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This book aims to help answer two questions that Western philosophy has paid relatively little attention to - what is injustice and what does justice require when injustice occurs? Injustice and Rectification offers a taxonomy of justice, which sets forth an initial framework for a moral theory of justice and focuses on framing a conception of rectificatory justice. The taxonomy is ground for this book's eleven other essays, in which a diverse group of authors brings philosophical analysis to bear on the idea of injustice itself and on some important conceptual and normative issues concerning the rectification of injustice.
Should contemporary citizens provide material redress to right past wrongs? There is a widespread belief that contemporary citizens should take responsibility for rectifying past wrongs. Nahshon Perez challenges this view, questioning attempts to aggregate dead wrongdoers with living people, and examining ideas of intergenerational collective responsibility with great suspicion. He distinguishes sharply between those who are indeed unjustly enriched by past wrongs, and those who are not. Looking at issues such as the distinction between compensation and restitution, counterfactuals and the non-identity problem, Perez concludes that individuals have the right to a clean slate, and that almost all of the pro-intergenerational redress arguments are unconvincing. Key Features *Unique in claiming past wrongs should not be rectified *Analyses pro-intergenerational material redress arguments *Case studies include court cases from Australia, Northern Cyprus, the United States and Austria, and political and social movements from the US, Palestine and Arab countries
This thesis is concerned with the problem of rectification in the theory of justice. We are faced with examples of great historical injustice over the last few centuries. A proper regard for the demands of rectification seems required of us in the face of the overwhelming importance that victims place on it; without it, no society can hope to sustain mutual respect among its citizens, the non-victims and the victims, nor probably foster the self-respect of the victims. I argue that the problem of rectification poses a distinctive and fundamental problem for classical theories of justice and specifically for John Rawls's account of justice-as-fairness. Defenders of Rawls might claim, first, that rectification falls outside the scope of his theory of justice, since that is intended as ideal theory, and thus formulated against the fictional assumption that no historical wrongs have taken place. In this view, rectification is a concern of real political theory but not of ideal theory of justice. I argue that this defence is mistaken. Secondly, defenders of Rawls who concede that rectification is a proper part of the ideal theory of justice might claim that the principles of justice-as-fairness provide a basis for determining the extent to which justice requires rectification of wrongs. This too, I argue, is mistaken. In light of the demands that rectification places on us, I propose an alternative picture of equality as conceived of within the liberal tradition.
Winner of the Spitz Prize, Conference for the Study of Political Thought Winner of the North American Society for Social Philosophy Book Award Why do American ghettos persist? Scholars and commentators often identify some factor—such as single motherhood, joblessness, or violent street crime—as the key to solving the problem and recommend policies accordingly. But, Tommie Shelby argues, these attempts to “fix” ghettos or “help” their poor inhabitants ignore fundamental questions of justice and fail to see the urban poor as moral agents responding to injustice. “Provocative...[Shelby] doesn’t lay out a jobs program or a housing initiative. Indeed, as he freely admits, he offers ‘no new political strategies or policy proposals.’ What he aims to do instead is both more abstract and more radical: to challenge the assumption, common to liberals and conservatives alike, that ghettos are ‘problems’ best addressed with narrowly targeted government programs or civic interventions. For Shelby, ghettos are something more troubling and less tractable: symptoms of the ‘systemic injustice’ of the United States. They represent not aberrant dysfunction but the natural workings of a deeply unfair scheme. The only real solution, in this way of thinking, is the ‘fundamental reform of the basic structure of our society.’” —James Ryerson, New York Times Book Review
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race provides up-to-date explanation and analyses by leading scholars in African American philosophy and philosophy of race. Fifty-one original essays cover major topics from intellectual history to contemporary social controversies in this emerging philosophical subfield that supports demographic inclusion and emphasizes cultural relevance.
Calls for redress of historical wrongs regularly make headlines around the world. People dispute the degree to which justice should be concerned with righting past wrongs, with some arguing that justice should be primarily focused on claims arising from present disadvantage. Proponents and sceptics of restitution, compensation, and other forms of historical redress have engaged with the thesis that historical injustice can be superseded, the idea that changing circumstances following historical injustices can alter what justice later requires. The “supersession thesis,” developed by legal and political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, has been challenged, both conceptually and in terms of its possible application and implications. This is the first book to critically assess how the supersession thesis might be reconstructed, challenged, or applied to empirical cases, with an eye toward larger questions surrounding the temporal orientation of justice. Cases examined include Indigenous peoples, linguistic injustice, and climate change. The edited volume includes contributions by established and junior scholars from philosophy, law, American Indian Studies, and political science, who draw from Indigenous thought, settler colonial theory, liberalism, theories of historical entitlements, and structural injustice theories. It concludes with a reply by Jeremy Waldron. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology (including logical empiricism, phenomenology, and ordinary language philosophy). The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience.
Within academic circles, arguments supporting the rectification of anti-Black injustice in America have become more widespread in recent years. Three questions arise from these arguments: How should we understand what it means to rectify those injustices? What explains why these arguments, despite the increased attention by scholars, have not been taken seriously in mainstream American social and political discussions? Finally, what can be done to change this lack of mainstream attention? My dissertation answers these questions by advancing a new moral framework for understanding what it means to rectify anti-black injustice. On this view, rectificatory justice requires possessing a moral right to rectification, a right that Black Americans would have if moral rights possession was based solely on making morally justified demands. Possessing and ultimately exercising moral rights requires more than having moral justification it requires being socially recognized in a certain sort of way, such that morally justified demands become a social reality. Correspondingly, even though Black Americans are making morally justified demands, they do not yet possess a moral right to rectification because of how they are socially recognized. This constrains the social and political potential of arguments supporting rectificatory measures, like reparations. Some have argued that Black Americans have already gained rectificatory justice through anti-discrimination legislation and programs like affirmative action. Although they appear to be rectificatory, they do not meet the standards of rectificatory justice because they do not take responsibility for creating the conditions of injustice, preferring to focus on preventing future versions of similar forms of injustice. Since Black Americans have not received rectificatory justice but are making morally justified demands, what is required for them to possess a right to rectification is a change in how they are socially recognized. By amending the cultural narrative regarding anti-Black injustice as an enduring phenomenon rather than a historic one, and endeavoring to produce a sense of justice within mainstream America regarding anti-Black injustice, it may be possible to change how Black Americans are socially recognized such that they possess a right to rectification..