[PDF] Fictional Wage Dispersion In Search Models eBook

Author :
Publisher :
Page : pages
File Size : 27,50 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Unemployment
ISBN :

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Standard search and matching models of equilibrium unemployment, once properly calibrated, can generate only a small amount of frictional wage dispersion, i.e., wage differentials among ex-ante similar workers induced purely by search frictions. We derive this result for a specific measure of wage dispersion -- the ratio between the average wage and the lowest (reservation) wage paid. We show that in a large class of search and matching models this statistic (the "mean-min ratio") can be obtained in closed form as a function of observable variables (i.e., the interest rate, the value of leisure, and statistics of labor market turnover). Various independent data sources suggest that actual residual wage dispersion (i.e., inequality among observationally similar workers) exceeds the model's prediction by a factor of 20. We discuss three extensions of the model (risk aversion, volatile wages during employment, and on-the-job search) and find that, in their simplest versions, they can improve its performance, but only modestly. We conclude that either frictions account for a tiny fraction of residual wage dispersion, or the standard model needs to be augmented to confront the data. In particular, the last generation of models with on-the-job search appears promising.

Author : Andreas Hornstein
Publisher :
Page : 56 pages
File Size : 28,25 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Labor market
ISBN :

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Standard search and matching models of equilibrium unemployment, once properly calibrated, can generate only a small amount of frictional wage dispersion, i.e., wage differentials among ex-ante similar workers induced purely by search frictions. We derive this result for a specific measure of wage dispersion -- the ratio between the average wage and the lowest (reservation) wage paid. We show that in a large class of search and matching models this statistic (the "mean-min ratio") can be obtained in closed form as a function of observable variables (i.e., the interest rate, the value of leisure, and statistics of labor market turnover). Various independent data sources suggest that actual residual wage dispersion (i.e., inequality among observationally similar workers) exceeds the model's prediction by a factor of 20. We discuss three extensions of the model (risk aversion, volatile wages during employment, and on-the-job search) and find that, in their simplest versions, they can improve its performance, but only modestly. We conclude that either frictions account for a tiny fraction of residual wage dispersion, or the standard model needs to be augmented to confront the data. In particular, the last generation of models with on-the-job search appears promising.

Author : Giovanni Sulis
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 36,99 MB
Release : 2008
Category :
ISBN :

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This paper provides a structural estimation of an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search and heterogeneity in firms' productivities using a sample of Italian male workers. Results indicate that arrival rates of offers for workers are higher when unemployed than when employed and firms exploit their monopsony power when setting wages. As a result, workers earn far less than their marginal product. The model is then used to study regional labour market differentials in Italy. Wide variation in frictional transition parameters across areas helps to explain persistent unemployment and wage differentials.

Author : Damien Gaumont
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 30 pages
File Size : 11,27 MB
Release : 2005
Category : Labor market
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We analyze labor market models where the law of one price does not hold-that is, models with equilibrium wage dispersion. We begin by assuming workers are ex ante heterogeneous, and highlight a flaw with this approach: if search is costly, the market shuts down. We then assume workers are homogeneous, but matches are ex post heterogeneous. This model is robust to search costs, and it delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. However, we prove the law of two prices holds: generically, we cannot get more than two wages. We explore several other models, including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, which is robust and can deliver more than two-point wage distributions.

Author : Damien Gaumont
Publisher : INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Page : 16 pages
File Size : 47,79 MB
Release : 2006-01-01
Category :
ISBN : 9781451862799

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Search models with posting and match-specific heterogeneity generate wage dispersion. Given K values for the match-specific variable, it is known that there are K reservation wages that could be posted, but generically never more than two actually are posted in equilibrium. What is unknown is when we get two wages, and which wages are actually posted. For an example with K = 3, we show equilibrium is unique; may have one wage or two; and when there are two, the equilibrium can display any combination of posted reservation wages, depending on parameters. We also show how wages, profits, and unemployment depend on productivity.

Author : Robert Ernest Hall
Publisher :
Page : 55 pages
File Size : 17,96 MB
Release : 2015
Category : Job hunting
ISBN :

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We use a rich new body of data on the experiences of unemployed job-seekers to determine the sources of wage dispersion and to create a search model consistent with the acceptance decisions the job-seekers made. From the data and the model, we identify the distributions of four key variables: offered wages, offered non-wage job values, the value of the job-seeker's non-work alternative, and the job-seeker's personal productivity. We find that, conditional on personal productivity, the dispersion of offered wages is moderate, accounting for 21 percent of the total variation in observed offered wages, whereas the dispersion of the non-wage component of offered job values is substantially larger. We relate our findings to an influential recent paper by Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante who called attention to the tension between the fairly high dispersion of the values job-seekers assign to their job offers--which suggest a high value to sampling from multiple offers--and the fact that the job-seekers often accept the first offer they receive.

Author : Matthias S. Hertweck
Publisher :
Page : pages
File Size : 14,99 MB
Release : 2010
Category :
ISBN :

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This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion in US data. The standard job matching model without on-the-job search cannot replicate this pattern. With on-the-job search, however, unemployed job searchers are more willing to accept low wage offers since they can continue to seek for better employment opportunities. This explains why observably identical workers may be paid very differently. Therefore, we examine the quantitative implications of on-the-job search in a stochastic job matching model. Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the degree of frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude.