[PDF] Are Efficiency Wages Efficient eBook

Author : George A. Akerlof
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 196 pages
File Size : 17,79 MB
Release : 1986-11-28
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780521312844

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The contributors explore the reasons why involuntary unemployment happens when supply equals demand.

Author : Fouad Sabry
Publisher : One Billion Knowledgeable
Page : 301 pages
File Size : 13,53 MB
Release : 2024-02-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :

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What is Efficiency Wage The term efficiency wages was introduced by Alfred Marshall to denote the wage per efficiency unit of labor. Marshallian efficiency wages are those calculated with efficiency or ability exerted being the unit of measure rather than time. That is, the more efficient worker will be paid more than a less efficient worker for the same amount of hours worked. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Efficiency wage Chapter 2: Labour economics Chapter 3: Minimum wage Chapter 4: New Keynesian economics Chapter 5: Phillips curve Chapter 6: Employment Chapter 7: Principal-agent problem Chapter 8: Personnel economics Chapter 9: Signalling (economics) Chapter 10: Labour market flexibility Chapter 11: Compensating differential Chapter 12: Insider-outsider theory of employment Chapter 13: Ekkehart Schlicht Chapter 14: Involuntary unemployment Chapter 15: Union wage premium Chapter 16: Monopsony Chapter 17: Rehn-Meidner model Chapter 18: Real rigidity Chapter 19: Wage compression Chapter 20: Shapiro-Stiglitz theory Chapter 21: Gift-exchange game (II) Answering the public top questions about efficiency wage. (III) Real world examples for the usage of efficiency wage in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Efficiency Wage.

Author : Jon Strand
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 31,90 MB
Release : 2003
Category :
ISBN :

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We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non-shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.