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This study consolidates various, unclassified Soviet military and political writings on strategic deception into a theoretical model. The Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are then compared and contrasted to the model. The study shows these two specific invasions to be textbook examples of Soviet strategic deceptions.
First Published in 1987. New information obtained from the declassification of Ultra intercepts and other Second World War documents as well as from recent scholarly research has credited Allied deception operations with an even more important contribution to winning the war than was previously supposed. Yet deception is only one factor in the achievement of victory; it cannot guarantee success. It must be fully understood and exploited by the highest levels of command. Most histories of deception operations during the Second World War have focused on those that were successful. Instances in which deception operations failed to achieve their objectives are discussed by John Campbell, who describes an early attempt to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade at Pas de Calais in the summer of 1943, and by Katherine Herbig, who gives the first detailed description of US deception operations in the Pacific. Klaus-Jurgen Moiier questions the actual effectiveness of deception operations against the Germans. He argues that many successes attributed to the Allies' use of deception were in fact achieved by independent considerations on the German side. Professor Moiier builds a particularly strong case in challenging the success of Operation Fortitude North, in which the Allies tried to divert German troops to Norway before invading Normandy. Although very little is known of Soviet deception operations on the Eastern Front, it must be remembered that they were conducted on a much larger scale than those of either the British in Europe or the Americans in the Pacific. Colonel David Glantz's account of Soviet deception and covert activities offers a version of the historiography of the war between the USSR and Germany which may explain some of the monumental German failures. Tom Cubbage not only contributes a synthesis of the primary and secondary sources available on the deception operations preceding Overlord, but also reviews the so-called Hesketh Report - Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe April 1943 to May 1945, Colonel Roger Hesketh's official report on Allied deception operations against the Germans in north-west Europe which was declassified in 1976, yet remains unpublished. It indicates that Professor Muller's suspicions that the Allies over-estimated the impact of Fortitude are unfounded. Edited and with a comprehensive introduction by Michael Handel, these important and original studies put the entire deception effort during the Second World War into a more balanced and accurate perspective.
Strategic Military Deception explains the nature of deception, its processes, and the elements and conditions when a person used and succeeds at deception. The main focus of the book is the discussion of strategic military deceptions. The book is mainly a collection of research that seeks to develop a common idea of deception’s basic elements and its relationships. The first part of the book contains such topics as the application of game, communication, organization, and systems theories. The second part of the book deals with the testing and validation of some of the theories of deception through a series of historical case studies. By analyzing a series of cases, the book identifies some recurring patterns in a group of deception cases. There are also chapters that focus on the use of deception during World War II. The book will be a useful tool for military agents, game theorists, and psychoanalysts.
The Red Army learned and practice the art of deception at all levels of warfare during World War II. By cloaking various force groupings and activities, Soviet military leadership, particularly in the latter stages of the war, created operational-level deceptions that surprised German intelligence and commanders. Through their empirically structured military science, Soviet researchers and doctrine writers have applied deception to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. While operational-level deception promotes the achievement of operational surprise, its practice provides a number of collateral effects, such as masking force ratios, delaying enemy decisions, and misdirecting the enemy's attention and commitment of forces. In 1943-45, Soviet operations were consistently successful and offer historical lessons concerning operational-level deception. A review of these lessons and a close look at the Red Army's improved capability to produce battlefield illusions during an operation in the summer of 1944 is instructive and may prove useful to current U.S. Army initiatives exploring battlefield deception. Keywords: Military history; Soviet army; Military deception tactics.
Deception, its significance in peacetime, in war, and in war avoidance, and how to counter deception, are topics of a widening public literature. This bibliography of open literature on detection in the English language includes sections on: (1) arms control and deception; (2) behavior of targets of deception; (3) bibliographies on deception; (4) China: military and political deception; (5) countering deception; (6) general deception studies; (7) historical studies; (8) human deception; (9) interspecie deception; (10) surprise attack and deception; (11) Soviet military deception; and (12) Soviet political deception. An author index is included.
The author reviews the basic concepts related to "deception." Dr. Caddell defines terms, provides historical examples, and discusses problems associated with deception. He provides a general overview, a "primer" which is not directed at those who already possess a working knowledge of deception operations. Nevertheless, given the complex and everchanging nature of deception in the political-military environment, it may serve as a useful reminder of the basic assumptions and methods concerning the subject.
Does foreign denial and deception threaten the interests of contemporary democracies? Strategic denial and deception (D&D) has emerged as a little understood challenge to security in general, and the intelligence community in particular. To gain advantages, adversaries seek to deny critical information about their own activities and capabilities, and to decieve foreign governments. In recent years, Iraq, India, Somalia, Colombian criminal groups, and terrorists, for example, have all used D&D successfully against the United States. Denial and deception is a low cost, potentially high impact to level political, military, and economic playing fields, particularly against strong opponents. Concerns about the threat of denial and deception have waxed and waned since the end of World War II. Sometimes it shaped assessments about the former Soviet Union, for example. At other times, such as the end of the Cold War, such threats appear to fade into insignificance. This volume considers whether globalization, proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more or less likely. Contributors also examine whether more information and data sources make policymakers better informed or simply create confusion. Drawing on lessons learned from historical experiences, the authors propose ways to minimize future challenges. Chapters include "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," by Abram Shulsky; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by Barton Whaley; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by M.R.D. Foot; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by J. Bowyer Bell; "Arms Control," by Lynn M. Hansen; and "Prescription: Detecting Deception-Practice, Practitioners, and Theory," by Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby. While there are previous books about celebrated D&D cases, from Troy to Pearl Harbor and D-Day, no work attempts to assess how these instruments of denial and deception can be used in the early twenty-first century. This book will be of interest to students, security planners, and general readers interested in political science, security, and foreign and military policy.