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This study examines the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff in strategic planning. Such planning began just after World War II as a way of preparing for a global war against the Soviet Union. After the demise of that monolithic threat in 1991, the general consensus of senior military leaders was that threats would become more diffuse and generally confined within a geographic region. That shifted the locus of planning efforts to the combatant commands and away from the Joint Staff. But declining defense budgets and the consequent need to more carefully husband resources prompted the Joint Staff to adopt a role of reviewing and balancing various combatant command plans. By 2015, however, the return of threats with global reach caused the staff to revert to its more centralized role, arbitrating and synchronizing combatant command efforts to address those threats wherever they appeared. This review not only connects presidential level strategy documents to those produced by the Joint Staff across these three different phases, but also for the first time documents how the twenty-first century concept of global integration came to be.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized. The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications. Volume II describes JCS activities during the period 1947 to 1949 except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume is the work of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit of the Historical Division, Joint Secretariat; he developed the volume's concept and outline, performed the research, and wrote the chapters. The initial draft of Chapter 8 was prepared by Miss Judith A. Walters. Mr. William J. Tobin contributed to the production of Chapter 14. Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of the Chief, Histories Branch, Dr. Robert J. Watson. Resource constraints have prevented revision to reflect recent scholarship. Readers familiar with the present-day operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a somewhat different organization and set of procedures—those existing some years before the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. As organized under the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Staff had three main components: the Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Intelligence Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. At an organizational level above the three Joint Staff Groups were three joint committees composed of Service representatives (such as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint Strategic Plans Group). The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned tasks to one of the committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff Group for a report. The resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment, and approval for return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS Committees and Groups that were established under the National Security Act of 1947 were direct successors of elements of the wartime JCS organization that had continued to function in the postwar period. The transition from old forms to new occurred during October 1947 and involved extensive changes in titles.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons. the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.
Volume V describes JCS activities during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration. It traces the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of the basic national security policies of those years, in force planning and strategy development, and in the nascent area of arms control. The volume also describes JCS participation in planning and operations in various areas of the world where the United States was involved, with the exception of the Korean War-a subject covered in The joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III, The Korean War. 1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953 * 2. Basic National Security Policy, 1954 * 3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths * 4. Strategic Planning, 1953-1954 * 5. Continental Air Defense * 6. Mobilization Planning * 7. Manpower Mobilization: Organization of Reserve Forces * 8. Missions and Weapons * 9. Disarmament and Atoms for Peace * 10. Military Assistance * 11. The Far East: Korea * 12. The Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan * 13. Western Europe, 1953 * 14. Western Europe, 1954 * 15. The Middle East * 16. Latin America 1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953 * Policy Issues at the Beginning of 1953 * Early Decisions of the New Administration * A New Statement of National Security Policy: NSC 153/1 * Project Solarium * The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Recommendations * A New Policy Directive: NSC 162/2 * Military Strategy Reexamined: JCS 2101/113 * Differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff * The New Look and Its Interpretation * 2. Basic National Security Policy, 1954 * Framework of Policy Discussion in 1954 * NSC 162/2 and the FY 1956 Budget * JCS Appraisal of Free World Military Posture * First Budget Guidelines * JCS Views on Negotiations with the Soviets * Interim Policy Revision: NCS 5422/2 * Policy Debate Continued * A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5501 * The Direction of Policy in 1954 * 3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths * FY 1954 Goals under the Eisenhower Administration * The JCS Interim Look for FY 1955 * The FY 1955 Budget: Impact of the New Look * FY 1956 Plans and the Indochina Crisis * The Issue of Support Force Recommendations * The Decision to Accelerate Retrenchment * Force Levels under the New Ceilings * FY 1956 Defense Budget * Force Levels and Strategy, 1953-1954 * 4. Strategic Planning, 1953-1954 * The JCS Planning Program: Policy Memorandum 84 * Planning at the Beginning of 1953 * Progress of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan * Development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan * The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate * The Planning Program Reconsidered * The First Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Completed * The Joint Mid-Range War Plan * The 1955-1956 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan * Revision of the Planning Program * The JCS Planning Program: The First Two Years * 5. Continental Air Defense * Plans, Organization, and Forces for Air Defense * Legacy of the Truman Administration * The New Administration Confronts a Dilemma * Service and Continental US Defense Planning Group Proposals * A New Policy for Continental Defense: NSC 159/4 * Continental Defense and the FY 1955 Budget * Canada's Role in the Early Warning System * A Second Look at Continental Defense Plans * Command and Organizational Changes * The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee * Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line * Objectives for FY 1956 * Continental Defense at the End of 1954 * 6. Mobilization Planning * Allocation of Responsibilities * The Eisenhower Administration and the Mobilization Base in 1953 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Stockpile Policy * The Role of the Office of Defense Mobilization Mobilization * Planning as an Issue in 1954 * Mobilization Policy at the End of 1954 * Service Approaches to Mobilization: The Joint Mid-Range War Plan * Mobilization Planning and the New Look * 7. Manpower Mobilization: Organization of Reserve Forces * Manpower Policy as a Problem
Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This paper will first describe the Chairman's statutory responsibilities and strategic challenges, because this affects leaders and the focus of the strategic planning system. The paper then briefly examines how the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) changed in five major ways during the time period of 1990 to 2012 before describing in greater detail the key products and processes of the current system. The paper then goes on to summarize the more significant ways each Chairman used this system during the past 2 decades to produce specific planning products, which is part of their formal leadership legacy. During this time the Chairmen were Generals Powell (1989-93), Shalikashvili (1993-97), Shelton (1997-2001), Myers (2001-05), Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Mullen (2007-11). General Dempsey's current strategic planning focus, since he became Chairman in October 2011, is also summarized. This leadership focus and concluding thoughts provide broad insights into how senior leaders have used the strategic planning system to respond to internal and external challenges. These leadership and management insights are related to the importance of strategic vision, planning system and process characteristics, decision making styles, and organizational change.
