Institutions And Information Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Institutions And Information book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that "domestic politics matters." Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations. Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.
Contesting prior assumptions that institutions simplify the world for the sake of efficiency, this book argues that rather than institution expansion indicating the movement of markets to optimal states, expanding institutions generate information costs.
This open access book bridges the disciplinary boundaries within the social sciences to explore the role of social institutions in shaping geographical contexts, and in creating new knowledge. It includes theorizations as well as original empirical case studies on the emergence, maintenance and change of institutions as well as on their constraining and enabling effects on innovation, entrepreneurship, art and cultural heritage, often at regional scales across Europe and North America. Rooted in the disciplines of management and organization studies, sociology, geography, political science, and economics the contributors all take comprehensive approaches to carve out the specific contextuality of institutions as well as their impact on societal outcomes. Not only does this book offer detailed insights into current debates in institutional theory, it also provides background for scholars, students, and professionals at the intersection between regional development, policy-making, and regulation.
Contesting prior assumptions that institutions simplify the world for the sake of efficiency, this book argues that rather than institution expansion indicating the movement of markets to optimal states, expanding institutions generate information costs.
Author : Joseph P. H. Fan Publisher : University of Chicago Press Page : 401 pages File Size : 37,40 MB Release : 2013 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : 0226237249
La 4e de couverture indique : "Despite a vast accumulation of private capital, China is not embracing capitalism. Deceptively familiar capitalist features disguise the profoundly unfamiliar foundations of "market socialism with Chinese characteristics." The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by controlling the career advancement of all senior personnel in all regulatory agencies, all state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and virtually all major financial institutions state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and senior Party positions in all but the smallest non-SOE enterprises, retains sole possession of Lenin's Commanding Heights. The chapters in this volume examine China's high savings rate, banking system, financial markets, financial regulations, corporate governance, and public finances; and consider policy alternatives the CCP might consider if its goal is China's elevation into the ranks of high income countries."
Cultural forces govern a synergistic relationship among information institutions that shapes their roles collectively and individually. Cultural synergy is the combination of perception- and behavior-shaping knowledge within, between, and among groups. Our hyperlinked era makes information-sharing among institutions critically important for scholarship as well as for the advancement of humankind. Information institutions are those that have, or share in, the mission to preserve, conserve, and disseminate information objects and their informative content. A central idea is the notion of social epistemology that information institutions arise culturally from social forces of the cultures they inhabit, and that their purpose is to disseminate that culture. All information institutions are alike in critical ways. Intersecting lines of cultural mission are trajectories for synergy for allowing us to perceive the universe of information institutions as interconnected and evolving and moving forward in distinct ways for the improvement of the condition of humankind through the building up of its knowledge base and of its information-sharing processes. This book is an exploration of the cultural synergy that can be realized by seeing commonalities among information institutions (sometimes also called cultural heritage institutions): museums, libraries, and archives. The hyperlinked era of the Semantic Web makes information sharing among institutions critically important for scholarship as well as the advancement of mankind. The book addresses the origins of cultural information institutions, the history of the professions that run them, and the social imperative of information organization as a catalyst for semantic synergy.
As classrooms and universities strive to adapt their instructional methods to an ever progressing technological age, it is imperative that academic libraries also revisit the ways in which reference and instruction services are organized and implemented. Library Reference Services and Information Literacy: Models for Academic Institutions not only advocates for a more intentional integration of reference and instructional services, but it also provides organizational background, staff objectives, and various successes and challenges that have already been experienced by real institutions. This publication is an important reference source for librarians, practitioners, and university leaders who wish to maximize the current utilization of their resources.
El objeto de estudio de esta tesis es la interacción entre el diseño de las instituciones, el comportamiento de los agentes económicos, y la información. Comenzamos en el capítulo 2 mirando a una vieja pregunta: ¿cuál es el valor de la información? Lo hacemos desde el punto de vista de los grupos. Hemos creado un modelo bastante general de toma de decisiones colectivas a través del voto. La atención se limita a los grupos en los que los miembros comparten un objetivo común. Examinamos si es posible comparar las estructuras de información en términos del valor agregado esperado que ofrecen al grupo. Nuestro primer resultado muestra que la comparación es posible en algunos casos, para cualquier grupo de ideas afines y cualquier regla de votación. Sin embargo, mostramos que los casos en que tales comparaciones son posibles son muy limitados. El conjunto de estructuras de información que pueden ser comparadas se amplía si uno plantea restricciones en el perfil de las preferencias de los miembros del grupo o la regla de votación. Aplicamos algunos de nuestros resultados a un modelo en el que la información es endógena. El capítulo 3 estudia una institución diferente: los mercados. Las características específicas de los mercados, que a priori parecen no estar relacionadas a la información, puede tener efectos significativos sobre como los agentes forman a sus creencias acerca de los bienes disponibles. Las creencias determinan la demanda que puede resultar afectada. Nos fijamos en un modelo en el que los agentes pueden invertir en un proyecto con un número limitado de plazas disponibles. Los agentes tienen información incompleta sobre los beneficios esperados del proyecto. En base a eso, ellos deben decidir si invertir en el proyecto o elegir una opción segura. Las participaciónes se asignan siguiendo un orden de prioridad exógeno. Agentes de baja prioridad pueden enfrentarse a una maldición del ganador: si optan por invertir y obtener una participación en el proyecto, debe ser que los agentes con mayor prioridad optan por no hacerlo. En el equilibrio, sólo los agentes de alta prioridad optan por invertir si su información privada indica que deberían. Los agentes de baja prioridad escogen la opción segura, independientemente de su información privada. Esta característica de equilibrio se mantiene cuando nos fijamos en las variaciones del modelo con las prioridades asignadas por sorteo o determinado por un proceso de Bernoulli. Realizamos estáticas comparativas y comparamos los resultados del equilibrio de nuestro modelo de acción simultánea con los de un modelo de aprendizaje social. Nuestro análisis pone de relieve los vínculos entre características de diseño del mercado inexploradas y el desempeño de estos mercados. En particular, el conocimiento de los agentes de la orden de prioridad afecta a la demanda y la eficiencia. Por otra parte, el "herding" se produce incluso en ausencia de aprendizaje social. En el último capítulo de la tesis, en lugar de estudiar en una institución particular,estudiamos a las personas y la forma en que se comportan en diferentes situaciones estratégicas. El orden y la observabilidad de las acciones en un juego determinan las inferencias que pueden hacer los jugadores. La intuición sugiere que tales inferencias requieren un mayor nivel de sofisticación cuando se refieren a acciones que no son directamente observables, como en los juegos de acción simultáneos, en comparación con los juegos secuenciales donde un jugador puede observar las acciones de otros antes de tomar decisiones. Esta intuición contrasta con el supuesto. Utilizamos un novedoso diseño experimental en el que los sujetos juegan, de forma simultánea y secuencial, un juego en el que cualquiera de estos fenómenos pueden ocurrir. Los resultados confirman nuestra intuición y contradicen las predicciones de ambas teorías clásicas y de comportamiento (behavioral).