[PDF] Changes In Russias Military And Nuclear Doctrine eBook

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Page : pages
File Size : 20,81 MB
Release : 2012
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In 1993, the Russian Federation set out a new military doctrine that would determine the direction of its armed forces until President Putin set out the next doctrine in 2000. The Russian Federation creating the doctrine was new; the USSR had recently collapsed, Gorbachev - the creator of the predecessor to this doctrine in 1987 - was out of office, and the new Russian military had only been formed in May, 1992.1 The analysis of the 1993 doctrine is as follows: a definition of how doctrine is defined; a short history of Russian military doctrine leading up to the 1993 doctrine (officially the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation); and finally, what the doctrine established. An overview of the 1993 doctrine is: (1) Russia's 1993 doctrine was a return to older, more aggressive doctrine as a result of stability concerns surrounding the recent collapse of the USSR; (2) Russia turned from Gorbachev's 'defensive defense' in the 1987 doctrine to aggressive defense with the option of preempting or striking back against an aggressor; (3) Russia was deeply concerned about how nationalism would affect the former Soviet Republics, particularly in respect to the ethnic Russians still living abroad; and (4) Nuclear doctrine pledged to not be the first to use nuclear weapons but provided for the potential for escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The 2000 doctrine (officially the Russian Federation Military Doctrine) was created in a more stable world than the 1993 doctrine was. The Russian Federation had survived independence and the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies' had diminished. It had secured all of the nuclear weapons from its neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had elected a new president, Vladimir Putin, to replace Boris Yeltsin. Yet, even as the doctrine took more defensive tones than the 1993 doctrine, it expanded its nuclear options. Below are a new definition of what doctrine meant in 2000 and an outline of the 2000 doctrine. An overview of the 2000 doctrine is: (1) The 2000 doctrine was a return to a more defensive posture; the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than that of preemptive force, would be its deterrence; (2) In order to strengthen its nuclear deterrence, Russia extended and redefined the cases in which nuclear weapons could be used to include a wider range of conflict types and a larger spectrum of attackers; and (3) Russia's threats changed to reflect its latest fear of engaging in a limited conflict with no prospect of the use of nuclear deterrence. In 2006, the defense minister and deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the government was starting on a draft of a future doctrine. Four years later, in 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was put into effect with the intent of determining Russian doctrine until 2020. The 2010 doctrine, like all previous doctrines, was a product of the times in which it was written. Gone were many of the fears that had followed Russia for the past two decades. Below are an examination of the 2010 definition of doctrine as well as a brief analysis of the 2010 doctrine and its deviations from past doctrines. An overview of the 2010 doctrine is: (1) The new doctrine emphasizes the political centralization of command both in military policy and the use of nuclear weapons; (2) Nuclear doctrine remains the same in many aspects including the retention of first-use; (3) At the same time, doctrine was narrowed to using nuclear weapons only when the Russian state's existence is in danger; to continue strong deterrence, Russia also opted to follow the United States by introducing precision conventional weapons; (4) NATO is defined as Russia's primary external threat because of its increased global presence and its attempt to recruit states that are part of the Russian 'bloc'; and (5) The 2000 doctrine's defensive stance was left out of the doctrine; rumor ...

Author : Amy F Woolf
Publisher : Independently Published
Page : 46 pages
File Size : 41,83 MB
Release : 2020-01-04
Category :
ISBN : 9781655332814

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Russia's nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems-including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers-and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia's number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory. Doctrine and Deployment During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet "no first use" policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials' public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO member, in an effort to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the conflict. Russian officials, along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture. Russia's current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. In addition, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States, others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.

Author : Alekseĭ Georgievich Arbatov
Publisher :
Page : 68 pages
File Size : 11,73 MB
Release : 2000
Category : Chechni︠a︡ (Russia)
ISBN :

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" ... Paper provides an authoritative analysis of national security thinking in Moscow, as well as some pointed suggestions on how to improve relations between Russia and the West. To assist readers who may want more details from official documents, as opposed to the opinions of an individual scholar and parliamentarian, we have also included extracts from the current Russian Military Doctrine and National Security Concept."--Forward.

Author : Stephen Blank
Publisher :
Page : 528 pages
File Size : 10,14 MB
Release : 2011
Category : Military doctrine
ISBN :

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This book presents several essays analyzing Russia's extensive nuclear agenda and the issues connected with it. It deals with strategy, doctrine, European, Eurasian, and East Asian security agendas, as well as the central U.S.-Russia nuclear and arms control equations. This work brings together American, European, and Russian analysts to discuss Russia's defense and conventional forces reforms and their impact on nuclear forces, doctrine, strategy, and the critical issues of Russian security policies toward the United States, Europe, and China. It also deals directly with the present and future roles of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy and strategy.

