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This paper studies the impact of financing decisions onrisk-averse managers. Leverage raises stock volatility, driving a wedge between the cost of debt to shareholders and the cost to undiversified, risk-averse managers. I quantify these "volatility costs" of debt and examine their impact on financing decisions. The paper finds: (1) the volatility costs of debt can be large, particularly if the CEO owns in-the-money options; (2) higher option ownership tends to increase, not decrease, the volatility costs of debt; (3) a stock price increase typically reduces managerial preference for leverage, consistent with prior evidence on security issues. Empirically, I estimate the volatility costs of debt for a large sample of U.S. firms and test whether these costs affect financing decisions. I find evidence that volatility costs affect both the level of and short-term changes in debt. Further, a profit model of security issues suggests that managerial preferences help explain a firm's choice between debt and equity. Keywords: Executive Compensation, Stock Options, Risk Incentives, Leverage. JEL Classifications: G3, G32, M52.
This paper presents a theoretical framework for understanding the interaction between production-investment decisions on the one hand, and the associated financing decisions of nonfinancial enterprises over the business cycle. At the core of this theoretical framework is an agency problem between relatively more risk averse bondholders and relatively less risk averse stockholders over the future business decisions of the firm. In this paper the solution to this agency problem is an up-front contract that directs the manager of the firm to make production-investment decisions in the interest of their stockholders, and financing decisions in the interest of their bondholders. External taste shocks initiate business cycles in this model by changing the risk aversion and required yield of shareholders. The resulting changes in share prices then sends a signal to managers to change the production-investment strategy of the firm. The changes in the production-investment strategy of firms cause business cycles. The up-front contract protecting the interests of bondholders then constrains the managers to implement a matching financial strategy (e.g., a financial leverage decision and dividend payout decision) that offsets any shock induced changes in the risk of their production-investment strategy. In this way bondholders and stockholders equitably share the risk and return resulting from the business decisions put in place by their firms over the business cycle.
The book answers a simple question: when managers and companies face a decision with two outcomes that are safe and risky, what leads them to choose the risky alternative? The answer starts with a detailed review of the theory behind risk and decision making by managers. The book then gathers real-world evidence using two surveys of senior managers and directors to analyze why they take risks, and how companies control risks.
This handbook in two parts covers key topics of the theory of financial decision making. Some of the papers discuss real applications or case studies as well. There are a number of new papers that have never been published before especially in Part II.Part I is concerned with Decision Making Under Uncertainty. This includes subsections on Arbitrage, Utility Theory, Risk Aversion and Static Portfolio Theory, and Stochastic Dominance. Part II is concerned with Dynamic Modeling that is the transition for static decision making to multiperiod decision making. The analysis starts with Risk Measures and then discusses Dynamic Portfolio Theory, Tactical Asset Allocation and Asset-Liability Management Using Utility and Goal Based Consumption-Investment Decision Models.A comprehensive set of problems both computational and review and mind expanding with many unsolved problems are in an accompanying problems book. The handbook plus the book of problems form a very strong set of materials for PhD and Masters courses both as the main or as supplementary text in finance theory, financial decision making and portfolio theory. For researchers, it is a valuable resource being an up to date treatment of topics in the classic books on these topics by Johnathan Ingersoll in 1988, and William Ziemba and Raymond Vickson in 1975 (updated 2 nd edition published in 2006).
This paper describes an equilibrium macro finance model where contracts are the mechanism by which differentially risk averse bondholders and stockholders resolve a conflict of interest problem and confront the risks associated with future operating decisions and financing decisions of a representative firm/economy. In resolving this conflict of interest problem the interrelated covenants in the financial contract shape certain stylized financial facts of business cycles ignored in Classical and Keynesian models. The model set-up includes 2 agents (bondholders and stockholders); 2 decisions (production-investment decisions generating operating income and operating risk) and (financial decisions generating financial risk); and 2 no-arbitrage equilibrium conditions (market value equals economic book value for both bonds and stocks). In this 2x2x2 set-up contract constrained managers of the representative firm make production-investment decisions that conform to the risk aversion of stockholders as reflected in stock prices, and then use financing decisions to offset any effect of a change in operating risk on the market valuation of bonds. In this model managers work for both stockholders and bondholders. Preliminary evidence from the U.S. non-financial corporate sector does not reject the predictions of the model. A similar form of risk and return sharing is shown to occur between more risk averse mature and experienced workers with seniority and less risk averse young apprentice workers.
