[PDF] Coalitional Rationality And Efficient Coalition Formation eBook

Author : Debraj Ray
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 336 pages
File Size : 38,6 MB
Release : 2007-11
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 019920795X

GET BOOK

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Author : Licun Xue
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 21,62 MB
Release : 1998
Category :
ISBN :

GET BOOK

We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions that are likely to form and the "stable" outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted) players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.

Author : H.A.M. Wilke
Publisher : Elsevier
Page : 305 pages
File Size : 44,3 MB
Release : 2000-04-01
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 0080866786

GET BOOK

A comprehensive view of coalition formation is presented here. Each of the chapters gives a summary of theories and research findings in a specific field of interest, at various levels of human and primate organisation.

Author : Georgios Chalkiadakis
Publisher : Morgan & Claypool Publishers
Page : 170 pages
File Size : 26,66 MB
Release : 2011-10-01
Category : Computers
ISBN : 1608456536

GET BOOK

Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.