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Amerikansk militærhistorie, amerikanske hær's historie. Army Almanac for 1959. Udkom første gang i 1950 (dette ex. er på DEPOT I-1159). KGB har1959-udgaven med ajourførte oplysninger på Læsesalen. En form for grundbog om US Army. Indeholder alle mulige nyttige oplysninger og informationer om den amerikanske hær, organisation, opdeling, enheder, uddannelse, officerskorpset, veteraner, material, våben, uniformer, udrustning, efterretningsvirksomhed, logistikområdet, militærlove, dekorationer og belønninger, oversigt over generaler, hærens relationer til det civile, m.m. samt afsnit om USA's deltagelse i krige og væbnede konflikter fra Uafhængighedskrigene i 1775 til Koreakrigen i 1950, væbnede konflikter, "småkrige", m.m.
A new narrative and analytic history of the twenty U.S. Army divisions that fought in the Pacific War. Despite the prevailing view that the Marine Corps bore the brunt of the fighting in the Pacific War, the men of the US Army played a decisive role in the conflict. Indeed, GIs did most of the war’s heavy lifting on the ground by conducting more amphibious assaults and prosecuting more operations than the Marines. By the end of the war there were 1.77 million U.S. Army troops in the Pacific and Asia, compared to the USMC’s 484,000. The Pacific was as much the Army’s war as the fighting in the European theater. The U.S. Army deployed twenty combat divisions to fight in the Pacific, including famous ones such as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th “Tropic Lightning” Division. Most were infantry, and included Regular, National Guard and draftee divisions. The divisions were deployed and maneuvered by theater, field army, and corps commanders around the Pacific’s geostrategic chessboard to battle and defeat the Japanese. The Army may have wanted its divisions to be interchangeable and uniform, but this proved impossible. Their quality and performance depended upon their resources, the geography and terrain on which they fought, experience, leadership, and organizational culture. Historians, though, have made little effort to examine their records in a systematic way before now. In addition, almost all of the Army’s divisions, some after admittedly rocky starts, became units capable of winning their engagements. Indeed, not a single Army division fighting the Japanese during the American counteroffensive across the Pacific was completely destroyed in combat. Whatever problems these divisions faced tended to grow out of the society that produced them, not fundamental flaws in Army doctrine. This is a tribute to the Army as a whole and to the twenty divisions that the Army deployed against the Japanese. This new history uses a narrative approach to describe and analyze each division's history, characteristics, and battles during the conflict, concluding with an assessment of their battlefield records, taking into account the innumerable factors affecting their combat performance.
When World War II broke out in September 1939 the US Army – starved of resources since 1919 – numbered just 174,000 men. By VJ-Day, 2 September 1945, a total of 8.3 million had served in an army which had risen to a stable strength of 91 divisions. The Army's contribution to the war against Japan – 20 divisions and numerous smaller units – has tended to be overshadowed by the exploits of the much smaller Marine Corps. This first of three titles describes the organisation, uniforms and equipment of the US Army in the CBI and the Central and South-West Pacific from 1941 to 1945. Men-at-Arms 342, 347 and 350 are also available as a single volume special edition as 'The US Army in World War II”.
"John C. McManus, one of our most highly-acclaimed historians of World War II, takes readers from Pearl Harbor--a rude awakening for a ragtag militia woefully unprepared for war--to Makin, a sliver of coral reef where the Army was tested against the increasingly-desperate Japanese. In between were nearly two years of punishing combat as the Army transformed, at times unsteadily, from an undertrained garrison force into an unstoppable juggernaut, and America evolved from an inward-looking nation into a global superpower."--Provided by publisher.
"Offers an overview of the Army's history in this rapidly changing region. It describes how the Army's involvement began with an expedition to seize Manila from Spain in 1898, which led to a protracted campaign against Philippine insurgents. When Japan attacked in 1941, the Army fought back as part of a joint and multinational team in some of the most far-reaching campaigns in history, after which the Army became responsible for post-conflict operations in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines. During the Cold War, the Army fought hot wars in Korea and Vietnam. After the Vietnam War, the Army provided regional stability, a shield against aggression, and engagement with allies and partners as the region experienced unprecedented growth. This broad historical perspective reveals some enduring lessons: the vast distances and diversity of terrain and weather, the necessity for joint and multinational operations, and the need for a versatile, adaptive, and agile force"--Publisher's website.
The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now. In Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory. Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals. Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.
In the island battles of World War II, the United States Marine Corps came into its own. From a force previously numbering 55,000, the ranks of the Marines swelled to 480,000. With Pacific theater command essentially divided geographically between General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, these forces found themselves under the command of the Army or Navy depending on their particular location. On land and at sea, the contribution which the six Marine divisions made to the Allied victory in the Pacific cannot be ignored. Concentrating on the infantry units, this volume provides a brief history of each of the six Marine divisions which took part in the Pacific conflict. Beginning with a chronology of the war in the Pacific, it succinctly describes each campaign through the eyes of a specified division, focusing on the division's exact movements and actions. Some battles and operations are covered from different perspectives because of the presence of multiple divisions. An initial section contains brief biographical sketches of key players in the Pacific arena. Extensive maps and photographs are also included.
[Includes 2 tables, 14 charts, 33 maps and 89 illustrations] In the capture of the southern Marianas during the summer of 1944, Army ground and air forces played an important, though subordinate, role to that of the Navy and its Marine Corps. Marine personnel constituted the bulk of the combat troops employed. The objective of this campaign was "to secure control of sea communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and long-range air attacks against the Japanese home land." Its success would provide steppingstones from which the Americans could threaten further attack westward toward the Philippines, Formosa, and Japan itself, and would gain bases from which the Army Air Forces’ new very long range bombers, the B-29’s, could strike at Japan’s heartland. Recognizing and accepting the challenge, the Japanese Navy suffered heavy and irreplaceable losses in the accompanying Battle of the Philippine Sea; and the islands after capture became the base for all the massive air attacks on Japan, beginning in Nov. 1944. In the operations described in the present volume, landings against strong opposition demonstrated the soundness of the amphibious doctrine and techniques evolved out of hard experience in preceding Pacific operations. Bitter inland fighting followed the landings, with Army and Marine Corps divisions engaged side by side. The author’s account and corresponding Marine Corps histories of these operations provide ample opportunity to study the differences in the fighting techniques of the two services. Dr. Crowl also deals frankly with one of the best-known controversies of World War II, that of Smith versus Smith, but concludes that it was the exception to generally excellent interservice co-operation.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.