[PDF] Combinatorial Auctions eBook

Author : Peter C. Cramton
Publisher : MIT Press (MA)
Page : 678 pages
File Size : 40,10 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :

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A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

Author : Peter Cramton
Publisher :
Page : 671 pages
File Size : 35,81 MB
Release : 2010
Category :
ISBN : 9780262302920

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A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

Author : Martin Bichler
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 935 pages
File Size : 11,96 MB
Release : 2017-10-26
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1107135346

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An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Author : Klaus Jansen
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 280 pages
File Size : 37,72 MB
Release : 2002-09-02
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3540441867

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, APPROX 2002, held in Rome, Italy in September 2002. The 20 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 54 submissions. Among the topics addressed are design and analysis of approximation algorithms, inapproximability results, online problems, randomization techniques, average-case analysis, approximation classes, scheduling problems, routing and flow problems, coloring and partitioning, cuts and connectivity, packing and covering, geometric problems, network design, and applications to game theory and other fields.

Author : Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 396 pages
File Size : 44,81 MB
Release : 2004-01-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780521536721

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Table of contents

Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Academic Press
Page : 337 pages
File Size : 49,30 MB
Release : 2009-09-28
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0080922937

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Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Author : Paul Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 378 pages
File Size : 10,56 MB
Release : 2004-01-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1139449168

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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.