[PDF] Exchange Rate Regimes And Fiscal Discipline eBook

Author : João Tovar Jalles
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 30 pages
File Size : 35,81 MB
Release : 2016-11-17
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1475555784

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We look at the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, taking into account the effect of underlying political conditions. We present a model where strong politics (defined as policymakers facing longer political horizon and higher cohesion) are associated with better fiscal performance, but fixed exchange rates may revert this result and lead to less fiscal discipline. We confirm these hypotheses through regression analysis performed on a panel sample covering 79 countries from 1975 to 2012. Our empirical results also show that the positive effect of strong politics on fiscal discipline is not enough to counter the negative impact of being at/moving to fixed exchange rates. Finally, we use the synthetic control method to illustrate how the transition from flexible to fully fixed exchange rate under the Euro impacted negatively fiscal discipline in European countries. Our results are robust to a number of important sensitivity checks, including different estimators, alternative proxies for fiscal discipline, and sub-sample analysis.

Author : Mr.Yan Sun
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 32 pages
File Size : 15,22 MB
Release : 2003-04-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1451850123

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Conventional wisdom has held that a fixed exchange rate regime induces more fiscal discipline, but Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998) argue the opposite. Using a dynamic model with fragmented fiscal policymaking, this paper evaluates the two arguments in a single framework and shows that (1) future punishment against fiscal laxity exists under both fixed and flexible regimes; (2) fiscal authorities have a greater incentive to spend more today under fixed rates than under flexible rates; (3) in the presence of both factors above, fixed rates will induce more fiscal discipline only if the future punishment is sufficiently stronger than under flexible rates; and (4) neither fixed nor flexible rates could resolve the structural distortions caused by fragmented policymaking, and fiscal centralization needs to be undertaken to strengthen fiscal discipline.

Author : Rupa Duttagupta
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
Page : 42 pages
File Size : 46,34 MB
Release : 2006-05
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :

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This paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or "free-ride" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004.

Author : Enrique Alberola
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 42,41 MB
Release : 2007
Category :
ISBN :

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Empirical evidence shows that fixed exchange rates do not provide more fiscal discipline than flexible regimes, despite the fact that, in principle, fixing the exchange rate imposes important restrictions on seignoriage revenues. A more detailed analysis of seignoriage allows to explain the channels whereby monetary financing is possible in the short and medium run even in a exchange rate peg. More precisely, it is argued that the traditional concept of money seignoriage is misguiding and that fiscal seignoriage, defined as the actual revenues accruing to govern from the Central Bank, is a key variable to determine fiscal discipline. The paper shows that a peculiar version of fixed regimes, the currency boards, may effectively restrain fiscal policy by ruling out fiscal seignoriage. An indirect confirmation of these hypotesis is advanced by observing the empirical link between monetary seignoriage and fiscal seignoriage, and their relation with fiscal discipline.

Author : Kady Keita
Publisher :
Page : 36 pages
File Size : 17,12 MB
Release : 2019
Category :
ISBN :

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This paper examines how fiscal rules, exchange rate regimes, and institutional quality affect the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy (how government spending responds to fluctuations in gross domestic product). The analysis is performed on a panel of 153 advanced, emerging, and developing countries over 1993-2015 using local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimators. The findings show that the adoption of fiscal rules alone is not sufficient to promote countercyclical fiscal policy and should be combined with strong institutions. Moreover, fiscal rules seem to limit procyclicality, especially in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes rather than in countries with fixed exchange rates. The analysis also finds that the disciplining effect of fiscal rules depends on the type of rule.

Author : Friedrich Heinemann
Publisher :
Page : 20 pages
File Size : 12,5 MB
Release : 1999
Category :
ISBN :

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Since the start of EMU national fiscal policy in the Eurozone can be conducted almost without paying any attention to consequences for the exchange rate. This might lower fiscal discipline. In order to shed light on the empirical relevance of this consideration, the impact of the exchange rate regime and a number of other variables on primary deficits is analysed in a panel estimation for 20 OECD countries from 1970 onwards. The conclusion is that the exchange rate regime as such is not relevant for the fiscal balance - a result backing an optimistic view on fiscal discipline under EMU. On the other hand, however, there is the result that a high degree of openness has a deficit reducing impact. This is a worrying result in the EMU context since the single currency reduces openness. The study underlines the efficacy of the Maastricht criteria. The criteria and not economic necessity have dictated the consolidation in the EU during the 90s.