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Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine is designed to educate Russia watchers, policymakers, military leaders, and the broader foreign policy community about the Russian Armed Forces and security apparatus across the full spectrum of geographic, doctrinal and domain areas. Each chapter addresses a different strategic-level issue related to the Russian military, ranging from naval and maritime doctrine, to the role nuclear weapons play in its strategy, to cyber and electromagnetic warfare, to Moscow's posture in the Arctic or the Black Sea, to the lessons its Armed Forces have learned from their ongoing operations in Syria and eastern Ukraine. And each section of the book is written by one of the world's foremost experts on that theme of Russia's military development. The key questions emphasized by this book include "how Russia fights wars" and "how its experiences with modern conflicts are shaping the evolution of Russia's military strategy, capabilities and doctrine." The book's value comes not only from a piecemeal look at granular Russian strategies in each of the theaters and domains where its Armed Forces may act, but more importantly this study seeks to present a unifying description of Russia's military strategy as a declining but still formidable global power. Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine will be an essential reference for US national security thinkers, NATO defense planners and policymakers the world over who must deal with the potential military and security challenges posed by Moscow.
" ... Paper provides an authoritative analysis of national security thinking in Moscow, as well as some pointed suggestions on how to improve relations between Russia and the West. To assist readers who may want more details from official documents, as opposed to the opinions of an individual scholar and parliamentarian, we have also included extracts from the current Russian Military Doctrine and National Security Concept."--Forward.
This book surveys Russia's relations with the world since 1992 and assesses the future prospect for the foreign policy of Europe's largest country. Together these essays offer an authoritative summary and assessment of Russia's relations with its neighbors and with the rest of the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In 1993, the Russian Federation set out a new military doctrine that would determine the direction of its armed forces until President Putin set out the next doctrine in 2000. The Russian Federation creating the doctrine was new; the USSR had recently collapsed, Gorbachev - the creator of the predecessor to this doctrine in 1987 - was out of office, and the new Russian military had only been formed in May, 1992.1 The analysis of the 1993 doctrine is as follows: a definition of how doctrine is defined; a short history of Russian military doctrine leading up to the 1993 doctrine (officially the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation); and finally, what the doctrine established. An overview of the 1993 doctrine is: (1) Russia's 1993 doctrine was a return to older, more aggressive doctrine as a result of stability concerns surrounding the recent collapse of the USSR; (2) Russia turned from Gorbachev's 'defensive defense' in the 1987 doctrine to aggressive defense with the option of preempting or striking back against an aggressor; (3) Russia was deeply concerned about how nationalism would affect the former Soviet Republics, particularly in respect to the ethnic Russians still living abroad; and (4) Nuclear doctrine pledged to not be the first to use nuclear weapons but provided for the potential for escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The 2000 doctrine (officially the Russian Federation Military Doctrine) was created in a more stable world than the 1993 doctrine was. The Russian Federation had survived independence and the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies' had diminished. It had secured all of the nuclear weapons from its neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had elected a new president, Vladimir Putin, to replace Boris Yeltsin. Yet, even as the doctrine took more defensive tones than the 1993 doctrine, it expanded its nuclear options. Below are a new definition of what doctrine meant in 2000 and an outline of the 2000 doctrine. An overview of the 2000 doctrine is: (1) The 2000 doctrine was a return to a more defensive posture; the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than that of preemptive force, would be its deterrence; (2) In order to strengthen its nuclear deterrence, Russia extended and redefined the cases in which nuclear weapons could be used to include a wider range of conflict types and a larger spectrum of attackers; and (3) Russia's threats changed to reflect its latest fear of engaging in a limited conflict with no prospect of the use of nuclear deterrence. In 2006, the defense minister and deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the government was starting on a draft of a future doctrine. Four years later, in 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was put into effect with the intent of determining Russian doctrine until 2020. The 2010 doctrine, like all previous doctrines, was a product of the times in which it was written. Gone were many of the fears that had followed Russia for the past two decades. Below are an examination of the 2010 definition of doctrine as well as a brief analysis of the 2010 doctrine and its deviations from past doctrines. An overview of the 2010 doctrine is: (1) The new doctrine emphasizes the political centralization of command both in military policy and the use of nuclear weapons; (2) Nuclear doctrine remains the same in many aspects including the retention of first-use; (3) At the same time, doctrine was narrowed to using nuclear weapons only when the Russian state's existence is in danger; to continue strong deterrence, Russia also opted to follow the United States by introducing precision conventional weapons; (4) NATO is defined as Russia's primary external threat because of its increased global presence and its attempt to recruit states that are part of the Russian 'bloc'; and (5) The 2000 doctrine's defensive stance was left out of the doctrine; rumor ...
