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This book explores the impact of information systems on the management of North–South asymmetric strategic alliances through a series of in-depth case studies which analyze different types of partnerships. Positioned at the heart of the value creation process, the choice of information system seems to be becoming a strategic issue which should be centered not only on the organizational decisions related to the type of alliance but also the management systems of each of the partners. The authors provide an understanding of the nature of this relationship between the organizational structure and the method of information system integration in asymmetric alliances. The in-depth analysis of strategic alliance case-studies illustrates the different methods of information system integration, which are themselves linked to the organisational and structural choices of the alliance. These methods are characterized by information-sharing and coordination mechanisms as well as the balance of control over shared activities developed by the distinct partners.
This dissertation is the first systematic analysis of variation in alliance behavior in the context of asymmetric international security alliances. When weak states ally with stronger states - i.e. states with significantly greater military capabilities - what explains differences in the junior party's approach to the alliance relationship? Why do some junior allies show their strong willingness to coordinate their military policy with their senior partner, whereas others distance themselves from their senior partner? Why do some grow more dependent on their senior partner for security, while others pursue their own deterrent to reduce their dependence? Their military dependence is not necessarily determined by structural factors, as states generally have some room for maneuver to decide on the level of resources they extract for national security from their overall economic and technological capacity. This variation in alliance behavior deserves scholarly attention, because these differences affect their senior partner's alliance management costs, including the chance of alliance entrapment - i.e. getting dragged into an unwanted war due to a junior ally's problematic behavior. When a senior partner has vested interests in the asymmetric alliances that advance its own interests, its junior partners, as parties to the alliance contracts, also have the power to "manipulate" their senior partner with a variety of strategies to maximize what are often noninstitutionalized benefits from their security relationships. To explain the variation in the junior partner's approach, the dissertation proposes a Theory of Asymmetric Alliance Strategy, a new paradigm for understanding four types of junior partner alliance behavior and strategy. In essence, their differences are based upon differences relating to the two most contentious and yet core issues of alliance management - the junior ally's degree of dependence for security and its level of coordination with the senior partner. As junior allies choose one of the two opposing approaches to each of these two core issues, there are four different, mutually exclusive strategies: [More Dependent, Reluctant Coordination], [More Dependent, Proactive Coordination], [Less Dependent, Proactive Coordination], and [Less Dependent, Reluctant Coordination], which I call Cheap-riding, Rescue-compelling, Favor-currying, and Autonomy-seeking, respectively. The Theory posits that the following three factors determine a junior partner's choice of alliance strategy: (1) perceived senior partner commitments to fighting the adversary by force; (2) the junior partner's "revisionist" goal - i.e. a goal of changing the local distribution of power and goods by force; and (3) the local balance of power. Particularly problematic from a senior partner's perspective is the Rescue-compelling strategy, which is driven by weak or weakened security commitments a junior ally perceives when it faces a local balance of power shifting in favor of its adversary. A junior ally utilizing this strategy can make a crisis escalation more likely and cause serious consequences including a costly war. By explaining the sources of the variation in alliance strategy and identifying risks associated with security partnerships with some types of junior allies, the dissertation helps better anticipate the costs of offering new security commitments to other states as well as those of withdrawing, or threatening to withdraw, existing commitments.
Military alliances are a constant feature in international politics, and a better understanding of them can directly impact world affairs. This book examines why alliances endure or collapse. As a distinctive feature, it analyses asymmetric alliances focusing on the junior allies’ decision to continue or terminate a military agreement. It deepens our knowledge of alliance cohesion and erosion, investigating the relevance of the weaker side’s preferences and behavior in alliance politics. The author examines the literature on alliance persistence and termination and puts forward a theoretical model that helps interpret historical and contemporary cases in a way that is useful for expert researchers and non-expert readers alike.
