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An accurate understanding of the Chinese decision-making process is critical to anticipating and deescalating Sino-American crises through effective crisis management. Although rational models of decision making have been heavily used to explain state decisions, some outcomes do not fit rational assumptions, leaving questions of state intentions seemingly ambiguous and unanswered. This study uses an organization-centered, cybernetic approach and assumes: 1) that alternatives considered by a government reside in the existing capabilities of the state's institutions, and 2) decision-making outcomes are characterized as governmental actions through organizational routines. After identifying three functional decision-making variables (how a decision-making process manages complexity, deals with uncertainty, and adapts to change), this research tests the general structure and current trends in PRC politics for evidence that Beijing uses cybernetic methods when deciding how to resolve complex problems. Additionally, this study selects five recent near-crisis events (1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, 2001 EP-3 midair collision, 2002-03 SARS outbreak, 2007 PRC anti-satellite test, and 2008 Sichuan earthquake response) for a cross-case analysis of these same three variables in times of crisis. This research offers unique insight in both the applicability of the cybernetic model in PRC analysis as well as expectations of Beijing's future decision making under stress.
If there is one constant in expert analyses of the history of modern China, it is the characterization of a country perpetually in the throes of crises. And in nearly all crises, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has played an instrumental role. While China at the mid-point of the 21st century's first decade is arguably the most secure and stable it has been in more than a century, crises continue to emerge with apparent frequency. Consequently, the study of China's behavior in conditions of tension and stress, and particularly how the PLA is a factor in that behavior, is of considerable importance to policymakers and analysts around the world. This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2004 on the theme of "Chinese Crisis Management." One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of these incidents were perceived as crises, a key case in point being the three Iraq wars (1980-88, 1990-91, and 2003). As a result, the rubric of "decisionmaking under stress" was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication. No matter what rubric is employed, however, the chapters in this volume shed light on patterns of Chinese behavior in crisis-like situations and decisionmaking under stress. Michael Swaine's contributed chapter first establishes a general framework for understanding crisis management based on previous work by Alexander George and J. Philip Rogers. He then proceeds to apply this framework to Chinese crisis management in particular. Swaine identifies five basic variables that influence crisis management behavior, subjective views of leaders and public, domestic environment, decisionmaking structure, information receipt and processing, and idiosyncratic features. In the case of China, he argues, the country often views itself as a victim and therefore strongly reacts to what it perceives as "unjust actions" on the part of other countries. Chinese leaders are thereby compelled to signal their firm resolve on serious issues through words and actions. However, decisionmaking is centralized in the hands of a small number of Party cadre, who work to develop a consensus, while China's bureaucratic Party and intelligence system severely compartmentalizes the flow of information, especially to senior leaders. This limits and sometimes distorts the information they receive during crisis situations. Swaine then raises a number of questions about the factors that influence the Chinese framework for decisionmaking. He concludes that, if we can better understand the broad tendencies that affect China's crisis management style, we may be able to reduce the likelihood of undesirable situations in which a Sino-U.S. crisis would erupt. Larry Wortzel presented a paper on Chinese decisionmaking and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In Wortzel's opinion, at the time of Hu Yaobang's death, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was under intense public pressure to reform and reduce corruption. Hu's death acted as a catalyst, leading to student demonstrations, which were encouraged by reformist members of the CCP. As the protests became larger, several conservative factions, normally at odds with one another, closed ranks and sought to end the demonstrations, first through police, then military, means. However, the consensus decision to use force took time, and the apparent lack of action by the Party was seen by protestors to be tacit approval of their actions.
If there is one constant in expert analyses of the history of modern China, it is the characterization of a country perpetually in the throes of crises. While China at the mid-point of the Twenty-first Century's first decade is arguably the most secure and stable it has been in more than a century, crises continue to emerge with apparent frequency. Consequently, the study of china's behavior in conditions of tension and stress is of considerable importance to policy makers and analysts around the world.