When this Volume first saw the light of day some 20 years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union were frozen in one of the most frigid antagonisms of the cold war. Each country was making every effort to develop and deploy the new weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen its own bloc of allies, and to expand its influence and control around the world. To deal with this potent potential enemy, the Eisenhower administration had redirected its strategy and force planning to emphasize strategic retaliatory striking power. Nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles were the essential components of the New Look, as the policy came to be called. Robert J. Watson has described the JCS role in the creation of the New Look in Volume V of this series. This Volume VI is primarily concerned with the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to "fine tune" the New Look through strategic plans, the force levels to support them, and allocation of responsibility among the military services for developing and operating the new weapons systems. This turned out to be a contentious process owing to interservice disagreement. Other important matters involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the strengthening of NATO, extension of collective security to the Middle and Far East through CENTO and SEATO, commenting on arms control proposals, and helping prepare the military assistance program. Organizational matters, which are the subject of other publications by the Historical Office, are omitted. 1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953 * Policy Issues at the Beginning of 1953 * Early Decisions of the New Administration * A New Statement of National Security Policy: NSC 153/1 * Project Solarium * The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Recommendations * A New Policy Directive: NSC 162/2 * Military Strategy Reexamined: JCS 2101/113 * Differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff * The New Look and Its Interpretation * 2. Basic National Security Policy, 1954 * Framework of Policy Discussion in 1954 * NSC 162/2 and the FY 1956 Budget * JCS Appraisal of Free World Military Posture * First Budget Guidelines * JCS Views on Negotiations with the Soviets * Interim Policy Revision: NCS 5422/2 * Policy Debate Continued * A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5501 * The Direction of Policy in 1954 * 3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths * FY 1954 Goals under the Eisenhower Administration * The JCS Interim Look for FY 1955 * The FY 1955 Budget: Impact of the New Look * FY 1956 Plans and the Indochina Crisis * The Issue of Support Force Recommendations * The Decision to Accelerate Retrenchment * Force Levels under the New Ceilings * FY 1956 Defense Budget * Force Levels and Strategy, 1953-1954 * 4. Strategic Planning, 1953-1954 * The JCS Planning Program: Policy Memorandum 84 * Planning at the Beginning of 1953 * Progress of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan * Development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan * The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate * The Planning Program Reconsidered * The First Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Completed * The Joint Mid-Range War Plan * The 1955-1956 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan * Revision of the Planning Program * The JCS Planning Program: The First Two Years * 5. Continental Air Defense * Plans, Organization, and Forces for Air Defense * Legacy of the Truman Administration * The New Administration Confronts a Dilemma * Service and Continental US Defense Planning Group Proposals * A New Policy for Continental Defense: NSC 159/4 * Continental Defense and the FY 1955 Budget * Canada's Role in the Early Warning System * A Second Look at Continental Defense Plans * Command and Organizational Changes * The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee * Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line * Objectives for FY 1956 * Continental Defense at the End of 1954 * 6. Mobilization Planning
Author : Richard M. Meinhart Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College Page : 40 pages File Size : 34,9 MB Release : 2006 Category : Biography & Autobiography ISBN :
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized. The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945-1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications. Volume I describes JCS activities during the period 1945-1947 except for activities related to Indochina, which are covered in a separate series. Contents * 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 * Relationships with the President * The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State * JCS Relations with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) * JCS Participation in the United Nations * Future Prospects * 2. Between War and Peace * Initial US Views of the Postwar World * Differences over Eastern Europe: First Signs of Rift between East and West * A Cautious Reappraisal of Soviet Intentions * The Yalta Conference * Worsening Relations over Eastern Europe * Occupation Plans for Germany and Austria * The Venezia Giulia Confrontation * Creation of the United Nations * Preliminaries to the Potsdam Conference. * JCS Views of Soviet Demands on Turkey * The Meeting at Potsdam * The War Ends * 3. US-Soviet Confrontation Intensifies: September 1945-March 1947 * The London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers * A Problem in Czechoslovakia * Defining US Foreign Policy * The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers * Trouble in Iran * Soviet Policies: Several Views * More Problems in Iran * The Paris Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers * Trouble in Venezia Giulia * The JCS Appraise the Soviet Threat-July 1946 * Possible Aid to Turkey and Iran * The Truman Doctrine Evolves * 4. US Military Policy: Strategic Planning and Command Arrangements * Authority for JCS Participation in Postwar Military Policymaking * The Effects of "New Weapons" on Policy and Strategy * The JCS Propose a US Postwar Military Policy * The JCS Strategic Concept and Plan * Concept of Operations for a Joint Outline War Plan * The JCS Strategic Estimate for the President * Joint Basic Outline War Plan PINCHER * The JCS Advise President Truman on Military Policy * Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning * Unified Command * Strategic Concept and Deployment Planning for the Pacific * 5. Postwar Military Forces: Planning and Problems * US Armed Forces on V-J Day * Early Demobilization Planning * Planning for Demobilization after the Defeat of Japan * Demobilization and the Soviet Threat * Postwar Force Requirements