[PDF] Determinants Of Democracy eBook

Author : Jan Teorell
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 221 pages
File Size : 50,13 MB
Release : 2010-10-28
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1139492519

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What are the determinants of democratization? Do the factors that move countries toward democracy also help them refrain from backsliding toward autocracy? This book attempts to answer these questions through a combination of a statistical analysis of social, economic, and international determinants of regime change in 165 countries around the world in 1972–2006, and case study work on nine episodes of democratization occurring in Argentina, Bolivia, Hungary, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay. The findings suggest that democracy is promoted by long-term structural forces such as economic prosperity, but also by peaceful popular uprisings and the institutional setup of authoritarian regimes. In the short-run, however, elite actors may play a key role, particularly through the importance of intra-regime splits. Jan Teorell argues that these results have important repercussions both for current theories of democratization and for the international community's effort in developing policies for democracy promotion.

Author : Stephan Haggard
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 418 pages
File Size : 26,84 MB
Release : 2016-09-06
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0691172153

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A rigorous and comprehensive account of recent democratic transitions around the world From the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, the spread of democracy across the developing and post-Communist worlds transformed the global political landscape. What drove these changes and what determined whether the emerging democracies would stabilize or revert to authoritarian rule? Dictators and Democrats takes a comprehensive look at the transitions to and from democracy in recent decades. Deploying both statistical and qualitative analysis, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman engage with theories of democratic change and advocate approaches that emphasize political and institutional factors. While inequality has been a prominent explanation for democratic transitions, the authors argue that its role has been limited, and elites as well as masses can drive regime change. Examining seventy-eight cases of democratic transition and twenty-five reversions since 1980, Haggard and Kaufman show how differences in authoritarian regimes and organizational capabilities shape popular protest and elite initiatives in transitions to democracy, and how institutional weaknesses cause some democracies to fail. The determinants of democracy lie in the strength of existing institutions and the public's capacity to engage in collective action. There are multiple routes to democracy, but those growing out of mass mobilization may provide more checks on incumbents than those emerging from intra-elite bargains. Moving beyond well-known beliefs regarding regime changes, Dictators and Democrats explores the conditions under which transitions to democracy are likely to arise.

Author : Yi Feng
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 408 pages
File Size : 37,49 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780262562119

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A theoretical and empirical examination of why political institutions and organizations matter in economic growth.

Author : Daron Acemoglu
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 444 pages
File Size : 46,86 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780521855266

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This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

Author : Robert J. Barro
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 164 pages
File Size : 10,42 MB
Release : 1997
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780262522540

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Summarizes recent research from hundreds of empirical studies on economic growth across countries that have highlighted the correlation between growth and a variety of variables.

Author : Jonas Wolff
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 312 pages
File Size : 47,79 MB
Release : 2013-09-11
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1134509553

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Though scholarly attention to democracy promotion is increasing, there is still little comparative and theoretically-based work on the protagonists of democracy promotion. This book investigates the motives that drive democracy promotion in a comparative and theoretically oriented manner, exploring how democracy promoters deal with conflicting objectives and the factors that shape their behaviour. It also addresses the more policy-oriented debate on the contemporary challenges to democracy promotion, focusing on US and German policies towards three kinds of challenges: the emergence of ‘radical’ leftist governments in Bolivia and Ecuador, the political rise of Islamist movements in Turkey and Pakistan, and the consolidation of (semi-)authoritarian rule in Belarus and Russia. In each case, North-Western democracy promoters have been confronted with serious conflicts of objectives between security, economic interests and democracy promotion. The analysis and comparison of such situations in which democracy promoters have to deal with competing objectives and make tough decisions provides powerful evidence as to the factors that shape democracy promotion. The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, comparative politics, democratization studies and foreign policy.

Author : Michael Albertus
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 326 pages
File Size : 26,48 MB
Release : 2018-01-25
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 110819642X

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This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.

Author : Daron Acemoglu
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 15,23 MB
Release : 2011
Category :
ISBN :

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In this paper we revisit the central finding in Comparative politics that the greater the per-capita income of a country, the more likely it is to be democratic. We argue that the existing empirical literature fails to treat seriously the fact that income and democracy are jointly determined in a political-economic equilibrium. Based on our previous research we argue that whether or not a country is democratic and whether or not it is prosperous depends on its underlying institutions. We first show that once you control for country-specific variation in institutions using fixed effects income per-capita never plays a role in determining democracy. This finding is robust to different estimation techniques, covariates, and sample. We then try to directly control for institutions by using historical data from former European colonies. This restriction is motivated by the fact that we have exogenous sources of institutional variation for this sub-set of countries. We show that when we use these variables to control for the historical creation of institutions (age of country, population density in 1500, and a measure of institutions at the date of independence) they have statistically indistinguishable effects rom the results with fixed effect. The main conclusion is that we find no evidence that income causes democracy. Rather, different countries move onto different development paths as the results of critical junctures and historical circumstances (such as European colonialism). Different paths are supported by different sets of institutions and the nexus of institutions that promotes prosperity simultaneously tends to lead to democracy.