[PDF] Fixed Term Contracts And Unemployment eBook

Author : Roger Blanpain
Publisher : Kluwer Law International B.V.
Page : 226 pages
File Size : 19,13 MB
Release : 2010-01-01
Category : Law
ISBN : 9041133569

GET BOOK

In recent decades enterprises worldwide have reaped advantages of hiring employees on a contractual fixed-term basis, thus derogating from their traditional participation in the social protection of workers and insulating themselves from legal liability for unjust dismissal. A broad spectrum of effectiveness has emerged in this development, as different countries have adopted varying measures to regulate the conditions under which fixed- term employment contracts are written, applied, and interpreted. This important book --- which reprints papers submitted to the 10th Comparative Labour Law Seminar of the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training held in Tokyo on 8 and 9 March 2010 - details the regulatory approaches to fixed-term contracts in major industrial jurisdictions in Asia and Europe, providing an opportunity to explore normative directions for labour law and policy in the age of a diversified workforce. Nine Knowledgeable and experienced contributors describe and analyse the legal status of fixed-term employment contracts (including relevant case law) in Australia, Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and Taiwan. Each author takes into account evaluations from scholars, policymakers, and stakeholders to his or her country's regulatory approach to fixed-term employment contracts, revealing an array of responses ranging from a view that such contracts enhance employment opportunities in society to advocating suppression of their use as inherently abusive and discriminatory. The combined effect of these nine essays is to greatly increase our awareness of the nature of fixed-term employment contracts, from their fundamental value as social policy instruments to their inextricable connection with the law of dismissal. The book sets the stage for deeper and more firmly grounded work that promises to elucidate the underlying pattern of a new employer-employee relationship emerging on a worldwide scale.

Author : Fernando Alvarez
Publisher :
Page : 84 pages
File Size : 35,54 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Labor contract
ISBN :

GET BOOK

This paper analyzes the effects of fixed-term contracts using a version of the Lucas and Prescott island model with undirected search. A fixed-term contract of length J is modeled as a tax on separations of workers with tenure higher than J . While in principle these policies require a very large state space to analyze the firms and households' problems, we show that equilibrium allocations solve a simple dynamic programming problem. Analyzing this problem we show that equilibrium employment dynamics are characterized by two dimensional inaction sets. Finally, to understand the effect of these contracts, we compare them with two extreme cases: for J = 1 the fixed-term contracts are equivalent to the case of firing taxes, and for large J they are equivalent to the laissez-faire case. In a calibrated version of the model, we find that temporary contracts with J equivalent to three years length close about half of the gap between those two extremes.

Author : Irma Mooi-Reci
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 10,79 MB
Release : 2015
Category :
ISBN :

GET BOOK

Using a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of prime-age Dutch workers over the period 1980-2000, we examine how a previously held job with a fixed-term contract influences both the likelihood and the duration of a future spell of unemployment. Analyses show that Dutch workers with fixed-term contracts experience higher risks of future unemployment and have no shorter spells of unemployment compared to workers with regular contracts. Results also reveal that swifter employment re-entries among men with fixed-term contracts can be explained by their job search efforts before unemployment. Our study (partly) invalidates theoretical positions that claim that fixed-term contracts foster employment security by shortening unemployment durations; suggesting that fixed-term contracts are a short-term blessing that could end, for some workers, in a recurrent unemployment trap.