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Essays on Government Regulation and Government Governance Structure

Author : Bo Zhao
Publisher :
Page : pages
File Size : 39,53 MB
Release : 2017-01-26
Category :
ISBN : 9781361042601

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This dissertation, "Essays on Government Regulation and Government Governance Structure" by Bo, Zhao, 赵博, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis consists of two independent studies. The first study works on the effect of government regulation on financial markets. The second study analyses the multitask nature of government regulation in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime. The first study examines the influences of the 1934 US Securities and Exchange Act on stock markets. The Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933/1934 are the first nationwide public laws of financial regulation in the world. By imposing mandatory information disclosure requirements, these laws are implemented with the aims of reducing speculation and manipulation of stock prices. Subsequent financial regulations all over the world follow the principles embedded in these two laws. However, 80 years later, the effects of these laws on financial markets are still under debate and continue to have deep implications on law and financial development at a global scale. In this study I examine the impact of the 1934 Act in reducing stock idiosyncratic volatility. Monthly firm-level idiosyncratic volatility series for NYSE/AMEX listed firms in the period of 1926 - 1970 are constructed from daily CRSP stock data; voluntary disclosed accounting data from "Moody''s Manual of Investments 1934" are manually collected as a proxy of firms'' disclosure quality before the law. The comparisons of the firm-level idiosyncratic volatilities before and after the enactment of the Acts show systematic evidence indicating that the Acts significantly reduce idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, the firms that disclose much less the key accounting information before the implementation of the Acts, have experienced more reductions in volatility and are thus more deeply affected by the Acts than others. In addition, these firms are associated with further reductions in bid-ask spreads and additional improvements in liquidity after the enactment of the Acts. My findings suggest that one of the mechanisms, through which the Acts affect the market, have been identified. The second study explores the governance structure of government in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime. The organizational form of Chinese central-local government is characterized by regionally decentralized authoritarianism (RDA) (Xu (2011)). This system is a combination of political centralization and economic regional decentralization. Political centralization implies that subnational officials'' careers are determined by their superiors instead of constituencies; regional decentralization indicates that subnational governments are empowered to engage in regional development. At the early stage of economic reform, economic growth became the most important task. By utilizing yardstick competition reward based on economic performance, China''s central government is successful in incentivizing local government officials to promote economic growth. However, unlike private enterprises, which concentrate on maximizing profits, government agencies are bound to pursue multiple goals. The multitask nature of government has become increasingly prominent and has created serious problems in China. By extending the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) multitask principal-agent model to a multitask-multiagent model, I explain under which conditions yardstick competition would fail in motivating local officials, and show that the optimal linear contract designed under a RDA regime is not capable of solving problems generat

Government Failure Versus Market Failure

Author : Clifford Winston
Publisher : Brookings Institution Press and AEI
Page : 152 pages
File Size : 24,83 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :

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When should government intervene in market activity? When is it best to let market forces simply take their natural course? How does existing empirical evidence about government performance inform those decisions? Brookings economist Clifford Winston uses these questions to frame a frank empirical assessment of government economic intervention in Government Failure vs.

Essays on Market Competition with New Entrants

Author : Kaida Zhang
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 12,94 MB
Release : 2022
Category :
ISBN :

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In this dissertation, I empirically investigate the changes in the market structure after new entrants, and how these changes affect the welfare of market participants. In Chapter 1, using records for public and charter schools in New York City, I empirically show that public schools adjusted after charter schools entered the neighborhood. I construct a school-specific curriculum index from textual data to look into changes not only in vertical school quality but also in horizontal curriculum differentiation. One difficulty in studying charter school spillover effects is the concern on endogenous charter school locations. The research design leverages the co-location policy in NYC to overcome this concern. The co-location policy allows charter schools to share the building with public schools and therefore facilitates the entry of charter schools, which exogenously shifts the probability of charter school entry in different neighborhoods since such excess capacity is not evenly distributed across the city. Instrumental variable regression shows that the public schools under charter school competition are more likely to increase their teaching quality, and also adjust their after-school activities to be more attractive to White and Asian families. In Chapter 2, I use a structural model to separately estimate the preference of students and the objectives of schools. Using the estimated model, I investigate the welfare effects of expanding charter school capacity, a hotly debated policy in NYC. Results show that the spillover effects are substantial and the heterogeneity is large. The welfare effects for Black and Hispanic students are large and positive for those who get enrolled in charter schools, but the indirect welfare effects induced by public school horizontal adjustments are negative for them and partially offset the gains from expanded charter school enrollments. For White and Asian students, the direct welfare effects are small, but the overall welfare increases due to positive spillover effects. Overall, the expansion of charter schools has positive spillover effects, but some groups with disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds may have welfare loss. In Chapter 3, I quantify the effects of automobile franchising laws on US automobile dealer networks. I show that the US brand automobile manufacturers would like to have a smaller dealer network in absence of regulations. Building up the moment inequality approach, I estimate a static entry model with unobservable firm and market heterogeneity, where US automobile manufacturers are restricted in closing dealers. The counterfactual results show that US manufacturers would like to close about 28% of existing dealers if they are not restricted by government regulations.

Author :
Publisher : Soffer Publishing
Page : 117 pages
File Size : 32,50 MB
Release :
Category :
ISBN :

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Handbook of Production Economics

Author : Subhash C. Ray
Publisher : Springer Nature
Page : 1797 pages
File Size : 44,52 MB
Release : 2022-06-02
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9811034559

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This three-volume handbook includes state-of-the-art surveys in different areas of neoclassical production economics. Volumes 1 and 2 cover theoretical and methodological issues only. Volume 3 includes surveys of empirical applications in different areas like manufacturing, agriculture, banking, energy and environment, and so forth.

The Antitrust Paradox

Author : Robert Bork
Publisher :
Page : 536 pages
File Size : 39,60 MB
Release : 2021-02-22
Category :
ISBN : 9781736089712

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The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.