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Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was the most important philosopher of the movement known as logical empiricism or logical positivism, still the basis of much modern analytic philosophy. It was long thought that this movement had been destroyed by the polemics of Quine, Popper, and Kuhn. But recently, leading philosophers have been re-appraising this verdict. It is no longer universally agreed that Quine or Popper "won" their disputes with Carnap, and some have now been arguing that Kuhn's ideas are--as Carnap himself thought--perfectly compatible with logical empiricism. This volume presents the latest contributions to this discussion from both sides, and adds a number of new voices, who look at Carnap from a more international point of view -- bringing out, for instance, the roots of his thought in Continental neo-Kantianism and Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, and stressing his deep commitment to political and cultural change. Carnap grew up in Jena, and in his student days was an active member there of the utopian "Sera Group", part of the German youth movement. At the same time, he was one of Frege's few students, and was deeply influenced by him.
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in Germany and later a US citizen, he was a founder of the philosophical movement known as Logical Empiricism. He was strongly influenced by a number of different philosophical traditions (including the legacies of both Kant and Husserl), and also by the German Youth Movement, the First World War (in which he was wounded and decorated), and radical socialism. This book places his central ideas in a broad cultural, political and intellectual context, showing how he synthesised many different currents of thought to achieve a philosophical perspective that remains strikingly relevant in the twenty-first century. Its rich account of a philosopher's response to his times will appeal to all who are interested in the development of philosophy in the twentieth century.
This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World). It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science.
Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length--and over a long period of time--on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. Dear Carnap, I enclose a copy of a paper which I am ready to send off for publication. . . . I am anxious to have you look this over as soon as possible, to see whether you have reason to suppose the system contradictory: for it looks dangerous. Dear Quine: I read your paper very carefully and with the highest interest. . . . So far, I do not see any contradiction in the system itself . . . but I share your feeling that the whole looks rather dangerous. Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length--and over a long period of time--on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. Dear Carnap, I enclose a copy of a paper which I am ready to send off for publication. . . . I am anxious to have you look this over as soon as possible, to see whether you have reason to suppose the system contradictory: for it looks dangerous. Dear Quine: I read your paper very carefully and with the highest interest. . . . So far, I do not see any contradiction in the system itself . . . but I share your feeling that the whole looks rather dangerous.
A reconstruction of the lines of argument used by Carnap, Tarski, and Quine, highlighting their historical significance and contemporary relevance based on Carnap's own notes from his conversations of the time.During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. 'Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard' allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap's notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the most prominent question is: If the number of physical items in the universe is finite, what form should scientific discourse take? This question is closely connected to anabiding philosophical problem: What is the relationship between the logico-mathematical realm and the material realm? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine's attempts to answer this question involve issues central to philosophy today.This book focuses on three such issues: nominalism, the unity of science, and analyticity. In short, the book reconstructs the lines of argument represented in these Harvard discussions, discusses their historical significance (especially Quine's break from Carnap),and relates them when possible to contemporary treatments of these issues.
The first volume of the Library of Living Philosophers (LLP) appeared in 1939, the brainchild of the late Professor Paul A. Schilpp. Schilpp saw that it would help to eliminate confusion and endless sterile disputes over interpretation if great philosophers could be confronted by their capable philosophical peers and asked to reply. As well as a number of critical essays with the chosen philosopher's replies to each essay, each volume would include an intellectual autobiography and an up-to-date bibliography The LLP series has exceeded even Schilpp's expectations, enabling great philosophers to do more than clarify by extending and elaborating their thoughts. A volume in the Library of Living Philosophers is not merely a commentary on a philosopher's work; it is a critical part of that work.
Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle. In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap adopts the position of "methodological solipsism" and shows that it is possible to describe the world from the immediate data of experience. In his Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, he asserts that many philosophical problems are meaningless.
J. Albert Coffa traces the roots of logical positivism in a semantic tradition that arose in opposition to Kant's theory that a priori knowledge is based on pure intuition.
Examining the scholarly interest of the last two decades in the origins of logical empiricism, and especially the roots of Rudolf Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World), Rosado Haddock challenges the received view, according to which that book should be inserted in the empiricist tradition. In The Young Carnap's Unknown Master Rosado Haddock, builds on the interpretations of Aufbau propounded by Verena Mayer and of Carnap's earlier thesis Der Raum propounded by Sahotra Sarkar and offers instead the most detailed and complete argument on behalf of an Husserlian interpretation of both of these early works of Carnap, as well as offering a refutation of the rival Machian, Kantian, Neo-Kantian, and other more eclectic interpretations of the influences on the work of the young Carnap. The book concludes with an assessment of Quine's critique of Carnap's 'analytic-synthetic' distinction and a criticism of the direction that analytic philosophy has taken in following in the footsteps of Quine's views.