The future direction of Russian security and defense policies is a fundamental issue in contemporary world politics. Future Russian policies will have a major impact on all nuclear issues; on bilateral relations with the United States; and on European, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Far Eastern security. One primary indicator of the direction of Russian policies is the new Defense Doctrine published in November 1993. This document has aroused much controversy and diverging assessments as to its significance. However, since it encompasses all the major issues in Russia's security and defense agenda, it is a major statement that is crucial to any understanding of Russian trends and policies. Because of the controversy over Russian doctrine, the Strategic Studies Institute, as part of its ongoing coverage of Russian defense and security policies, presents here two very different assessments of that doctrine to contribute to the debate over its meaning. The Institute is not offering an official interpretation of the new doctrine. While both authors work for the Defense Department, they differ in their assessments and are expressing only their personal opinions, not those of any government agency.
This book, by one of the foremost authorities on the subject, explores the complex nature of Russian nationalism. It examines nationalism as a multilayered and multifaceted repertoire displayed by a myriad of actors. It considers nationalism as various concepts and ideas emphasizing Russia’s distinctive national character, based on the country’s geography, history, Orthodoxy, and Soviet technological advances. It analyzes the ideologies of Russia’s ultra-nationalist and far-right groups, explores the use of nationalism in the conflict with Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, and discusses how Putin’s political opponents, including Alexei Navalny, make use of nationalism. Overall the book provides a rich analysis of a key force which is profoundly affecting political and societal developments both inside Russia and beyond.
This edited volume analyses the evolution and main determinants of Russia's foreign policy choices. Containing contributions by renowned specialists on the topic, the study sheds light on some of the new trends that have characterised Russia's foreign policy since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term.
This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.
Russian Federation has been recognized with the strategy called as “Putin Doctrine” at the beginning of the 21st century. Accordingly, the West is no longer a reliable partner of Russia. The sovereignty of the post-Soviet countries is under the protection of Russia. Russian World and Russian Orthodoxy have become strong. Today, the term “Russia’s Way” has become almost acceptable throughout the world. Therefore, Russia began to be recognized as a society and state that has not accepted or want to accept the philosophy of “the way of common reason”. In both domestic and foreign policy, there is no effective force that can oppose this ‘special’ situation to Russia. Russian poet and diplomat Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev says in his famous quatrain: Russia can’t be understood with the mind alone, No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness: She stands alone, unique – In Russia, one can only believe. This aphorism is the most common phrase that describes Russia. According to Tyutchev, if we want to understand Russia, it is necessary to “believe it”. To understand the role of the “savior” that the Russians have assigned to them since history, it is necessary to know their history, foreign policy and security doctrines. When you read this book I’m sure you can find answers to some of these questions. In this book, the change and transformation of Russia in Putin Period and the general reasons of these policies are explained. In addition to this book, I would also recommend you to read our book “Is Russia & Turkey Eurasian Pact Possible?” In addition to the general reader, this book has been prepared to provide guidance to experts, diplomats and students working in the field of “Security Studies”, “Political Science and International Relations” and “History”. I wish you a good reading.