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We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to an "add-on" decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platform itself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no impact on aggregate donations. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less than they otherwise would have. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher contributions to the online platform.
The well-documented shortage of donated organs suggests that greater effort should be made to increase the number of individuals who decide to become potential donors. We examine the role of one factor: the no-action default for agreement. We first argue that such decisions are constructed in response to the question, and therefore influenced by the form of the question. We then describe research that shows that presumed consent increases agreement to be a donor, and compare countries with opt-in (explicit consent) and opt-out (presumed consent) defaults. Our analysis shows that opt-in countries have much higher rates of apparent agreement with donation, and a statistically significant higher rate of donations, even with appropriate statistical controls. We close by discussing the costs and benefits associated with both defaults as well as mandated choice.
How does setting a donation option as the default in a charitable appeal affect people's decisions? In eight studies, comprising 11,508 participants making 2,423 donation decisions in both experimental settings and a large-scale natural field experiment, we investigate the effect of “choice-option” defaults on the donation rate, average donation amount, and the resulting revenue. We find (1) a “lower-bar” effect, where defaulting a low amount increases donation rate, (2) a “scale-back” effect where low defaults reduce average donation amounts and (3) a “default-distraction” effect, where introducing any defaults reduces the effect of other cues, such as positive charity information. Contrary to the view that setting defaults will backfire, defaults increased revenue in our field study. However, our findings suggest that defaults can sometimes be a “self-cancelling” intervention, with countervailing effects of default option magnitude on decisions and resulting in no net effect on revenue. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on fundraising specifically, for choice architecture and behavioral interventions more generally, as well as for the use of “nudges” in policy decisions.
Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Psychology - Social Psychology, grade: 1,6, University of Paderborn, language: English, abstract: The so called nudging or setting defaults are getting more and more common. After the United Kingdom and the United States of America, Germany also got a nudging unit to affect laws by behavioral economic founding. Many aid organizations often struggle to collect enough donations in order to provide the help that is needed. By learning more about the donation behavior of individuals this problem might be solved. This study tries to find possible connections between donation behavior and default option problems. A lot of previous studies in behavioral economics show that setting defaults to opt-out are significantly influencing the behavior of the participants. Our experiment should analyze these findings concerning giving donations to charity organizations. We want to investigate if there are differences in donation between the opt-in and opt-out options. For that, we will conduct selling “Berliner” at two booths. At the first booth we will set the default 1€ and ask for a 0.50€ donation on top. At the second table we will set the default 1.50€ with the opportunity, not to pay the 0.50€ for donation, if the participant does not want to. First, we will build a theoretical framework for our study in which different default option studies will be introduced. Furthermore, a hypothesis is constructed following the results of these previous studies. Following our argumentation, it is hypothesized that the number of donations should be higher in the case of opt-out than in the case of opt-in. After the overall framework is explained, our experiment will be described in detail. At first the overall environment, structure and design of the experiment is described. Following, the implementations are stated. In the next chapter an analysis of our results is conducted. In the beginning our findings are presented in a number of charts and figures. Subsequently, these findings are analyzed and dis-cussed with a critical point of view. Possible improvements are mentioned and problems that occurred during the experiment described. At last an overall conclusion will be drawn with suggestions for further Research.
In the months before the 2020 U.S. election, several campaign websites added pre-checked boxes (defaults), automatically making donations into recurring weekly contributions unless donors unchecked them. Since these changes occurred at different times for different campaigns, we measure the causal effects of defaults on donors' behavior. We estimate that defaults increased campaign donations by over $44 million while increasing requested refunds by $3.5 million. The longer defaults were displayed, the more money campaigns raised through weekly donations. Donors did not compensate for starting weekly chains by changing the amount they donated through other means. We found that the default had a larger impact on smaller donors and on donors who had no prior experience with defaults.
The article discusses how should policy-makers choose defaults regarding organ donors. First, consider that every policy must have a no-action default, and defaults impose physical, cognitive, and, in the case of donation, emotional costs on those who must change their status. Second, note that defaults can lead to two kinds of misclassification, willing donors who are not identified or people who become donors against their wishes. Changes in defaults could increase donations in the United States of additional thousands of donors a year. Because each donor can be used for about three transplants, the consequences are substantial in lives saved.
Author : Institute of Medicine Publisher : National Academies Press Page : 358 pages File Size : 33,53 MB Release : 2006-08-24 Category : Medical ISBN : 0309164648
Rates of organ donation lag far behind the increasing need. At the start of 2006, more than 90,000 people were waiting to receive a solid organ (kidney, liver, lung, pancreas, heart, or intestine). Organ Donation examines a wide range of proposals to increase organ donation, including policies that presume consent for donation as well as the use of financial incentives such as direct payments, coverage of funeral expenses, and charitable contributions. This book urges federal agencies, nonprofit groups, and others to boost opportunities for people to record their decisions to donate, strengthen efforts to educate the public about the benefits of organ donation, and continue to improve donation systems. Organ Donation also supports initiatives to increase donations from people whose deaths are the result of irreversible cardiac failure. This book emphasizes that all members of society have a stake in an adequate supply of organs for patients in need, because each individual is a potential recipient as well as a potential donor.
The troubling ethics and politics of philanthropy Is philanthropy, by its very nature, a threat to today’s democracy? Though we may laud wealthy individuals who give away their money for society’s benefit, Just Giving shows how such generosity not only isn’t the unassailable good we think it to be but might also undermine democratic values. Big philanthropy is often an exercise of power, the conversion of private assets into public influence. And it is a form of power that is largely unaccountable and lavishly tax-advantaged. Philanthropy currently fails democracy, but Rob Reich argues that it can be redeemed. Just Giving investigates the ethical and political dimensions of philanthropy and considers how giving might better support democratic values and promote justice.