[PDF] A Legal Theory Of Economic Power eBook

Author : Calixto Salomão Filho
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
Page : 238 pages
File Size : 35,68 MB
Release : 2011-01-01
Category : Law
ISBN : 0857931873

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In this provocative book Calixto Salomao Filho builds a strong case for why economic power cannot be considered a mere market phenomenon. Taking the forgotten realities and effects of these power structures into account, his comprehensive legal analysis persuasively argues the need for a new theory of economic power. The book begins with a discussion of the insufficiency of antitrust concepts and instruments. The author provides an economic history of monopolistic colonial systems and its effect on the development process, and offers an alternate paradigm of legal structuralism and social organization. He goes on to explore the creation of economic power structures with a cogent discussion of market power, legal structures and the dominance of common pool resources. An examination of the dynamics and behavior of power structures follows, with particular attention paid to exclusion and collusion, legal monopolies and the exploitation of natural resources. The author shows clearly how the negative effects of economic power structures directly impact the social and economic development of societies. This new legal theory, with its basis in the realities of economic structures, will prove a powerful alternative to the traditional market rationality paradigm. As such it will be of great interest to students and scholars of law and economics, development and antitrust.

Author : John Cirace
Publisher : Lexington Books
Page : 393 pages
File Size : 33,67 MB
Release : 2020-07-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1498549098

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This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach economists that legal rationality is a separate and distinct decision-making process that can be formalized by behavioral rules that are parallel to and comparable with the behavioral rules of economic rationality, that efficiency often must be constrained by legal goals such as equal protection of the laws, due process, and horizontal and distributional equity, and that the general case methodology of economics vs. the hard case methodology of law for determining the truth or falsity of economic theories and theorems sometimes conflict. Economics and Game Theory: Law and economics books focus on economic analysis of judges’ decisions in common law cases and have been mostly limited to contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and suit and settlement. There is usually no discussion of the many areas of law that require cooperative action such as is needed to provide economic infrastructure, control public “bad” type externalities, and make legislation. Game theory provides the bridge between competitive markets and the missing discussion of cooperative action in law and economics. How? Competitive markets are examples (subset) of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which explains the conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation both in economic markets and in legislative bodies and demonstrates the need for social infrastructure and regulation of pollution and global warming. Game Theory and Law: Lawsuits usually involve litigation between two parties, not the myriad participants in markets, so the assumption of self-interest constrained by markets does not carry over to legal disputes involving one-on-one bargaining in which the law gives one party superior bargaining power. Game theory models predict the effect of different legal institutions, rights, and rules on the outcome of such bargaining. Game theory also has a natural four-model framework which is used in this book to analyze the law and economics of civil obligation, which consists of torts (negligence), contracts, and unjust enrichment.

Author : Søren Mau
Publisher : Verso Books
Page : 353 pages
File Size : 45,79 MB
Release : 2023-01-31
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1839763507

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A new Marxist theory of the abstract and impersonal forms of power in capitalism Despite insoluble contradictions, intense volatility and fierce resistance, the crisis-ridden capitalism of the 21st century lingers on. To understand capital’s paradoxical expansion and entrenchment amidst crisis and unrest, Mute Compulsion offers a novel theory of the historically unique forms of abstract and impersonal power set in motion by the subjection of social life to the profit imperative. Building on a critical reconstruction of Karl Marx’s unfinished critique of political economy and a wide range of contemporary Marxist theory, philosopher Søren Mau sets out to explain how the logic of capital tightens its stranglehold on the life of society by constantly remoulding the material conditions of social reproduction. In the course of doing so, Mau intervenes in classical and contemporary debates about the value form, crisis theory, biopolitics, social reproduction, humanism, logistics, agriculture, metabolism, the body, competition, technology and relative surplus populations.

Author : John R. Commons
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 600 pages
File Size : 36,2 MB
Release : 2017-07-05
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1351509101

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In what has universally been recognized as a classic of institutional economics, John R. Commons combined the skills of a professional economist, the sensibilities of an American historian, and the passion of an active participant in the conflicts of individuals, self-interest of groups, and function of voluntary associations.The aim of this volume is to work out an evolutionary and behavioral theory of value. In order to do so thoroughly, Commons examines the decisions of the courts. Doing so compelled an examination of what the courts mean by reasonable value. Commons found that the answer was tied up with a notion of reasonable conduct. It was Commons who carried the study of the habits and customs of social life to the next stage: the decisions of the courts that are based on custom and that profoundly impact the nature and function of the economic system as such.Reviewing Legal Foundations of Capitalism, Wesley Mitchell declared that Commons carried this "analysis further along his chosen line than any of his predecessors. Into our knowledge of capitalism he has incorporated a great body of new materials which no one else has used adequately." And writing in the same American Economic Review twenty-one years later, Selig Perlman noted that "To Commons the workingmen were not abstract building blocks out of which a favored deity called History was to shape the architecture of the new society, but concrete beings with legitimate ambitions for a higher standard of living and for more dignity in their lives." This edition is graced with a special introduction that places Commons in proper academic as well as intellectual context.

Author : Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker
Publisher : Mohr Siebeck
Page : 72 pages
File Size : 10,41 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Law
ISBN : 9783161492761

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Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker reviews Richard Posner's and Friedrich A.von Hayek's legal theories. Both are famous for their contributions to law and economics. They are, however, adversaries in their concepts of law and how it is to be informed by economics. Posner finds the only scientific legal theory in the external (economic) analysis of law. With Friedrich von Hayek the role of rules of conduct and legislation is to be determined by the principles that govern a free and competitive order. There are, contrary to Posner, important contributions from legal scholarship, legal history and comparative law.

Author : Warren Samuels
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 574 pages
File Size : 33,31 MB
Release : 2017-09-29
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1351483277

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First published in 1979. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis.

Author : Keith N. Hylton
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 436 pages
File Size : 42,56 MB
Release : 2003-03-27
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780521793780

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Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.