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Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
"Part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series, Deep Operations compares and contrasts US and Soviet theoretical approaches to deep operations. It provides readings that outline the theoretical approach to conducting deep operations in order to prevail and win. The US Army may be well served to look at how operations were done in the past in order to gain insight into not only what an adversary is doing, but why they are doing operations in a certain way"--
Author : Shimon Naveh Publisher : Taylor & Francis Page : 426 pages File Size : 11,15 MB Release : 1997 Category : Military art and science ISBN : 0714642770
Naveh (history and Russian and eastern European studies, Tel Aviv U.) offers an interpretation of the field of military knowledge between strategy and tactics, operational art. He traces its evolution into a full-fledged theory through the landmarks of 19th-century thought and operational ignorance, the Blitzkrieg concept, the Soviet Deep Operation theory of the 1920s and 1930s, and the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory in the 1970s and 1980s. Distributed in the US by ISBS. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Beginning in the interwar period between World War I and World War II the Soviet Union endured massive social, military, and political changes. G.S. Isserson and Mikhail Tukhachevsky innovated Soviet doctrine to encompass all the advances in military technology such as the tank, the airplane, and an improved military-industrial complex. The Soviets focused on Deep Operations Theory built from historical data from the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the Bolshevik revolution during the interwar period between World War I and World War II. Moving into the twenty-first century, Russia is taking advantage of the "Gray Zone" of competition in the Baltics and Black Sea regions, extending Russia's sphere of influence, buttressing itself against NATO's sphere. The adoption of protracted and/or sponsored warfare in today's tension filled diplomatic sphere, the doctrine of Deep Operations has gone from three domains; land, sea, and air; to now include cyberspace, and space operations. Still focused on Deep Operations to affect the enemy's warfare architecture, Russia is using its advances in technology, and manipulation of information to bolster and launch attacks and aid in the destabilization of NATO and the United States. The US is not comfortable with definitions of war that do not comply with U.S. norms. Additionally, as success is determined against NATO, other adversaries can benefit. By understanding the logic of Russian military strategy and its operational art Americans can organize themselves in such a way to maintain a competitive advantage. (Nicosia, Tony E.). The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is one of the parts of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Most SAMS students complete the regular CGSC course, then stay for a second academic year. They write either one or two monographs (depending on the requirement at the time) and are awarded a Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) graduate degree. Most go on to planning jobs in field units. This collection contains all the publicly releasable monographs produced since the program began in 1986. SAMS monographs typically address historical events, current operational issues, or new organizational concepts.
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
The United States Military has been conducting joint, operational-level deep operations for over a century. This is the point where U.S. Armed Services have found a common ground to focus their joint efforts. The American Civil War established a baseline for operational art in modern warfare. It also provided a basis for the study of operational-level deep operations. It is unclear whether the future battlefield will require a similar concept of deep operations. Joint Vision 2010 states that it does not. In this monograph, the author explores the idea that deep operations are an integral part of operational art and will play a critical part in future joint military operations. The monograph first establishes a working definition for deep operations and necessary functional capabilities. Based on this definition, the monograph examines application to modem warfare and potential for the future. It provides historical examples of deep operations in order to examine effects and trends leading to the current doctrine. The monograph places emphasis on explaining the common principles of deep operations, and the purpose for conducting these operations. It describes the operational dimensions, or battlespace, of deep operations in the different situations. It also discusses the operational level functions necessary to operate in the battlespace. This monograph concludes that joint, operational-level deep operations are part of operational art, and they are relevant in future joint military operations. The concept for operational-level deep operations holds promise for the U.S. Military as it enters the twenty-first century. It offers one potential avenue for meeting the challenges of the battlefield envisioned in the near future by retaining the multidimensional aspect of modem warfare. This potential warrants a more in-depth study of joint, operational-level deep operations, its combat organizations, its command structures, and a joint doctrine.
What is the feasibility of adapting the concepts of Soviet deep operations theory to future Marine Corps and joint operations? This paper is based on the supposition that the future employment of U.S. military forces will be in joint operations focused against third world threats. The current trend of proliferation of high-technology weapons to third world countries will result in many nations that have small, but modern, forces with high battlefield leverage. Faced with less resources, more potent threats, and the need to win quickly, future joint commanders will be required to employ their forces with imagination. To win, they must seize the initiative early and hold it to the end. This paper suggests that a joint doctrine that emphasizes the full potential of deep operations to impact battle on an operational level provides the means to rapidly defeat the enemy. The paper examines the feasibility of adapting the more prescriptive Soviet deep operations doctrine for use in future U.S. joint campaigns. To determine the feasibility of using Soviet deep operations doctrine as a template for a more thorough U.S. deep operations doctrine, the development and features of Soviet deep battle and deep operations theory are explored to identify lessons learned. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign of August 1945 is examined to validate this theory. The theory of deep operations, as manifested by an amphibious operational maneuver group, is then evaluated to determine its applicability to future Marine Corps amphibious operations. The United States should adopt a joint doctrine, similar to that envisioned by the Soviets in the late 1980s, that emphasizes the full potential of deep operations to impact battle on an operational level, and provides the means to rapidly defeat the enemy.