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This book presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States and explores the theory's ramifications for law and public policy. Bruner argues that regulatory structures affecting other stakeholders' interests - notably differing degrees of social welfare protection for employees - have decisively impacted the degree of political opposition to shareholder-centric policies across the common-law world.
The newest addition to the spate of recent theories of comparative corporate governance is Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power, an important new book by Christopher Bruner. Focusing on the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia, Bruner argues that the robustness of the country's social welfare system is the key determinant of the extent to which its corporate governance is shareholder-centered. This explains why corporate governance is so shareholder-oriented in the United Kingdom, which has universal healthcare and generous unemployment benefits, while shareholders' powers are more attenuated in the United States, with its much weaker social welfare protections. Canada and Australia fall in between but closer to the U.K. After describing Bruner's theory and evidence in the first part of this Essay, I poke at it from several angles in the three parts that follow. In Part II, I consider whether there is a mechanism that adequately explains the connection between social welfare and shareholder orientation; interestingly, despite the book's title, Bruner does not suggest that the common law plays any particular role. In Part III, I consider whether shareholders in the United States may have more power than their limited formal rights suggest, and in Part IV I ask whether the United States (rather than the United Kingdom, as is conventionally assumed) may simply be an outlier, due to federalism and other factors and as reflected in the U.S.'s weak social welfare system. I then conclude.
Grounded in history and written by a law professor, this book is a scholarly yet jargon-free explanation of the differences between the common and civil law concepts of the rule of law, and details how they developed out of two different cultural views of the relationships between law, individuals, and government. The author shows how those differences lead to differences in economic development, entrepreneurship, and corporate governance.
This book provides comprehensive and, above all, business focused guidance on the fundamentals of business law and how they should be integrated into ethical and effective business decisions. It concentrates on legal principles and thereby is able to articulate the impact of global business law and its international applications providing a comprehensive overview of the legal and ethical principles which both facilitate and regulate corporate business. This is an ambitious undertaking, yet arguably no more ambitious than the projects undertaken by global business leaders making business decisions around the world. The author combines the expertise of a long-term blue chip law background with the insights of an experienced business educator. Law and Ethics in Global Business is both a comprehensive course book for MBA study and an invaluable business reference source for any executive involved in global business.
Corporate law and governance are at the forefront of regulatory activities worldwide, and subject to increasing public attention in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Comprehensively referencing the key debates, the Handbook provides a much-needed framework for understanding the aims and methods of legal research in the field.
Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
The business corporation is one of the greatest organizational inventions, but it creates risks both for shareholders and for third parties. To mitigate these risks, legislators, judges, and corporate lawyers have tried to learn from foreign experiences and adapt their regulatory regimes to them. In the last three decades, this approach has led to a stream of corporate and capital market law reforms unseen before. Corporate governance, the system by which companies are directed and controlled, is today a key topic for legislation, practice, and academia all over the world. Corporate scandals and financial crises have repeatedly highlighted the need to better understand the economic, social, political, and legal determinants of corporate governance in individual countries. Comparative Corporate Governance furthers this goal by bringing together current scholarship in law and economics with the expertise of local corporate governance specialists from twenty-three countries.
For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.
Machiavelli Had it Easy is an engaging text for the emerging discipline of governance. Gaps arise when directors and managers come together from diverse vocational and cultural languages and interests. Compressed information streams in the digital age, yet few reconcile silos of business, legal expertise and regulatory public-interests for informed decisions. This text presents research and a market-tested decision-framework for comparative law, market practice, and human nature in the vital strategic-oversight role of governance. Informed by cognitive science, business practice and legal duties, one conclusion is that bias and self-interests are instinctive but reconciling best-interests is not. Too often lessons learned from centuries of law are overlooked. The chapters are a dozen inquiries into recurring problems in the boardroom. Part one is an entry-level technical reference of law and governance principles. Unique appendices of keywords and case notes will aid those new to markets governed by the western rule-of-law and those tripping on gaps in comparative jargon. Part two is a series of practical hot-topics in the context of law and governance; part three looks to next steps in accountability and liability. The text will help accountants, engineers, lawyers, and business operations and market-policy experts from around the world work together, and; professors, professionals and students anticipate change. After drilling through accountability and liability for hybrid organizations, typical crises are revealed to be from a lack of aligning interests and related information churn. Conclusions of the how and why of governance systems link the human condition and the rule-of-law in the digital age.