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This book explores the factors that explain incumbent and opposition behavior in electoral authoritarian regimes. It focuses on states in the post-Soviet region and finds variation in the types of manipulation, the formation of opposition coalitions as well as election boycotts.
Focusing on the case of Russia during Putin's first two presidential terms, this book examines media manipulation strategies in electoral authoritarian regimes. Which instruments and approaches do incumbent elites employ to skew media coverage in favour of their preferred candidate in a presidential election? What effects do these strategies have on news content? Based on two case studies of the presidential election campaigns in Russia in 2000 and in 2008, this investigation identifies the critical internal mechanisms according to which these regimes work. Looking at the same country, while it transformed from a competitive into a hegemonic authoritarian regime, allows one to make a diachronic comparison of these two regime types based on the Most-Similar Systems Design. The book explicates the subtle differences between competitive and hegemonic regimes, different types of media manipulation strategies, the diverging extent of media instrumentalisation, various interactions among state actors, large business owners, the media, and journalists, the respective effects that all these factors and interactions have on media content, and the peculiar types of bias prevalent in each type of regime. This deep exploration of post-Soviet politics is based on extensive review of documents, interviews with media professionals, and quantitative as well as qualitative content analyses of news media during two Russian presidential election campaigns.
This book examines how opposition groups respond to the dilemma posed by authoritarian elections in the Arab World, with specific focus on Jordan and Algeria. While scholars have investigated critical questions such as why authoritarian rulers would hold elections and whether such elections lead to further political liberalization, there has been comparatively little work on the strategies adopted by opposition groups during authoritarian elections. Nevertheless, we know their strategic choices can have important implications for the legitimacy of the electoral process, reform, democratization, and post-election conflicts. This project fills in an important gap in our understanding of opposition politics under authoritarianism by offering an explanation for the range of strategies adopted by opposition groups in the face of contentious elections in the Arab World.
From 1998 to 2005, six elections took place in postcommunist Europe that had the surprising outcome of empowering the opposition and defeating authoritarian incumbents or their designated successors. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik compare these unexpected electoral breakthroughs. They draw three conclusions. First, the opposition was victorious because of the hard and creative work of a transnational network composed of local opposition and civil society groups, members of the international democracy assistance community and graduates of successful electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in other countries. Second, the remarkable run of these upset elections reflected the ability of this network to diffuse an ensemble of innovative electoral strategies across state boundaries. Finally, elections can serve as a powerful mechanism for democratic change. This is especially the case when civil society is strong, the transfer of political power is through constitutional means, and opposition leaders win with small mandates.
Russia today represents one of the major examples of the phenomenon of "electoral authoritarianism" which is characterized by adopting the trappings of democratic institutions (such as elections, political parties, and a legislature) and enlisting the service of the country's essentially authoritarian rulers. Why and how has the electoral authoritarian regime been consolidated in Russia? What are the mechanisms of its maintenance, and what is its likely future course? This book attempts to answer these basic questions. Vladimir Gel'man examines regime change in Russia from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present day, systematically presenting theoretical and comparative perspectives of the factors that affected regime changes and the authoritarian drift of the country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's national political elites aimed to achieve their goals by creating and enforcing of favorable "rules of the game" for themselves and maintaining informal winning coalitions of cliques around individual rulers. In the 1990s, these moves were only partially successful given the weakness of the Russian state and troubled post-socialist economy. In the 2000s, however, Vladimir Putin rescued the system thanks to the combination of economic growth and the revival of the state capacity he was able to implement by imposing a series of non-democratic reforms. In the 2010s, changing conditions in the country have presented new risks and challenges for the Putin regime that will play themselves out in the years to come.
Today, electoral authoritarianism represents the most common form of political regime in the developing world - and the one we know least about. Filling in the lacuna, this book presents cutting-edge research on the internal dynamics of electoral authoritarian regimes.
Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.
Although the phenomenon of authoritarian elections has been a focal point for the literature on authoritarian institutions for more than a decade, our understanding of the effect of authoritarian elections is still limited. Combining evidence from cross-national studies with studies on selected cases relying on recent field work, this book suggests a solution to the "paradox of authoritarian elections". Rather than focusing on authoritarian elections as a uniform phenomenon, it focuses on the differing conditions under which authoritarian elections occur. It demonstrates that the capacities available to authoritarian rulers shape the effect of elections and high levels of state capacity and control over the economy increase the probability that authoritarian multi-party elections will stabilize the regime. Where these capacities are limited, the regime is more likely to succumb in the face of elections. The findings imply that although multi-party competition and state strength may be important prerequisites for democracy, they can under some circumstances obstruct democratization by preventing the demise of dictatorships. This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of democratization, and to those who study autocracy and electoral authoritarianism, as well as comparative politics more broadly.
Approximately one third of the world's states are competitive authoritarian regimes, where opposition parties compete against powerful incumbents that skew political and electoral institutions to their advantage. A key challenge for opposition parties in such regimes is to expand their electoral support and work with other opposition actors to win greater power. Under what conditions are they successful in building broad-based and coordinated challenges to authoritarian rulers? This dissertation argues that opposition success hinges on their strategic choices in elections and in office - and how they navigate key tradeoffs and dilemmas of expansion. Individual opposition parties face diverging incentives and costs to expand based on the identities and issues around which they initially build support. At the collective level, opposition parties often seek to coordinate their electoral challenges against the incumbent to build broader power. But when opposition parties work together, they face strong pressure to stick with their existing niche identities, since pursuing strategies of party broadening - changes to party image to appeal to new constituencies - risks encroaching on the electoral terrain and core constituencies of their coalition partners. As a result, parties frequently struggle to navigate conflicting incentives of individual and collective electoral strategies to win power. The dissertation tests the theory empirically using evidence from Malaysia, until 2018 the world's longest-running dominant party authoritarian government. It analyzes the strategies and variable success of the country's opposition parties in pursuing their core electoral and policy goals and coordinating their efforts in this environment - and why they were ultimately successful in securing substantial electoral support. Additional case studies illustrate how individual and collective dilemmas of expansion inform opposition behavior in other competitive authoritarian regimes. The study offers new insights into why opposition parties have difficulty in unseating even weak authoritarian incumbents, and the conditions under which they successfully scale up their power.
Author : Lee Morgenbesser Publisher : State University of New York Press Page : 294 pages File Size : 14,29 MB Release : 2016-09-07 Category : Political Science ISBN : 1438462891
Behind the Façade examines the question of why authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia bother holding elections. Using comprehensive case studies of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore, Lee Morgenbesser argues that elections allow authoritarian regimes to collect information, pursue legitimacy, manage political elites, and sustain neopatrimonial domination. He demonstrates how these functions are employed to manage the complex strategic interaction that occurs between dictators, political elites, and citizens. Far from being mere window dressing or even a precursor to democracy, flawed elections, Morgenbesser concludes, are paramount to the maintenance of authoritarian rule.