[PDF] Government Spending Shocks And The Role Of Legislature Size eBook

Author : William Hankins
Publisher :
Page : 20 pages
File Size : 19,7 MB
Release : 2015
Category :
ISBN :

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We examine the relationship between legislature size and several components of government spending using a methodology that allows us to estimate how legislature size influences the fiscal response to shocks that are common to all states. We find little evidence that states with larger than average lower or upper chambers experience a larger change in spending per capita in the presence of a shock. We do find a positive relationship between lower chamber size and the first difference of welfare spending per capita, but this increase is partially of set by a negative relationship between upper chamber size and welfare spending. These results are consistent with the interest group theory of government, which states that larger legislatures can be associated with lobbying and bargaining costs that may have offsetting effects.

Author : William Hankins
Publisher :
Page : 35 pages
File Size : 46,70 MB
Release : 2014
Category :
ISBN :

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Using an estimation method developed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) we study whether the size of a country's legislature impacts its fiscal response to common and country-specific shocks. The use of this method allows us to estimate the effects of legislature size while also controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity; an endogeneity issue common to this literature. We also classify legislatures using a definition of bicameralism based on fiscal power that was previously used by Heller (1997). We find evidence that larger than average upper chambers are associated with more government spending as a percentage of GDP.

Author : Reza Baqir
Publisher : INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 13,16 MB
Release : 2001-12-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9781451874709

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Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.

Author : Alberto Alesina
Publisher : University of Chicago Press
Page : 596 pages
File Size : 36,82 MB
Release : 2013-06-25
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 022601844X

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The recent recession has brought fiscal policy back to the forefront, with economists and policy makers struggling to reach a consensus on highly political issues like tax rates and government spending. At the heart of the debate are fiscal multipliers, whose size and sensitivity determine the power of such policies to influence economic growth. Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis focuses on the effects of fiscal stimuli and increased government spending, with contributions that consider the measurement of the multiplier effect and its size. In the face of uncertainty over the sustainability of recent economic policies, further contributions to this volume discuss the merits of alternate means of debt reduction through decreased government spending or increased taxes. A final section examines how the short-term political forces driving fiscal policy might be balanced with aspects of the long-term planning governing monetary policy. A direct intervention in timely debates, Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis offers invaluable insights about various responses to the recent financial crisis.

Author : John M. Carey
Publisher : University of Michigan Press
Page : 187 pages
File Size : 33,72 MB
Release : 2009-11-12
Category : Law
ISBN : 0472024108

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It has been predicted that term limits in state legislatures--soon to be in effect in eighteen states--will first affect the composition of the legislatures, next the behavior of legislators, and finally legislatures as institutions. The studies in Term Limits in State Legislatures demonstrate that term limits have had considerably less effect on state legislatures than proponents predicted. The term-limit movement--designed to limit the maximum time a legislator can serve in office--swept through the states like wildfire in the first half of the 1990s. By November 2000, state legislators will have been "term limited out" in eleven states. This book is based on a survey of nearly 3,000 legislators from all fifty states along with intensive interviews with twenty-two legislative leaders in four term-limited states. The data were collected as term limits were just beginning to take effect in order to capture anticipatory effects of the reform, which set in as soon as term limit laws were passed. In order to understand the effects of term limits on the broader electoral arena, the authors also examine data on advancement of legislators between houses of state legislatures and from the state legislatures to Congress. The results show that there are no systematic differences between term limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature (e.g., professional backgrounds, demographics, ideology). Yet with respect to legislative behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers. This book will be of interest both to political scientists, policymakers, and activists involved in state politics. John M. Carey is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. Richard G. Niemi is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester. Lynda W. Powell is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester.

Author : Daniel Shaviro
Publisher : University of Chicago Press
Page : 362 pages
File Size : 44,35 MB
Release : 1997-05
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780226751122

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Do deficits matter? Yes and no, says Daniel Shaviro in this political and economic study. Yes, because fiscal policy affects generational distribution, national saving, and the level of government spending. And no, because the deficit is an inaccurate measure with little economic content. This book provides an invaluable guide for anyone wanting to know exactly what is at stake for Americans in this ongoing debate. "[An] excellent, comprehensive, and illuminating book. Its analysis, deftly integrating considerations of economics, law, politics, and philosophy, brings the issues of 'balanced budgets,' national saving, and intergenerational equity out of the area of religious crusades and into an arena of reason. . . . A magnificent, judicious, and balanced treatment. It should be read and studied not just by specialists in fiscal policy but by all those in the economic and political community."—Robert Eisner, Journal of Economic Literature "Shaviro's history, economics, and political analysis are right on the mark. For all readers."—Library Journal

Author : Bruce Cain
Publisher :
Page : 279 pages
File Size : 13,74 MB
Release : 2013-10
Category :
ISBN : 9780674493254

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"The Personal Vote" describes the behavior of representatives in the United States and Great Britain and the response of their constituents as well. It shows how congressmen and members of Parliament earn personalized support and how this attenuates their ties to national leaders and parties. This book is essential for specialists in American national government, British politics, and comparative legislatures and comparative parties.