In high-stakes investing and business, success or failure largely depends on how well you play the game of risk-a game in which the rules of competition are constantly being rewritten. Strategies that proved effective in the past are no longer enough to win today. The key to success is not to rely on yesterday's news, but to peer into the future and ask what could happen tomorrow. Presenting a bold new way of thinking about risk, in Seeing Tomorrow Ron Dembo and Andrew Freeman offer a dynamic framework designed to enhance our ability to make important decisions, and consequently change how we manage our investments. By incorporating investors' individual circumstances and tolerances -as well as the unique reasoning behind their decision making-this innovative approach captures much more of how we actually think about risk. From the basic building blocks required for forward-looking risk management, Dembo and Freeman define and explore the roles and significance of such fundamentals as time horizons, risk measures, benchmarks, and scenarios. Once the foundation is laid, these elements are used to construct a solid architecture for risk management and risk-adjusted analysis that is not only general enough to be able to handle a multitude of risks, but also able to present many different measures of risk. With clear-cut explanations and intriguing real-world examples, Seeing Tomorrow leads you step by step through the authors' groundbreaking risk rules. These include: choosing an appropriate time horizon, selecting scenarios, computing Value at Risk (VAR), assessing both the upside and downside of a potential deal, calculating Regret, and compiling a reliable Regret matrix. By combining Regret, Upside, and a measure of our tolerance for risk, the authors demonstrate how these components create a powerful new way of approaching decisions. They offer guidance on very specific real life problems-such as buying a house or suing someone-as well as on broad matters of strategy and investing. Written by two leading authorities in the field, Seeing Tomorrow is a milestone addition to risk literature that will dramatically alter the way you view, identify, and manage risk. It is must reading for investors and decision makers alike. "Seeing Tomorrow is a powerhouse in the understanding of risk. With their ingenious blend of psychology and rigorous quantitative analysis, the authors have created an authoritative and innovative handbook of risk management that is essential for both practitioners and theoreticians." -Peter L. Bernstein author, Against the Gods and Capital Ideas. "This excellent and readable book provides an innovative approach to choosing actions when the outcomes are uncertain. Anyone with an interest in improving their decision-making skills would benefit from reading this. Anyone with a professional interest in risk management must read it." -Stephen A. Ross Fischer Black Visiting Professor of Finance Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management Sterling Professor of Economics and Finance, Yale University. "Ron Dembo and Andrew Freeman have done an excellent job of describing how to think about and measure risk. This will become required reading for businesses and personal investment executives." -Ned C. Lautenbach.
A comprehensive guide to making better capital structure and corporate financing decisions in today's dynamic business environment Given the dramatic changes that have recently occurred in the economy, the topic of capital structure and corporate financing decisions is critically important. The fact is that firms need to constantly revisit their portfolio of debt, equity, and hybrid securities to finance assets, operations, and future growth. Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions provides an in-depth examination of critical capital structure topics, including discussions of basic capital structure components, key theories and practices, and practical application in an increasingly complex corporate world. Throughout, the book emphasizes how a sound capital structure simultaneously minimizes the firm's cost of capital and maximizes the value to shareholders. Offers a strategic focus that allows you to understand how financing decisions relates to a firm's overall corporate policy Consists of contributed chapters from both academics and experienced professionals, offering a variety of perspectives and a rich interplay of ideas Contains information from survey research describing actual financial practices of firms This valuable resource takes a practical approach to capital structure by discussing why various theories make sense and how firms use them to solve problems and create wealth. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the insights found here are essential to excelling in today's volatile business environment.
ABSTRACT: My dissertation examines the impact that executive compensation has on external financing decisions. In my first essay I examine the long-run stock and operating performance of firms following seasoned equity offerings based on the level of equity-based compensation the top five managers receive. I find that firms paying high levels of equity-based compensation experience lower abnormal stock returns and less favorable changes in operating performance in the three-year period following the issue than firms paying low, or no, equity-based compensation. Moreover, in calendar-time regressions, post-issue stock returns of issuers who pay high equity-based compensation do not load significantly on an investment factor, suggesting that these issuers have non-investment motives. Overall the findings support the premise that managers receiving high equity-based compensation act in the interest of current shareholders by issuing equity when they believe their stock is overvalued, while managers receiving low equity-based compensation do not. My second essay examines to what extent executive stock options received by the top five executives affects capital structure decisions and the debt-equity choice, and whether these effects are strengthened when a firm is near, or has recently received, a credit rating change. I hypothesize that executives receiving higher levels of stock options, especially stock options held that are in-the-money, as a percentage of their overall compensation are more risk averse due to greater sensitivity of their personal wealth portfolios to firm stock performance. As a result, they reduce the riskiness of the firm by reducing the amount of debt in the capital structure of the firm and issuing equity rather than debt when raising external financing. I also expect that the risk reduction is more pronounced when the firm is near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade, or has recently received a credit rating downgrade.