processing personal data for diverse purposes, the aggregation of data across various operations, and the shift from offering stand-alone products and services to ecosystems of several, with personal data central in connecting the different markets. These shifts engender a complex economic landscape, marked by multiple actors, a web of interactions, and non-linear, emergent outcomes. Despite this complexity, the prevailing approach to data privacy law and competition law emphasises isolated units of analysis-whether a relevant market or a distinct processing operation. This approach overlooks system-wide (emergent) risks borne of cumulative processing operations and cross-market practices. Additionally, a mindset focused on either data privacy law or competition law overlooks the increasing intersection between the two regimes, missing opportunities for synergy. In light of these challenges, Esayas's volume calls for recalibrating data privacy law and competition law for a complex economy, emphasizing a holistic, systems-level perspective that addresses emergent harms and a polycentric strategy that leverages the strengths of each legal regime.
Increasingly, we conduct our lives online, and in doing so, we grant access to our personal information. The crucial feedstock of the world economy thus generated - the commercialization and exploitation of personal data and the intrusion of digital privacy it entails - has built an imposing edifice of market power. As we enter the third decade of the 21st century, this detailed exploration of the interlinkage between competition and data privacy takes a critical look at competition policy to evaluate whether the system in its current form and with the existing approach is capable of tackling the challenges raised by the role of personal data in the shift from an offline to an online economy. Challenging the commonplace assumption that privacy has little or no role and relevance in competition law, the author’s penetrating analysis accomplishes the following and more: provides an in-depth understanding of the intersection of competition and privacy in the data-driven economy; surveys legal policy developments on the role of privacy in competition law; underlines the importance of non-price parameters in competition, such as consumer choice; clearly explains why and how competition law can protect privacy among its policy objectives; and addresses challenges in measuring the intangible harm of digital privacy violation in assessing abuse of market power. Recent case law in Europe and elsewhere, a revealing comparison between relevant European Union (EU) and United States (US) practice, the expanded role of the EU’s Competition Commissioner, and the likely impact of such phenomena as the coronavirus pandemic are all drawn into the book’s remit. In her analysis of the growing privacy dimension in competition policy, the author examines the topic from a broad perspective that includes societal, political, economic, historical and cultural elements. Her insightful multidimensional and value-based review will prove of immeasurable value to practitioners, academics, policymakers and enforcers in its identification of implications for business practice as we go forward.
Author : Jens-Uwe Franck Publisher : Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE) Page : 96 pages File Size : 34,4 MB Release : 2019-05-08 Category : Law ISBN :
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
The digital economy is gradually gaining traction through a variety of recent technological developments, including the introduction of the Internet of things, artificial intelligence and markets for data. This innovative book contains contributions from leading competition law scholars who map out and investigate the anti-competitive effects that are developing in the digital economy.