[PDF] Perishable Good Dynamic Pricing Under Competition eBook

Author : Nan Chen
Publisher :
Page : 50 pages
File Size : 17,55 MB
Release : 2019
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Dynamic pricing is increasingly popular in the perishable good markets, but its effect under competition is uncertain due to the potential for the prisoner's dilemma. I study profit and welfare implications of dynamic pricing techniques in a competitive setting. I construct a structural dynamic oligopoly model where capacitated firms compete in selling differentiated products over a finite horizon when facing demand fluctuations. I estimate the model in U.S. oligopolistic airline markets using an event of carrier exit and flight-level data. I find that (i) the ability to smooth demand fluctuations intensifies competition and benefits consumers substantially; (ii) the ability to price discriminate softens competition and allows firms to extract a substantial amount of consumer surplus.

Author : Guillermo Gallego
Publisher :
Page : 45 pages
File Size : 21,39 MB
Release : 2013
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We study dynamic price competition in an oligopolistic market with a mix of substitutable and complementary perishable assets. Each firm has a fixed initial stock of items and competes in setting prices to sell them over a finite sales horizon. Customers sequentially arrive at the market, make a purchase choice and then leave immediately with some likelihood of no-purchase. The purchase likelihood depends on the time of purchase, the product attributes and the current prices. The demand structure includes time-variant linear and MultiNomial Logit demand models as special cases. Assuming deterministic customer arrival rates, we show that any equilibrium strategy has a simple structure, involving a finite set of shadow prices measuring capacity externalities that firms exert on each other: equilibrium prices can be resolved from a one-shot price competition game under the current-time demand structure, taking into account capacity externalities through the time-invariant shadow prices. The former reflects the transient demand side at every moment and the latter captures the aggregate supply constraint over the sales horizon. This simple structure sheds light on dynamic revenue management problems under competition, which helps capture the essence of the problems under demand uncertainty. We show that the equilibrium solutions from the deterministic game provide pre-committed and contingent heuristic policies that are asymptotic equilibria for its stochastic counterpart, when demand and supply are sufficiently large.

Author : Ali Hortaçsu
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 15,10 MB
Release : 2022
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We introduce a model of dynamic pricing in perishable goods markets with competition and provide conditions for equilibrium uniqueness. Pricing dynamics are rich because both own and competitor scarcity affect future profits. We identify new competitive forces that can lead to misallocation due to selling units too quickly: the Bertrand scarcity trap. We empirically estimate our model using daily prices and bookings for competing U.S. airlines. We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes to those where firms use pricing heuristics based on observed internal pricing rules at a large airline. We find that pricing heuristics increase revenues (4-5%) and consumer surplus (3%).

Author : Nan Chen
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 43,77 MB
Release : 2022
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Dynamic pricing is a common tool to maximize sales in markets for perishable goods with limited capacity and stochastic demand. We look at the relationship between dynamic pricing and oligopolistic competition in the airline industry. For this purpose, we estimate the dynamic oligopoly model of dynamic pricing competition in a market with carrier exit using flight-level data. We discover that dynamic pricing results in a Pareto improvement, increasing firm profits and consumer welfare. We break down the impact into two categories: price discrimination and pricing on residual capacity (revenue management). We find that price discrimination softens competition, whereas revenue management intensifies it.

Author : Rainer Schlosser
Publisher :
Page : pages
File Size : 22,34 MB
Release : 2016
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Most sales applications are characterized by competitive settings and limited demand information. Due to the complexity of such markets, smart pricing strategies are hard to derive. We analyze stochastic dynamic pricing models under competition for the sale of durable goods. In a first step, a data-driven approach is used to estimate sales probabilities in competitive markets. In a second step, we use a dynamic model to compute powerful feedback pricing strategies efficiently, which are even applicable if the number of competitors is large and their strategies are unknown. In the case of liquid markets, in which competitors frequently adjust their prices, we verify that our heuristic feedback strategy also yields excellent results. To be able to compare expected profits, we compute optimal response strategies in a duopoly market where the competitor's price adjustments can be anticipated. We also show that the lack of information can be (over)compensated by adjusting prices slightly more frequently than the competitor does.

