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Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?

Author : Dennis W. Carlton
Publisher : BiblioGov
Page : 28 pages
File Size : 30,57 MB
Release : 2013-06
Category :
ISBN : 9781289102685

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In 2002, Congress established the Antitrust Modernization Commission to address whether the antitrust laws needed to be changed in light of globalization and rapid technological change. This paper addresses that question. Although the basic framework of the antitrust laws is suitable to deal with current economic conditions, the paper identifies several areas where antitrust can be improved. The paper first examines whether the proper criterion for antitrust should be total or consumer surplus. Then it identifies some key issues that need to be clarified and explains how they should be clarified. Those issues include market definition, merger policy and the treatment of efficiencies, the interaction of antitrust and intellectual property, exclusionary conduct, the right of indirect purchasers to sue, and the proper allocation of responsibility between regulation and antitrust.

Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?

Author : Dennis W. Carlton
Publisher :
Page : 25 pages
File Size : 45,40 MB
Release : 2007
Category :
ISBN :

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In 2002, Congress established the Antitrust Modernization Commission to address whether the antitrust laws needed to be changed in light of globalization and rapid technological change. This paper addresses that question. Although the basic framework of the antitrust laws is suitable to deal with current economic conditions, the paper identifies several areas where antitrust can be improved. The paper first examines whether the proper criterion for antitrust should be total or consumer surplus. Then it identifies some key issues that need to be clarified and explains how they should be clarified. Those issues include market definition, merger policy and the treatment of efficiencies, the interaction of antitrust and intellectual property, exclusionary conduct, the right of indirect purchasers to sue, and the proper allocation of responsibility between regulation and antitrust.

Pictures at the New Economy Exhibition

Author : Michael A. Carrier
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 34,67 MB
Release : 2015
Category :
ISBN :

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Is antitrust law up to the task of addressing the "New Economy"? That is the question many have asked in recent years. And that is one of the key questions addressed by the Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC"), a commission that Congress established in 2002 "to examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws." Because antitrust in fact is able to address the new economy, the AMC got the big picture right. The related middle picture is whether the antitrust laws - primarily sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act - can take into account innovation and intellectual property ("IP"). Because they can, the AMC also was right in concluding that the statutes do not need to be revised. The little picture involves more specific issues that the AMC did not address. One neglected issue, which the AMC had promised to review, involved "innovation markets," or markets for research and development. The Commission also sidestepped the most contentious issue in the IP-antitrust intersection today: patent settlement agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical firms and generic drug manufacturers. The wrong picture is composed of patents. The AMC, made up of antitrust attorneys and economists, offered no particular expertise in addressing the complicated topic of patent reform. But the Commission tiptoed into the area to offer one substantive recommendation. Given that it considered nine patent reforms, the AMC's sole focus on the "nonobviousness" doctrine demonstrates that it included a wrong picture in the new economy exhibition.

Antitrust Modernization

Author : Luigi Ferrigno
Publisher : Nova Science Publishers
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 24,63 MB
Release : 2010
Category : Antitrust law
ISBN : 9781607418054

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First, this book is fundamentally an endorsement of free-market principles. These principles have driven the success of the U.S. economy and will continue to fuel the investment and innovation that are essential to ensuring our continued welfare. Second, this book judges the state of the U.S. antitrust laws as "sound". Certainly, there are ways in which antitrust enforcement can be improved. The book identifies several. Third, the Commission does not believe that new or different rules are needed to address so-called "new economy" issues. That does not mean the Commission sees no room for improvement. To the contrary, the Commission makes several recommendations for change. This book highlights the overview of the Antitrust and the manners in which the Commission intends to improve what requires improvement.

The Antitrust Paradox

Author : Robert Bork
Publisher :
Page : 536 pages
File Size : 20,71 MB
Release : 2021-02-22
Category :
ISBN : 9781736089712

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The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Tying

Author : David S. Evans
Publisher :
Page : 26 pages
File Size : 36,60 MB
Release : 2006
Category :
ISBN :

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U.S. antitrust law has made enormous strides in the last twenty years towards becoming intellectually coherent and based on sound economic analysis. Economic analysis now has a preeminent place in evaluating and bringing cases, among enforcement agencies and in the courts. There is no serious debate that unilateral practices should be subjected to a per se test rather than a rule of reason analysis. Likewise, there is no debate among economists or legal scholars that tying should be removed from the genus of unilateral practices and placed in its own leper colony.The time has therefore come to abandon the per se label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have. The law of tie-ins will thus be brought into accord with the law applicable to all other allegedly anticompetitive economic arrangements, except those few horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints that can be said to have no economic justification whatsoever. This change will rationalize rather than abandon tie - in doctrine as it is already applied. Modern antitrust analysis does not support the per se condemnation of tying or the Jefferson Parish test. Neither should modern antitrust law.

Other Markets, Other Costs

Author : Jeffrey Lynch Harrison
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 43,97 MB
Release : 2017
Category :
ISBN :

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Today's antitrust law is characterized by stagnation and indeterminacy. The failure is so thorough that it is not clear that U.S. competition law actually leads to any outcomes that are defendable except at the most superficial level. Moreover, when enforcement does result in a desirable outcome, it not clear that it is the best outcome. The principal reason for this state of affairs is that antitrust scholars and courts cling to misguided goals and theories that have not evolved despite an avalanche of information now available that can modernize the discipline. This Article has two main sections that necessarily overlap. The first examines the three principal goals of antitrust -- consumer surplus, allocative efficiency, and productive efficiency -- and explains why they are imperfect, incomplete, and indeterminate guides for policy. The purpose of this section is not to express a nihilistic view of antitrust but to demonstrate that those who protect the status quo approach to antitrust stand on a wobbly foundation and to suggest that if the current rigidity in antitrust economics continues it will be at the expense of the relevancy of the discipline. It includes, sometimes by implication, proposals for improvement. The second section continues that basic theme but considers two areas in which growth is needed if antitrust is to remain relevant in the next fifty years. They may or may not be addressed but, if they are not, the legitimacy of antitrust economics and its application will surely be called into question. This material stresses the need, if there is to be a coherent antitrust policy, to broaden the scope of factors to consider when assessing the effectiveness of modern competition policy. The concluding section offers specific recommendations for the modernization of antitrust.