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During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.
This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.
It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.
This innovative new book aims to put society's fight against terrorism into a comprehensive crime prevention perspective with a clear, understandable theoretical foundation, developing a general model for the prevention of crime which is, in this book, applied to terrorism.
Author : Alex S. Wilner Publisher : University of Pennsylvania Press Page : 265 pages File Size : 39,89 MB Release : 2015-01-21 Category : Political Science ISBN : 0812292049
Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.
This monograph summarizes the findings of a six-month project on deterrence of terrorism conducted jointly by RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). This study was initiated by a request to develop a framework for deterring terrorism. It was subsequently broadened to address, which greatly increased the operating space for our research, allowing us to consider measures ranging from co-optation to full-scale military attacks executed to deter future terrorist attacks (by al Qaeda or by others). This broadening of the problem also reflected a lesson gleaned from reviewing historical experience with terrorism: Successful strategies to combat terrorism spawned by serious, deep-rooted problems have involved first crushing the current threat and then bringing about changes to make terrorism's reemergence less likely. Thus, although concepts such as co-optation and inducement are not effective for dealing with terrorists who have the unshakable commitment of a bin Laden, they do apply to others that the United States must try to influence.
This innovative new book aims to put society's fight against terrorism into a comprehensive crime prevention perspective with a clear, understandable theoretical foundation, developing a general model for the prevention of crime which is, in this book, applied to terrorism.
This book analyses the usefulness of terrorist profiling utilised by law enforcement officers as a pre-emptive means to assist them in the detection, prevention and deterrence of terrorism and/or its preparatory activities. It explores two main themes arising from the phenomenon of terrorist profiling: the lawfulness of terrorist profiling and the utility of profiling. These two themes are explored in three separate parts. Firstly, the book begins by drawing upon human rights concerns arising from the use of terrorist profiling by law enforcement officers. Secondly, an analytical framework capable of making determinations on the usefulness of terrorist profiling. This framework develops a profiling spectrum that ranges from formal and informal manifestations of terrorist profiling that forms the basis for evaluating its usefulness. Finally, the book presents an examination of various manifestations of terrorist profiling by separating the analysis of the ‘construction’ of profiles on the one hand, from their ‘application,’ on the other, so as to be able to identify and examine profiling’s usefulness as a technique to assist law enforcement officers make predictions about likely offender characteristics. This book ultimately concludes that terrorist profiling should only be conducted by undertaking a systematic assessment of the construction of profiles separate from the application of profiles whilst simultaneously taking into account fundamental human rights concerns with the practice of terrorist profiling. The work will be an essential resource for academics, law enforcement officers and lawyers in the disciplines of law, criminology, human rights, criminal justice and policing. As the book engages with terrorist profiling, it will also be of interest to those engaged in the psychology of terrorism.
Essay from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 2+ (B+), University of Kent (Brussels School of International Studies), language: English, abstract: For more than four decades during the Cold War, deterrence has been a key element of US defence policy and it can even be argued that the strategy of nuclear deterrence thwarted a major military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA. With the end of superpower tensions and the end of the Cold War itself, the deterrence system became obsolete. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 brought deterrence back on the political agenda. In its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction the USA calls for “new methods of deterrence” in order to meet the threats of global terrorism. The question arises whether deterrence, which seems to have worked in a traditional setting, where one state deters military action of another state, can work in a non-traditional confrontation between a state and an abstract opponent like terrorism? In order to establish whether deterrence can work against terrorism, this essay will firstly look at the theory of deterrence. What are the criteria that must be fulfilled for deterrence to be successful and why does it not work in all situations? Secondly, this essay identifies the main characteristics of the terrorist threat and establishes what the difficulties of deterrence in this specific asymmetric confrontation might be. The main difficulty seems to be the problem to execute appropriate action should deterrence fail, since the target is often unclear and the perpetrator of the terrorist action most likely dead. Special attention is given to the moral dilemma that derives from suggestions to execute retaliation actions against the families of suicide bombers in order to deter others from becoming suicide bombers as suggested by Steinberg. He argues that terrorism can indeed be deterred, if the concept was applied correctly, that is against terrorist leaders, who are “not so quick to give up their own lives” . Finally, this essay will conclude that although it might be possible to deter individual terrorist actions , terrorism itself cannot be deterred by military means. And if the aim is indeed to eradicate terrorism completely, like the rhetoric used in the war on terrorism seems to suggest, deterrence is certainly not the most effective strategy.
This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called ‘rogue states’ and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the ‘three pillars’ of the Bush administration’s national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001 pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.