"This dissertation examines how weak states manipulate the incentives of strong states to achieve their own ends in international bargaining over alliances and international cooperation in areas such as counter-terror operations, nuclear (non-)proliferation, and conflict. First, I examine moral hazard problems in international aid-for-policy relationships. Donor states face a compliance dilemma. On the one hand, providing aid generates short-term incentives for a client state to comply with desired policies such as eliminating terrorists within their borders. On the other hand, the client state may "fail by succeeding"- failure to eliminate terrorists creates incentives for the donor to continue to provide aid in the future. I present a formal moral hazard model to study the compliance dilemma. It shows that the shadow of the future is sufficient to cause suboptimal efforts to fight terrorists in the client state, even if their government receives a direct benefit from monopolizing violence. One partial solution is for donor states to launch a limited intervention independent of their allies. This intervention directly contributes to achieving their objectives but also reduces the bite of the moral hazard issue. Examining the relationship between the United States and Pakistan illustrates the mechanisms of the model. Second, I examine how nuclear latency development - the ability to build nuclear weapons - affects a state's ability to secure a place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States has long opposed nuclear proliferation. However, empirically, many U.S. allies have chosen to research and develop nuclear capabilities. Existing theories do not account for the interrelated strategic choices to enter alliances and pursue nuclear weapons, nor do empirical estimates incorporate this strategic behavior. I construct a strategic probit model based on a new theory in which weaker states strategically manipulate nuclear development to influence strong states' alliance offers. Strong states select weak states into alliances to change their nuclear development calculus. The estimates overturn two pieces of conventional wisdom. First, nuclear latency can push past entrapment concerns in uncertain security environments to drive alliance formation. Second, I show that high latency states that are militarily strong can use latency to secure alliance guarantees. Finally, I examine the effect of alliances with a militarily strong state on the risk of protege-initiated conflict. The literature widely argues that asymmetric alliances, where a powerful, often nuclear-armed state commits to the defense of a weaker protege state, encourages revisionism against third parties. The leading explanation for this tendency is moral hazard. However, in contrast to this literature, I argue that adverse selection, driven by uncertainty over patron preferences at the time of alliance formation, drives both the pattern of conflict initiation observed in the literature and significant restraint by proteges in alliances. I build a formal model of asymmetric alliance formation and coercive bargaining and then test the theory using an empirical strategic model of alliance formation that allows for adverse selection into alliance arrangements. Once I account for the adverse selection problem, I find that alliances are restraining."--Pages vii-viii.
"The book analyzes the development of global business-to-business electronic markets, and whether these markets are becoming a way of improving trust between organizations"--Provided by publisher.
"This 4-volume set provides a compendium of comprehensive advanced research articles written by an international collaboration of experts involved with the strategic use of information systems"--Provided by publisher.
Alliances are usually understood as a way for states to aggregate military capabilities in the face of a common threat. From this perspective, the willingness of relatively powerful states to form alliances with much weaker partners is puzzling. The weaker ally often adds little to the stronger state's security and may increase its chance of military entanglement. This paper presents evidence that international trade helps explain these alliances. Just as fear of losing a valuable trading relationship deters bilateral conflict between trading partners, so it also gives states that have the power to do so a motive to defend their trading partners from external threats that might disrupt commerce. This argument contrasts with most other research on trade and alliances, which reverses the causal arrow and suggests instead that alliances increase trade. Empirical analysis employing several different datasets on bilateral trade indicates that trade makes the formation of alliances more likely in major power-minor power dyads, and reduces the probability that these alliances will dissolve. By contrast, there is no evidence that alliances increase trade between these pairs of states.
With the idea of “deep learning” having now become the key to this new generation of solutions, major technological players in the business intelligence sector have taken an interest in the application of Big Data. In this book, the author explores the recent technological advances associated with digitized data flows, which have recently opened up new horizons for AI. The reader will gain insight into some of the areas of application of Big Data in AI, including robotics, home automation, health, security, image recognition and natural language processing.