This book describes various crisis situations in transitional China, and by analyzing the unique characteristics and backgrounds of emergencies and crisis, it argues that crisis management has become a major challenge for the Chinese governments. It then discusses the chronology of crisis, organizational behaviors and the decision-making processes to construct a modern crisis management system in detail, to shed light on the creation of a strategic design and institutional framework of crisis management in China. In so doing, it provides not only insights into the dynamics of crisis decision-making and communication, but also solutions for possible problems specific to a transitional political regime in China.
Author : Andrew Scobell Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College Page : 264 pages File Size : 42,89 MB Release : 2005 Category : Political Science ISBN :
This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2005 on the theme of "Chinese Crisis Management." One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of those incidents were perceived as crises. As a result the rubric of "decision making under stress" was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication.
Author : Institute of Medicine Publisher : National Academies Press Page : 376 pages File Size : 13,39 MB Release : 2004-04-26 Category : Medical ISBN : 0309182158
The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in late 2002 and 2003 challenged the global public health community to confront a novel epidemic that spread rapidly from its origins in southern China until it had reached more than 25 other countries within a matter of months. In addition to the number of patients infected with the SARS virus, the disease had profound economic and political repercussions in many of the affected regions. Recent reports of isolated new SARS cases and a fear that the disease could reemerge and spread have put public health officials on high alert for any indications of possible new outbreaks. This report examines the response to SARS by public health systems in individual countries, the biology of the SARS coronavirus and related coronaviruses in animals, the economic and political fallout of the SARS epidemic, quarantine law and other public health measures that apply to combating infectious diseases, and the role of international organizations and scientific cooperation in halting the spread of SARS. The report provides an illuminating survey of findings from the epidemic, along with an assessment of what might be needed in order to contain any future outbreaks of SARS or other emerging infections.
This book explores how China's political system responds to crisis. A crisis is an episode whose impact cannot be controlled merely by astute on-the-ground incident management, particularly in cases involving widespread doubt about the legitimacy of established policy paradigms or the political order as a whole. Crisis can create “political windows” for advocacy groups challenging established policies in pluralist democracies. The political battle between competing definitions of an uncertain and ambiguous situation among the various actors provides them with crisis-induced opportunity space for dramatic policy change. However, the process of crisis-induced policy change, mainly by crisis framing, in non-west regimes like China has not been adequately addressed. As China's leadership foregrounds legitimacy in “victory” over COVID-19, and a new era of climate change disasters begins, this dynamic model of crisis and recuperation will offer food for thought for scholars of Chinese and global politics.
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decision making is based on consensus opinion within the party. This cumbersome method can result in paralysis and does not allow Chinese leaders to react quickly to crises. The decision making process within the CCP is compartmentalized and opaque, even to lower-level Chinese of officials. Also, of officials are reluctant to give the CCP "bad news." This has led to incomplete or incorrect information being passed to high-level decision makers. The signals sent by the Chinese government, both to domestic and foreign audiences, are not as clearcut as the government believes them to be. China's crisis management strategy is geared towards obtaining the maximum political advantage for China, as opposed to resolving the crisis. China tries to define the crisis on its terms in order to shape the resolution favorably.
This thesis examines the process by which decisions are made in the People's Republic of China during times of crisis. It explores who has the authority to make decisions in China today and who will have this authority as new leaders take control of the Politburo in 2002. The thesis also examines the role that the People's Liberation Army plays in national security and foreign policy decision- making during times of crisis. The April 2001 EP-3 incident is examined to assess high-level decision-making in the Communist Party, the level of military involvement, and the role of the media. This thesis concludes that decisions are made on a consensual basis by a nuclear circle of leaders consisting mainly of Politburo Standing Committee members and a few close advisors to the President. The thesis also concludes that the military plays a smaller role than is often presumed in the decision-making process during times of crisis. Decision-making in the PRC may be expected to become more decentralized in the future. Although no theoretical or legal framework exists to guide the current process, it is likely that the process will become more efficient and structured over time.