Author : Niloofar Fadavi
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 40,31 MB
Release : 2022
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Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly fierce. This paper studies sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a price competition in an oligopoly market with perishable assets. Sellers each has one unit of a good that cannot be replenished, and they compete in setting prices to sell their good over a finite sales horizon. Each period, buyers desire one unit of the good and the number of buyers coming to the market in each period is random. All sellers' prices are accessible for buyers, and search is costless. Using stochastic dynamic programming methods, the best response of sellers can be obtained from a one-shot price competition game regarding remained periods and the current-time demand structure. Assuming a binary demand model, we demonstrate that the duopoly model has a unique Nash equilibrium and the oligopoly model does not reveal price dispersion with respect to a particular metric. We illustrate that, when considering a generalized demand model, the duopoly model has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium while the oligopoly model has a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Author : Fouad Sabry
Publisher : One Billion Knowledgeable
Page : 374 pages
File Size : 35,66 MB
Release : 2024-03-27
Category : Business & Economics
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What is Price Discrimination Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or largely similar goods or services are sold at different prices by the same provider in different market segments. Price discrimination is distinguished from product differentiation by the more substantial difference in production cost for the differently priced products involved in the latter strategy. Price differentiation essentially relies on the variation in the customers' willingness to pay and in the elasticity of their demand. For price discrimination to succeed, a firm must have market power, such as a dominant market share, product uniqueness, sole pricing power, etc. All prices under price discrimination are higher than the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market. However, some prices under price discrimination may be lower than the price charged by a single-price monopolist. Price discrimination is utilized by the monopolist to recapture some deadweight loss. This Pricing strategy enables firms to capture additional consumer surplus and maximize their profits while benefiting some consumers at lower prices. Price discrimination can take many forms and is prevalent in many industries, from education and telecommunications to healthcare. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Price discrimination Chapter 2: Monopoly Chapter 3: Monopolistic competition Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Two-part tariff Chapter 9: Pricing Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Yield management Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Market structure Chapter 15: Pricing strategies Chapter 16: Dynamic pricing Chapter 17: Revenue management Chapter 18: Value-based pricing Chapter 19: Rental value Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about price discrimination. (III) Real world examples for the usage of price discrimination in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Price Discrimination.

Author : Carine Anne Marie Simon
Publisher :
Page : 204 pages
File Size : 19,78 MB
Release : 2007
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(cont.) Finally, we consider closed-loop strategies in a duopoly market when demand is stochastic. Unlike open-loop policies (such policies are computed once and for all at the beginning of the time horizon), closed loop policies are computed at each time period, so that the firm can take advantage of having observed the past random disturbances in the market. In a closed-loop setting, subgame perfect equilibrium is the relevant notion of equilibrium. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, as well as approximations of the problem in order to be able to compute such policies more efficiently.

Author :
Publisher : Elsevier
Page : 632 pages
File Size : 40,71 MB
Release : 2019-09-19
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0444637656

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Handbook of the Economics of Marketing, Volume One: Marketing and Economics mixes empirical work in industrial organization with quantitative marketing tools, presenting tactics that help researchers tackle problems with a balance of intuition and skepticism. It offers critical perspectives on theoretical work within economics, delivering a comprehensive, critical, up-to-date, and accessible review of the field that has always been missing. This literature summary of research at the intersection of economics and marketing is written by, and for, economists, and the book's authors share a belief in analytical and integrated approaches to marketing, emphasizing data-driven, result-oriented, pragmatic strategies. Helps academic and non-academic economists understand recent, rapid changes in the economics of marketing Designed for economists already convinced of the benefits of applying economics tools to marketing Written for those who wish to become quickly acquainted with the integration of marketing and economics