[PDF] A Political Economy Positive Roe Of The Social Security System In Sustaining Immigration eBook

Author : Edith Sand
Publisher :
Page : 56 pages
File Size : 46,95 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Emigration and immigration
ISBN :

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In the political-economy debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old, thus help sustaining the social security system. In addition, the median voter whose income derives from wages will wish to keep out the immigrants who will depress his/her wage. Therefore the decisive voter will keep migrants out. The paper addresses these two accepted propositions. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration to explore how migration policy and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined. The sub-game perfect Markov , depends on the different patterns of fertility rates among native born and migrants. Our analysis demonstrates that a social security system may change the first proposition significantly because the median voter may opt to bring in migrants to help him/her during retirement. As for the second proposition we get a significantly nuanced version. Not always immigration helps sustain the social security.

Author : Edith Sand
Publisher :
Page : 44 pages
File Size : 45,80 MB
Release : 2010
Category :
ISBN :

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In the political-economy debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old, thus help sustaining the social security system. In addition, the median voter whose income derives from wages will wish to keep out the immigrants who will depress his/her wage. Therefore the decisive voter will keep migrants out. The paper addresses these two accepted propositions. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration to explore how migration policy and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined. The sub-game perfect Markov , depends on the different patterns of fertility rates among native born and migrants. Our analysis demonstrates that a social security system may change the first proposition significantly because the median voter may opt to bring in migrants to help him/her during retirement. As for the second proposition we get a significantly nuanced version. Not always immigration helps sustain the social security.

Author : Edith Sand
Publisher :
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 30,71 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Emigration and immigration
ISBN :

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In the political debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old. The paper explores this idea in a dynamic political-economy setup. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration. We characterize sub-game perfect Markov equilibria where immigration policy and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined through a majority voting process. The main feature of the model is that immigrants are desirable for the sustainability of the social security system because the political system is able to manipulate the ratio of old to young and thereby the coalition which supports future high social security benefits. We demonstrate that the older is the native born population the more likely is that the immigration policy is liberalized and the social security system survives

Author : Edith Sand
Publisher :
Page : 39 pages
File Size : 35,63 MB
Release : 2010
Category :
ISBN :

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In the political debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old. The paper explores this idea in a dynamic political-economy setup. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration. We characterize sub-game perfect Markov equilibria where immigration policy and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined through a majority voting process. The main feature of the model is that immigrants are desirable for the sustainability of the social security system because the political system is able to manipulate the ratio of old to young and thereby the coalition which supports future high social security benefits. We demonstrate that the older is the native born population the more likely is that the immigration policy is liberalized and the social security system survives.

Author : Assaf Razin
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 23,96 MB
Release : 2009
Category : Emigration and immigration
ISBN :

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The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favor of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism.

Author : Henry J. Aaron
Publisher : Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution
Page : 104 pages
File Size : 45,85 MB
Release : 1982
Category : Political Science
ISBN :

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Research report evaluating economic implications of social security in the USA - discusses three competing economic theories on people's economic decision making, namely the life-cycle, multigeneration and short-horizon models, outlines historical trends and the impact of social security on saving, labour supply and long term income distribution. Graphs and references.