Author : Glen E. Howard
Publisher :
Page : 400 pages
File Size : 21,66 MB
Release : 2019-04-09
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780998666013

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Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine is designed to educate Russia watchers, policymakers, military leaders, and the broader foreign policy community about the Russian Armed Forces and security apparatus across the full spectrum of geographic, doctrinal and domain areas. Each chapter addresses a different strategic-level issue related to the Russian military, ranging from naval and maritime doctrine, to the role nuclear weapons play in its strategy, to cyber and electromagnetic warfare, to Moscow's posture in the Arctic or the Black Sea, to the lessons its Armed Forces have learned from their ongoing operations in Syria and eastern Ukraine. And each section of the book is written by one of the world's foremost experts on that theme of Russia's military development. The key questions emphasized by this book include "how Russia fights wars" and "how its experiences with modern conflicts are shaping the evolution of Russia's military strategy, capabilities and doctrine." The book's value comes not only from a piecemeal look at granular Russian strategies in each of the theaters and domains where its Armed Forces may act, but more importantly this study seeks to present a unifying description of Russia's military strategy as a declining but still formidable global power. Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine will be an essential reference for US national security thinkers, NATO defense planners and policymakers the world over who must deal with the potential military and security challenges posed by Moscow.

Author : Stephen J. Cimbala
Publisher : Potomac Books, Inc.
Page : 291 pages
File Size : 21,75 MB
Release : 2011-07
Category : History
ISBN : 1612342833

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Russia is a post-communist country struggling to adapt to the modern world economically and politically. In the twenty-first century, Russia faces postmodern social, cultural, and political problems with its old policy of deterrence. For Russia's political leaders and military planners, three scenarios define their postmodern setting: 1) the world's leading military and economic powers, with the exception of China, are market-based economies and political democracies; 2) the revolution in military affairs, based on advances in information, electronics, and communications, is driving both civil and military technology innovation; and 3) the Cold War's fundamental war-fighting premises, such as deterrence based on nuclear weapons and on conventional armed forces organized and trained for massive wars of attrition, have changed radically. These points' implications for future Russian strategy are profound, Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Rainow argue. Russia faces an increased presence of its former adversary, the United States, in adjacent territories; an increasingly assertive NATO, which includes many of Moscow's former allies; and continued fighting in Chechnya. Ominously, China aspires to overtake Russia as the world's second-ranked military power and establish its hegemony over the Pacific basin. In short, Russia confronts a radically new political and military world order that demands adapting to postmodern thinking about deterrence and defense. The danger is that Russia, realizing that it lags behind in leveraging modern technology for military purposes and that it must scrap its dependence on conscription, now relies on nuclear weapons as its first line of deterrence against either nuclear or conventional attack.

Author : The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 42,10 MB
Release : 2020-09-29
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1000344517

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This new IISS Strategic Dossier examines the recent development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities. It analyses the aspirations underpinning Russia’s military reform programme and its successes as well as its failures. The book also provides insights into Russia’s operational use of its armed forces, including in the intervention in Syria, the goals and results of recent state armament programmes, and the trajectory of future developments. This full-colour volume includes more than 50 graphics, maps and charts and over 70 images, and contains chapters on: Russia's armed forces since the end of the Cold War Strategic forces Ground forces Naval forces Aerospace forces Russia’s approach to military decision-making and joint operations Economics and industry At a time when Russia’s relations with many of its neighbours are increasingly strained, and amid renewed concern about the risk of an armed clash, this dossier is essential reading for understanding the state,capabilities and future of Russia’s armed forces.

Author : James F. Holcomb
Publisher :
Page : 56 pages
File Size : 47,8 MB
Release : 1994
Category : Military doctrine
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In the past decade, Soviet/Russian military doctrine has experienced startling changes both in content and in the role such doctrine will play in protecting the vital interests of the state. This report focuses upon efforts during and after the Gorbachev era to establish clear national security priorities and to enumerate the ways in which military doctrine might ensure protection of the Russian national interest. Since 1987, when the Soviet Union switched to an ostensibly defensive military doctrine, the nature of this doctrine has been a contentious issue in both Soviet/Russian policies and Western perceptions of these policies. This controversy has persisted. The most recent iteration of Russia's defense doctrine was published, with President Yeltsin's signature, in November 1993. It immediately aroused controversy in the West as being a restatement of old Soviet themes, a document for an imperial conception of defense policy, an enshrinement of military superiority over civilians in defense policy, and so forth. On the other hand, a rival current of opinion argued for its novelty and recognition of new, more realistic positions on a broad range of policy issues. As this debate continues, the Strategic Studies Institute presents two independent and differing assessments of the published doctrine. LTC Holcomb's assessment sees in this document a conservative, even traditional approach that does not, in many cases, offer radical departures from previous policies and perspectives. The concept of doctrine is, he claims, no different than what preceded it, and the habit of worst case planning that characterized Soviet policy is also displayed here. Thus the overall perspective is shaped by an outlook that is skeptical of the West and on guard for military dangers, if not threats. Dr. Boll, on the other hand, argues that while disagreements may flourish among Russian analysts in the West as to the relative offensive and defensive aspects of both the new doctrine and its 1992 draft predecessor that was not formally approved, there is no question that both documents are firmly integrated with the overall Russian notion of identified national interests and preferred means for their protection. Accordingly, he contends that, for the first time, modern Russian military doctrine responds to a purely national concept of self-interest and threat assessment that is not ideological in nature. Therefore, Russia now has a truly national doctrine that is set out before the world for consideration. The changes in the content of Russian military doctrine are historic in nature. But the alteration in the form of doctrine is truly revolutionary!

Author : Stephen Blank
Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute
Page : 143 pages
File Size : 19,99 MB
Release : 2011
Category : History
ISBN : 1584874821

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This work presents three papers to illuminate the political struggles among the government and the military in Russia to forge a new defense doctrine and ultimately the 2010 doctrine itself. No analysis of Russian defense or security policy is complete without the understanding and analysis provided here.